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INTRODUCTION 
In the nearly thirty years since the Constitution of the Republic of 
Palau went into effect, the constitutional jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court of Palau has grown to such a quantum that it now primarily refers to 
its own case law without the need to look to other jurisdictions for 
guidance.  Collection and analysis of these cases is therefore appropriate, 
if not overdue.  This article collects and reviews cases interpreting and 
applying the Palau Constitution through the sixteenth anniversary of 
Palau‘s independence (October 1, 2010).  It focuses on the provisions of 
the Constitution that most directly affect the people:  citizenship, suffrage, 
right to due process, equal protection of the laws, criminal procedure 
rights, and the like.  Some higher-level issues (such as the designation of 
territory and states and the roles granted to traditional leaders) are 
included as well, but the focus of this paper is on individual rights and 
liberties. 
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Although by no means a history text, a small dose of history and 
geography is helpful to place the following analysis in context.  The 
Republic of Palau, an independent country, comprises an archipelago of 
nearly 300 islands at the western end of Micronesia, approximately 
situated between Guam and the Philippines.  After a history of relative 
isolation, Palau entered the colonial era in 1886 under Spanish (and then 
German) control before emerging from World War I as a Japanese 
possession.  After its liberation (or, to some, capture) by Allied forces, the 
United Nations took control of Palau in the wake of World War II. 
In 1947, the United Nations and the United States signed the 
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands.  This 
agreement assigned to the United States the administering authority over 
Palau and the other Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands.  While still a 
Trust Territory, Palau‘s Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1981.  
After Palau and the United States agreed on a Compact of Free 
Association, Palau gained its full independence on October 1, 1994 when 
the United Nations terminated its trusteeship. 
Even a cursory review of the Palau Constitution reveals that it was 
modeled—with some noteworthy departures—on the United States 
Constitution.  The Palau Constitution splits the government into three 
branches and enumerates rights and liberties of the people of Palau.  Since 
its enactment in 1981 it has been altered by twenty-seven amendments.  
Aside from the text of the Constitution, the constitutional decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Palau are the most significant guideposts setting forth 
the meaning of the Constitution.  This article analyzes the Supreme Court 
of Palau‘s case law interpreting the Constitution to discern the extent—and 
limitations—of the rights and liberties granted by the Constitution. 
 
I. SUPREMACY AND AUTHORITY OF THE PALAU CONSTITUTION 
A. Supremacy of the National Constitution 
As stated by its own text:  ―This Constitution is the supreme law of 
the land.‖1  Or, in the words of Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) 
Ngiraklsong, ―I see the Constitution as perhaps the best living expression 
of what the people of Palau want.‖2  Before Palau‘s independence in 1994, 
                                                 
1
 ROP CONST. Art. II, § 1.  The Constitution is published in both Palauan and in 
English.  Although both are ―equally authoritative[,] in case of conflict, the Palauan 
version shall prevail.‖  ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 2 & amend. 25.  Prior to the enactment 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 2008, this section directed that in cases of conflict the 
English version of the Constitution prevailed. 
2
 ROP v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 275 (1991) (Ngiraklsong, J., concurring) 
(writing separately to emphasize that the Palau Constitution sets forth the supreme law of 
the land).  Citations to the opinions of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of 
Palau are styled ―__ ROP __ (year)‖ or ―__ ROP Intrm. __ (year),‖ while citations to the 
Trial Division of the same court will include the designation ―Trial Div.‖ within the 
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it was a Trust Territory of the United Nations administered by the United 
States.  As such, a Trusteeship Agreement between the United Nations and 
the United States governed its administration.  However, the Palau 
Constitution went into effect in 1981, creating a period of overlap between 
the Constitution and the Trusteeship Agreement.  Justice Ngiraklsong 
stated that no conflict could be found between the Constitution and the 
Trusteeship Agreement because the primary purpose of the Trusteeship 
Agreement was to provide self-governance to the people of Palau and the 
Constitution is the best expression of the Palauan people‘s self-
governance.
3
  Justice Ngiraklsong confirmed that the Constitution‘s self-
declared ―supremacy‖ in Article II, Section 1 was to be respected by the 
courts even in cases of conflict with the Trusteeship Agreement.
4
 
Although Article II, Section 1 clearly sets forth the ―supremacy‖ of 
the national Constitution, Section 2 of that article spells out some of the 
Constitution‘s subordinates:  ―Any law, act of government, or agreement 
to which a government of Palau is a party, shall not conflict with this 
Constitution and shall be invalid to the extent of such conflict.‖5  Statutes, 
treaties, or state constitutions that conflict with the Constitution may be 
found void to the extent of the conflict under either Section 1 or Section 2 
of Article II.
6
 
Conflicts between legislation and the Constitution must be 
resolved in favor of the Constitution.
7
  Justice Hefner found national 
legislation void for unconstitutionality because it capped the residency 
                                                                                                                         
parenthetical as well as a parenthetical identifying the Justice who issued the opinion.  
Citations to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court are to the Supreme Court 
Reporter, as it is the only such reporter available in Palau. 
3
 See id. 
4
 Id. at 276 (―I accept and recognize, as I believe we must, the supremacy of the 
Palau Constitution.‖). 
5
 ROP CONST. Art. II, § 2. 
6
 Although Article II is entitled ―Sovereignty and Supremacy,‖ none of the 
sections of Article II grants sovereignty to Palau.  Sovereignty is granted to the Republic 
in the amended Article I, Section 1 (―The Republic of Palau shall have jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over its territory . . . ‖) as it was in the original form of that section.  For 
more discussion of this constitutional provision, see Section II.A, infra. 
A criminal defendant picked up on the lack of discussion of sovereignty in 
Article II and argued that Article II forbids sovereign immunity (as codified in 14 PNC § 
502(e)) because the text of the Article fails to mention it.  See Tell v. Rengiil, 4 ROP 
Intrm. 224, 227 (1994).  The Court was nonplussed, stating that the failure to mention 
sovereign immunity in Article II (or elsewhere in the Constitution) does not diminish the 
existence of sovereign immunity, a privilege inherent to sovereign governments.  See id. 
7
 See Mechol v. Soalablai, 1 ROP Intrm. 62, 63 (Trial Div. 1982) (Hefner, J.) (―It 
is further not subject to argument that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and 
prevails over any statutes passed by the Olbiil Era Kelulau.‖), (citing ROP CONST. Art. II, 
§ 1). 
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requirement that a state could impose for voting in a state election at fifty 
days, whereas Article VII of the Constitution grants states full autonomy 
to set length of residency requirements for voting in state elections.
8
 
Similarly, the Constitution trumps municipal ordinances, as 
explained by Chief Justice Nakamura in Silmai v. Magistrate of Ngardmau 
Municipality.
9
  The ordinance at issue in Silmai granted a seat on the 
Municipal Council of Ngardmau State to the representative(s) of 
Ngardmau to the Olbiil Era Kelulau.
10
  That portion of the ordinance was 
voided for its conflict with Article IX, Section 10 of the Constitution, 
which prohibits members of the Olbiil Era Kelulau from holding other 
public offices or otherwise engaging in public employment during their 
tenure in the national legislature.
11
  Chief Justice Nakamura further found 
that the Presiding Judge of the Community Court could not be seated on 
the Municipal Council of Ngardmau State (as was provided for by 
ordinance) because the establishment of the constitutional courts pursuant 
to Article X of the Constitution did not provide for community courts.
12
  
Therefore, community courts were repealed by implication on December 
23, 1981 (the date of the establishment of the constitutional court system) 
pursuant to Article XV, Section 3(a) of the Constitution.
13
 
A conflict between the national Constitution and a state law is also 
decided in favor of the national Constitution.  Chief Justice Ngiraklsong 
found that an Airai State law prohibiting the use of eminent domain power 
only when the expropriated land is used ―for the sole benefit of a foreign 
entity‖ (emphasis added) was invalid to the extent that it attempted to 
grant a broader eminent domain power to the state than was provided for 
in Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution (which provides that the 
eminent domain power ―shall not be used for the benefit of a foreign 
entity‖).14 
B. Delegation of Governmental Powers Including Authority Over 
Harmful Substances 
Article II, Section 3 permits the Republic to delegate ―major 
governmental powers‖ to another sovereign nation or international 
organization.  Such ―major governmental powers‖ include national 
                                                 
8
 See id. 
9
 See Silmai v. Magistrate of Ngardmau Municipality, 1 ROP Intrm. 47, 51 (Trial 
Div. 1982) (Nakamura, C.J.). 
10
 See id.  The Olbiil Era Kelulau is the national legislature of Palau. 
11
 See id. 
12
 See id. at 51-52. 
13
 See id. at 52. 
14
 See Airai State Gov’t v. Ngkekiil Clan, 11 ROP 261, 262 n.1 (Trial Div. 2004) 
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.). 
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security and foreign affairs.  Delegation of major governmental powers 
requires the approval of a two-thirds majority of the legislature and a 
simple majority of the citizens in a nation-wide referendum.  The wrinkle 
in Section 3 is that a super-majority vote of three-fourths of the citizens 
voting in a nation-wide referendum is required to approve any such 
agreement ―which authorizes use, testing, storage, or disposal or nuclear, 
toxic chemical, gas or biological weapons intended for use in warfare.‖15 
As the capstone to what Justice Hefner referred to as the ―long 
road the Palauan people have taken to determine their future political 
destiny,‖ Palau and the United States entered into a Compact of Free 
Association on August 26, 1982.
16
  Part of the Compact of Free 
Association would permit the United States to store nuclear, chemical, or 
biological materials within Palau‘s territory, thus requiring approval by 
75% of the popular votes. 
The proposed wording on the referendum ballot sought a ―yes‖ or 
―no‖ response to the question:  ―Do you approve the agreement under 
Section 314 of the Compact which places restrictions and conditions on 
the United States with respect to radioactive, chemical and biological 
materials?‖17  Justice Hefner found this language to be misleading, as it 
could be understood to mean that a ―yes‖ vote would place greater 
restrictions on the storage of such prohibited materials while in reality a 
―no‖ vote would maintain the Constitution‘s total prohibition.18  The Court 
ordered that the ballots be re-worded to more clearly set forth the issues 
for the voting public.
19
 
The issue persisted before Justice Hefner in Gibbons v. Remeliik.
20
  
The result of the referendum was a 53% ―yes‖ vote to the question, ―Do 
you approve of the Agreement concerning radioactive, chemical and 
biological materials pursuant to Section 314 of the Compact of Free 
Association?‖21  The vote fell short of the 75% affirmative vote required 
                                                 
15
 Similarly, Article XIII, Section 6 provides: 
Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological 
weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste 
materials therefrom, shall not be used, tested, stored, or disposed of 
within the territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval 
of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a referendum 
submitted on this specific question. 
ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 6. 
16
 See Koshiba v. Remeliik, 1 ROP Intrm. 65, 65 (Trial Div. 1983) (Hefner, J.). 
17
 Id. at 67. 
18
 See id. 
19
 See id. at 75-76. 
20
 Gibbons v. Remeliik, 1 ROP Intrm. 80 (Trial Div. 1983) (Hefner, J.). 
21
 See id. at 80-81. 
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by Article II, Section 3.  The specific issue before the Court in Gibbons 
was whether the ―harmful substances‖ provision was severable from the 
greater Compact, and therefore whether the Compact had been passed 
minus that provision.
22
  Justice Hefner ruled that the referendum had been 
split into two questions (one regarding the Compact as a whole and one 
regarding the harmful substances provision specifically) only to comply 
with the requirement in Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution, 
requiring that a referendum be held on the ―specific question‖ of harmful 
substances.
23
  Therefore, the rejection of the harmful substances provision 
meant that the larger Compact of Free Association had been rejected as 
well.
24
 
Approval of the Compact again came to the Court after the third 
referendum failed to garner 75% voter approval.
25
  The second referendum 
garnered a 67% approval vote and the third a 72.19% approval vote.
26
  
After the third referendum, the Compact was sent to the United States 
Congress for consideration (despite its failure to muster the requisite votes 
in Palau).
27
  The Gibbons v. Salii plaintiff sued for declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief, alleging that the Compact conflicted with Article II, 
Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6 of the Constitution by permitting the 
United States (or its designees) to bring nuclear substances (including 
nuclear weapons and nuclear-propelled ships and aircraft) into Palau‘s 
territory without first obtaining the constitutionally-required 75% voter 
approval.
28
  The plaintiff also complained that the Compact defined 
Palau‘s territory as smaller than the constitutionally-defined territory, thus 
permitting unchecked nuclear activity by the United States in the area not 
included in the Compact.
29
 
The Appellate Division, per Chief Justice Nakamura, traced the 
history of the constitutional prohibitions against nuclear materials in 
Palau.
30
  The enacted Constitution was the result of the third constitutional 
plebiscite, after the second constitutional plebiscite only garnered 31% 
support for the proposed constitution.
31
  That second proposed constitution 
                                                 
22
 See id. at 81. 
23
 See id. 
24
 See id. at 82. 
25
 See Gibbons v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 333 (1986). 
26
 See id. at 334 and n.1. 
27
 See id. at 335. 
28
 See id. 
29
 See id. 
30
 See id. at 339-44. 
31
 See id. at 343-44. 
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included language permitting an exception for the ―transit and port visits 
of ships, and transit and overflight of aircraft‖ from the nuclear-materials 
ban.
32
  The third draft constitution deleted this exception for nuclear craft 
in transit, but was otherwise substantially similar to the second draft 
constitution.  It was that third draft constitution that was approved by 78% 
of the voters on July 9, 1980 and went into effect as the Constitution on 
January 1, 1981.
33
  Drawing reasonable inferences from this 
constitutional-drafting history, the Court found that ―use‖ and ―store‖ in 
Article II, Section 3 included the operation of nuclear vessels as 
contemplated by the Compact.
34
  Going further, the Court stated, ―[W]e 
hold that the four verbs, ‗use, test, store or dispose of,‘ in the nuclear 
control provisions were meant to be a brief summation of all that could 
possibly be done with nuclear substances—in short, a general prohibition 
against the introduction of nuclear substances in Palau.‖35  Because the 
third Compact referendum only received 72.19% of the vote, the Compact, 
with its provisions permitting the United States to operate nuclear-capable 
vessels within Palau‘s territory, was not effective.36 
The Court‘s interpretation in Gibbons v. Salii that the prohibition 
against ―use, testing, storage, or disposal of‖ harmful substances in the 
nuclear-control provisions of the Constitution is, in actuality, a prohibition 
against anything that could possibly be done with those substances.  While 
expansive, this interpretation seems to comport with the rationale behind 
the nuclear-control provisions.  And, given the amount of litigation 
surrounding the issue, it was likely an attempt by the Court to cut off even 
more protracted litigation and settle the issue at once, rather than reach the 
same conclusion on an ad hoc basis. 
The issue again came before the Appellate Division after a 
referendum to amend the Constitution to suspend the nuclear-control 
provisions (Article II, Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6) of the 
Constitution insofar as they applied to the Compact.
37
  The Court found 
that, because the negotiated Compact was inconsistent with the nuclear-
control provisions, amendment of the Constitution was possible through 
                                                 
32
 See id. at 343, n.8. 
33
 See id. at 344. 
34
 See id. at 348. 
35
 Id. at 348. 
36
 See id. at 351.  The Court did not find a constitutional problem with the 
Compact‘s diminutive territorial definition of Palau because the Compact did not define 
the area to which it applied; therefore, the Court found that the Compact limitations 
applied no matter where the United States attempted to exercise its authority.  See id. at 
350-51. 
37
 See Fritz v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 521, 522 (1988). 
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the mechanism laid out in Article XV, Section 11.
38
  Article XV, Section 11 
permits amendment of the Constitution to avoid conflict with the Compact 
by a simple majority of voters in at least three-fourths of the states.
39
  The 
First Amendment to the Constitution was written and enacted specifically 
to avoid inconsistencies between the Compact and the nuclear-control 
provisions of Article II, Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6. 
The Court again reviewed the constitutionality of the Compact in 
Wong v. Nakamura.
40
  The challenge in Wong was that the national 
legislature needed to vote again (and reach a two-thirds majority approval 
under Article II, Section 3) before Palau could enter into the Compact.
41
  
The appellants argued that the Compact had been altered since the 
legislature had approved it in 1986, but the Court found that the legislature 
had approved the Compact again in 1993 after the alterations.
42
 
Although permitting approval of the Compact with its nuclear 
provisions with less than three-fourths popular approval seems an end-
round around Article II, Section 3 and Article XIII, Section 6, the 
Constitution does permit such amendment, either by the Compact-specific 
amendment provision in Article XV, Section 11 or the general amendment 
provision in Article XIV.
43
  Whenever a constitutional amendment can be 
effected by a lesser majority than a different limitation in the constitution, 
that limitation is effectively reduced to only requiring the majority needed 
for amendment.
44
  Although the result may have been an oversight in 
                                                 
38
 See id. at 534. 
39
 Article XV, Section 11 states: 
Any amendment to this Constitution proposed for the purpose of 
avoiding inconsistency with the Compact of Free Association shall 
require approval by a majority of the votes cast on that amendment and 
in not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the states.  Such amendment shall 
remain in effect only as long as the inconsistency continues. 
ROP CONST. Art. XV, § 11. 
40
 Wong v. Nakamura, 4 ROP Intrm. 243 (1994). 
41
 Id. at 244-45. 
42
 See id. at 245. 
43
 Article XIV, Sections 2 and 3 (as amended by the 15th Amendment in 2008) 
provide the general mechanism for amendments to the Constitution:  a majority vote 
(including a majority in at least three-fourths of the states) is necessary to approve a 
proposed amendment, but a special election on a proposed amendment cannot be held 
either six months before or after a general election.  The pre-amendment text of Article 
XIV, Section 2 required the vote on the proposed amendment to take place only on the 
next regularly-scheduled general election. 
44
 For instance, consider a constitution that requires three-fourths popular 
approval to levy a certain tax, but only requires one-half popular approval to amend the 
constitution.  The tax could be levied by a simple majority, because a simple majority 
could amend the constitution and nullify the three-fourths approval provision. 
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constitutional drafting (or perhaps not), the Court was bound to apply the 
Constitution as written.  The First Amendment therefore effectively 
removed the three-fourths popular vote requirement on the harmful 
substances provision of the Compact and paved the way for its approval. 
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II. TERRITORY AND LANGUAGE 
A. Territory of Palau 
The Constitution begins, in Section 1 of Article 1, with a definition 
of Palau‘s territorial boundaries and the declaration that Palau shall have 
―jurisdiction and sovereignty‖ over its territory.45  Palau‘s territorial 
boundaries, as described in Section 1, were changed by the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment in 2008.  This amendment split Section 1 into two sections 
and redefined the archipelagic baselines that dictate the boundaries of 
Palau‘s maritime zones.46 
Section 2(a) of Article I (added by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment) 
grants the Republic the exclusive ownership of all living and non-living 
resources within its exclusive economic zone and mandates that the 
Republic shall exercise its sovereign rights ―to conserve, develop, exploit, 
and manage at a sustainable manner‖ those resources in accordance with 
its treaties, international law, and practices.
47
  When read literally, this 
clause destroys private property rights in Palau, instead deeding all 
―resources‖ to the national government.  The more realistic meaning of 
this clause is that Palau—and no other foreign nation—lays claim to the 
resources within its territorial boundaries to the extent that those resources 
are not otherwise owned by private parties. 
Palau is divided into sixteen states.  Article I, Section 2(b) provides 
that each state has ―exclusive ownership of all living and non-living 
resources, except highly migratory fish, within the twelve (12) nautical 
mile territorial sea, provided, however, that traditional fishing rights and 
practices shall not be impaired.‖48  Justice Beattie applied the pre-
amendment version of this section
49
 to find that Koror State was the owner 
                                                 
45
 ROP CONST. Art. I, § 1. 
46
 In the only reported case to analyze section 1, a criminal defendant argued 
that, given the territorial definition in (pre-amendment) Article I, Section 1, the Airai 
International Airport (which does not physically lie on Palau‘s ―border‖) is not a ―border‖ 
for purposes of the ―border search‖ exception to the warrant requirement.  See Republic 
of Palau v. Techur, 6 ROP Intrm. 340, 342 (Trial Div. 1997) (Michelsen, J.).  Citing 
American precedent, Justice Michelsen found that, for purposes the border search 
exception, the site of embarkation or disembarkation of passengers is the ―functional 
equivalent‖ of the border.  See id.  This finding seems sensible because, although the 
Constitution defines Palau‘s territory, the international airport is the functional ―border‖ 
for the majority of travelers to and from Palau (and the ―border search exception‖ 
could—and perhaps should—just as easily be called the ―functional border search 
exception‖).  For a constitutional criminal procedure analysis of Techur, see section 
VIII.B, infra. 
47
 ROP CONST. Art. I, § 2(a). 
48
 ROP CONST. Art. I, § 2(b). 
49
 Before the 2008 amendment, Article I, Section 2 granted each state exclusive 
ownership of all living and non-living resources (except highly migratory fish) ―from the 
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of a World War II Japanese Zero fighter plane (a ―non-living resource‖) 
sunk in the Palau Lagoon in Toribiong v. Gibbons.
50
  Koror State‘s 
contention was that, as the owner of the Zero, it could ―do what [it] 
please[d]‖ with the aircraft and therefore it did not have to comply with 
the provisions of the national Lagoon Monument Act (19 PNC § 301, et 
seq.) prohibiting interference with Japanese aircraft sunk in the Palau 
Lagoon without a permit from the President.
51
  The Court found that 
Koror State‘s ownership rights over the Zero were subject, to some extent, 
to the legislature‘s constitutional power, under Article IX, Section 5(12), to 
regulate the ownership, exploration, and exploitation of natural 
resources.
52
  The focus of the Court‘s inquiry, therefore, became to what 
extent the Olbiil Era Kelulau could regulate Koror State‘s use of its Zero 
before the regulation became a ―taking‖ requiring compensation pursuant 
to Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
53
  But, because Koror State 
had not been denied a permit by the President (or even applied for one), 
the Court put off deciding such a ―hypothetical question‖ for another 
day.
54
 
The Toribiong opinion dodged the greater tension:  Article I, 
Section 2 grants exclusive ownership rights to the states for all living and 
non-living resources within certain boundaries, but Article IX, Section 
5(12) grants the national legislature the power to regulate the ―ownership‖ 
of natural resources.  The former grant of ownership is in direct conflict 
with the latter grant of power over regulation of ownership.  Ownership 
power over natural resources should be granted either to the states or the 
national legislature, and the Constitution‘s contradictory grant to both 
creates an uneasy strain.
55
 
Section 3 of Article I grants to the national government the power 
―to add territory and to extend jurisdiction.‖56  Although this power is 
likely inherent in Article I, Section 1‘s grant of ―sovereignty and 
                                                                                                                         
land to twelve (12) nautical miles seaward from the traditional baselines.‖ 
50
 Toribiong v. Gibbons, 3 ROP Intrm. 419, 421 (Trial Div. 1993) (Beattie, J.). 
51
 See id. at 420. 
52
 See id. at 421. 
53
 See id. at 422. 
54
 See id. at 423-25. 
55
 This tension has been magnified by the 2008 addition of Article I, section 2(a) 
providing ―exclusive ownership‖ to the Republic over all resources within its exclusive 
economic zone and ―over all mineral resources in the seabed, subsoil, water column, and 
insular shelves within its continental shelf.‖  Since the amendment, however, the 
Appellate Division has cited Article I, Section 2 for the proposition that the states hold 
authority over the land below the high water mark.  See House of Traditional Leaders v. 
Koror State Gov’t, Civ. App. No. 09-004, slip op. at 9 (Feb. 10, 2010). 
56
 ROP CONST. Art. I, § 3. 
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jurisdiction‖ to Palau, Section 3 clarifies that state governments cannot 
expand their territory without national approval.  The final section of 
Article I states that nothing in Article I should be interpreted ―to violate 
the right of innocent passage and the internationally recognized freedom 
of the high seas.‖57 
B. Establishment of Permanent Capital 
The Constitution provides for continuation of the provisional 
capital of Koror, but mandates that the legislature shall designate a 
permanent capital in Babeldaob within ten years of the effective date of 
the Constitution (essentially, by 1991).
58
  The Constitution only required 
the ―designation‖ of a permanent capital within that time frame, not the 
actual establishment of one.  But the capital has since been established in 
Ngerulmud, Melekeok State (on the island of Babeldaob), so this 
provision provides little fodder for future dispute.  One remaining issue, 
however, is whether the constitutional designation of the capital as 
―permanent‖ means that it could never be moved, even to another location 
on Babeldaob. 
C. Official and National Languages 
Article XIII, Section 1 dubs Palauan and English the ―official 
languages‖ and the ―Palauan traditional languages‖ as the ―national 
languages.‖59  The national legislature is to dictate the appropriate use of 
each, and the Constitution does not indicate the relevance of these titles.
60
 
 
III. SPECIAL RIGHTS OF PALAUANS 
A. Citizenship 
The Constitution affords special rights to Palauan citizens.  Article 
III constrictively defines Palauan citizenship, although the requirements 
have become less stringent through amendments.  Citizens of the Trust 
Territory at the time of the adoption of the Constitution who had ―at least 
one parent of recognized Palauan ancestry‖ automatically became citizens 
of Palau per Section 1 of Article III.
61
 
                                                 
57
 ROP CONST. Art. I, § 4. 
58
 ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 11. 
59
 ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 1.  The traditional languages are not enumerated. 
60
 Citing the ―official language‖ status of Palauan and English, Justice Beattie 
denied a challenge to the ballots used in a presidential primary election based on the 
failure to translate the instructions into Japanese.  See Gibbons v. Republic of Palau, 5 
ROP Intrm. 353, 356 (Trial Div. 1996) (Beattie, J.). 
61
 ROP CONST. Art. III, § 1. 
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Section 4 of Article III, as modified in 2008 by the Seventeenth 
Amendment, states that a person born of at least one parent who is a 
citizen of Palau or ―of recognized Palauan ancestry‖ is a citizen of Palau.62  
The Seventeenth Amendment also repealed Sections 2 and 3 of Article III 
and rendered the Second Amendment a nullity by permitting unrestricted 
dual-citizenship with the statement that ―[c]itizenship of other foreign 
nations shall not affect a person‘s Palauan citizenship.‖63 
The original text of Section 2 provided that a person born of at 
least one Palauan citizen was a Palauan citizen by birth ―so long as the 
person is not or does not become a citizen of any other nation.‖64  The 
effect of Section 2 was then altered by the Second Amendment (enacted in 
2004).  Under this amendment, United States citizenship had no effect on 
Palauan citizenship and persons with recognized Palauan ancestry who 
were citizens of foreign nations could gain or retain Palauan citizenship.  
Section 3 provided that a person with dual Palauan and non-Palauan 
citizenship, who was under eighteen, must renounce her non-Palauan 
citizenship by her twenty-first birthday (or within three years of the 
effective date of the Constitution) or else be deprived of Palauan 
citizenship.
65
 
Before the Seventeenth Amendment, Section 4 allowed for 
citizenship through naturalization only by a person born to at least one 
parent of recognized Palauan ancestry (and on the condition that the 
naturalized citizen renounce all other foreign citizenships).  The 
Seventeenth Amendment struck all ―naturalization‖ language from Article 
III—no longer explicitly permitting it, but also no longer restricting the 
requirements for naturalization.  Therefore, citizenship by naturalization of 
persons not born to Palauan parents could be constitutionally 
implemented.
66
 
The Appellate Division applied the Constitution to conclude that 
the appellee was a Palauan citizen—and thus entitled to acquire title to 
land
67—in Ucherremasech v. Hiroichi.68  Because the appellee was born to 
parents of Japanese ancestry, she was ineligible for citizenship under the 
                                                 
62
 ROP CONST. Art. III, § 4 & amend. 17. 
63
 ROP CONST. amend. 17. 
64
 ROP CONST. Art. III, § 2. 
65
 Such divestment was found in Aguon v. Aguon, 5 ROP Intrm. 122, 128 (1995).  
Had the Second Amendment been enacted and applied in Aguon, no divestment of 
Palauan citizenship would have been found, as the non-Palauan citizenship at issue was 
United States citizenship. 
66
 Indeed, the legislature has the power to ―establish a uniform system of 
naturalization.‖  ROP CONST. Art. IX, § 5(4). 
67
 See section III.B, infra. 
68
 Ucherremasech v. Hiroichi, Civ. App. No. 09-009 (May 14, 2010). 
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original version of Article III, Section 2 or the Seventeenth Amendment.
69
  
The question then became whether the appellee, who was adopted at the 
age of eight by a Palauan couple in 1944, qualified as a citizen under 
Article III, Section 1. 
The Appellate Division found that an adoptive parent qualifies as a 
―parent‖ for the purposes of Article III, Section 1 because the plain 
meaning of the word ―parent‖ includes adoptive parents.70  Therefore, the 
appellee had ―at least one parent of recognized Palauan ancestry‖ as 
required by Article III, Section 1.  The Court found that the appellee 
satisfied Article III, Section 1‘s second requirement for citizenship (that 
she was a citizen of the Trust Territory immediately prior to the effective 
date of the Constitution) without analysis, because that point was not 
argued before the Trial Divisions and had, in fact, been admitted by the 
appellants.
71
 
Palauan citizenship brings with it certain ―special rights,‖ 
including the right to acquire land, to vote, to freely migrate, to certain 
health care benefits, and to complimentary primary and secondary 
education.  The equal protection clause also permits the ―preferential 
treatment of citizens‖ by the government.72 
B. Acquisition of Land 
Acquisition of Palauan land or water is limited to Palauan citizens 
(or corporations wholly-owned by Palauans) by Article XIII, Section 8.  It 
is important to note that this section does not prohibit ownership of land 
by non-Palauans, only acquisition.
73
  The ―affirmative obligation‖ to prove 
Palauan citizenship falls on the party claiming acquisition of land.
74
  
Inability to prove citizenship at the time of the acquisition voids the 
transfer.
75
  Regarding corporations, it is the citizenship of a corporation‘s 
owners, not its officers or directors that is pertinent for the constitutional 
inquiry.
76
 
                                                 
69
 See id., slip op. at 9. 
70
 See id. at 10-11. 
71
 See id. at 13-16. 
72
 See section VI, infra. 
73
 See Aguon v. Aguon, 5 ROP Intrm. 122, 127 (1995). 
74
 See Dalton v. Borja, 8 ROP Intrm. 302, 303 n.2 (2001). 
75
 See Diaz v. Estate of Ngirchorachel, 14 ROP 110, 111 (2007) (holding that a 
land transfer to a Palauan who had renounced his Palauan citizenship at the time of the 
transfer was void). 
76
 See Airai State Pub. Lands Auth. v. Seventh Day Adventist Mission, 12 ROP 
38, 42 (2004). 
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The bar against acquisition of land by non-Palauans extends to 
acquisitions via inheritance.
77
  Even if an inheritress becomes a Palauan 
citizen before the formal distribution of the estate, she will be barred from 
inheriting land if she was not yet a Palauan citizen at the time of the 
decedent‘s death.78 
Article XIII, Section 8 only limits land acquisition by non-
Palauans, and cannot be used to bar acquisition by someone who is a 
Palauan at the time of the acquisition.
79
  If a Palauan and a non-Palauan 
jointly seek to acquire Palauan land (e.g., as joint purchasers), the 
Appellate Division has stated that the acquisition by the Palauan would 
still be effective.
80
  Such an interpretation safeguards situations in which 
Palauan and non-Palauan spouses jointly purchase Palauan land, but non-
Palauans must be wary that entering into such joint tenancies will leave 
them with no legal claim to the land. 
The Nineteenth and Twentieth Amendments to the Constitution, 
enacted in 2008, added two caveats to Article XIII, Section 8.  First, 
―[f]oreign countries, with which Palau establishes diplomatic relations, 
may acquire title to land for diplomatic purposes pursuant to bilateral 
treaties or agreements.‖81  Second, non-citizen individuals or corporations 
may lease land in Palau for up to ninety-nine years.
82
  Although a lease by 
a non-citizen for 100 years or greater is not explicitly prohibited, the 
implication of these amendments is that such a lease would constitute a de 
facto ―acquisition‖ and therefore be rendered unconstitutional. 
                                                 
77
 See Tengadik v. King, Civ. App. No. 08-039, slip op. at 7 (Nov. 4, 2009) 
(―[W]e hold that the phrase ‗acquire title to land‘ in Article XIII, § 8 applies equally to 
inheritance and the distribution of a decedent‘s estate as it does to other methods by 
which one can acquire such title.‖). 
78
 Id. at 6.  Although land usually vests in an inheritor immediately upon the 
decedent‘s death, the land at issue in Tengadik was not determined to be owned by the 
decedent until nineteen years after his death.  Id. at 6-8.  Therefore some question 
surrounded whether the time of death or time of determination of ownership was the 
relevant date to test the would-be inheritress‘ citizenship.  See id.  But, because the 
would-be inheritress was not a Palauan citizen at either of those potentially relevant 
times, the Appellate Division deemed it unnecessary to determine which date controlled.  
See id. at 8. 
79
 See Anastacio v. Haruo, 8 ROP Intrm. 128, 129 (2000) (―Article XIII cannot 
be read to prevent a Palauan citizen from acquiring title to land in Palau.‖). 
80
 See id. (―If a conveyance of title to land were made to a Palauan citizen and a 
noncitizen as tenants in common, nothing in Article XIII, Section 8, would prevent the 
Palauan citizen from becoming vested with title.‖). 
81
 ROP CONST., amends. 19-20. 
82
 Id. 
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C. Voting Rights 
Although Article VII secures the right to vote ―to all eligible 
citizens of Palau‖ in state and national elections,83 it has also been read as 
a restriction barring non-citizens from voting in those same elections.
84
  
This right of citizens to vote, at least for ―key public officials at both the 
national and state governments,‖ is ―an essential democratic principle.‖85  
Beyond citizenship, the Constitution mandates several voter requirements, 
one of which is that voters must be at least eighteen years old.  The 
Constitution delegates the responsibility to prescribe a minimum period of 
residence and provide for voter registration to the national and state 
legislatures for their respective elections.
86
 
Article VII goes on to state that ―[a] citizen who is in prison, 
serving a sentence for a felony, or mentally incompetent as determined by 
a court may not vote.‖87  The language of the Constitution is ambiguous in 
this respect—are all prisoners prohibited from voting, or just those serving 
a sentence for a felony?  If ―in prison, serving a sentence for a felony‖ is 
only one category of prohibited voters, then those in prison serving 
misdemeanor sentences and those physically out of prison serving felony 
sentences (even if freed by an escape from Koror Jail) are constitutionally 
guaranteed the right to vote.  But if the article's language comprises two 
separate categories—all citizens ―in prison‖ as well as all citizens serving 
felony sentences—then the latter prohibition must include citizens serving 
felony sentences who are not in prison.  For instance, a person on parole or 
on probation is ―serving a sentence for a felony‖ but not ―in prison.‖  This 
latter reading is preferred—all prisoners, all persons serving felony 
sentences, and all judicially-determined mental incompetents are 
                                                 
83
 Olikong v. Salii, 1 ROP Intrm. 406, 412 (1987). 
84
 See Yano v. Kadoi, 3 ROP Intrm. 174, 184 (1992) (―Article VII of the Palau 
Constitution provides that only citizens of Palau can vote in Palauan state and national 
elections.‖). 
85
 Teriong v. Gov’t of State of Airai, 1 ROP Intrm. 664, 675 (1989). 
86
 This delegation has been read to impose a non-optional requirement on the 
states—each state ―shall‖ prescribe a minimum period of residence and provide for voter 
registration for state elections.  See Mechol v. Soalablai, 1 ROP Intrm. 62, 62-63 (Trial 
Div. 1982) (Hefner, J.). 
87
 ROP CONST. Art. VII. 
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prohibited from voting.
88
  Both the sentence structure and logic favors this 
approach, as does the statutory voter eligibility requirements.
89
 
In dicta, in Teriong v. Government of State of Airai, the Appellate 
Division stated that the only voter restrictions are that ―a person in prison 
serving a sentence for a felony, or one who has been declared mentally 
incompetent by a court is not eligible to vote.‖90  This interpretation 
breaks with the reading advocated above.  But the Court‘s recital of Article 
VII in Teriong omits the crucial comma after ―felony,‖91 an omission that 
may have poisoned the Court‘s entire interpretation of the clause. 
Article VII mandates the use of secret ballots in Palauan elections.  
The Eighteenth Amendment, enacted in 2008, added a provision to Article 
VII requiring the availability of voting by absentee ballot for voters who 
are outside of Palau during an election. 
D. Right of Migration 
Palauan citizens are guaranteed the right to ―enter and leave Palau‖ 
and ―migrate within Palau‖ by Article IV, Section 9.92  Non-citizens are 
relegated to the whims of the legislature by Article III, Section 5:  ―The 
Olbiil Era Kelulau shall adopt uniform laws for admission and exclusion 
of noncitizens of Palau.‖93 
The right to migrate has been judicially-interpreted only once, in 
King v. Republic of Palau, where a motorist was arrested for violating 
Koror State‘s curfew law.94  The curfew law made it ―unlawful for any 
person to be in any public area within the State of Koror‖ between 12:30 
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless their reason for being in the public place fit one 
of several enumerated exceptions (e.g., emergency, the seeking of medical 
attention, transport to or from work, a funeral, or fishing).
95
  The arresting 
                                                 
88
 A third reading, that only those voters who are both in prison and either 
serving a felony sentence or have been determined mentally incompetent are prohibited 
from voting, is not favored.  This reading would permit mentally incompetent citizens to 
vote as long as they are not in prison.  And offenders who have been judicially-
determined to be mentally incompetent would—hopefully—not be in prison, but rather 
be receiving treatment. 
89
 23 PNC § 1403 requires an applicant for voter registration to swear that she is 
―not currently under parole, probation, or sentence for any felony for which [she has] 
been convicted by any court of the Republic or any court within the jurisdiction of the 
United States‖ nor is she ―currently under a judgment of mental incompetency or 
insanity.‖ 
90
 Teriong v. Government of State of Airai, 1 ROP Intrm. 664, 675 (1989). 
91
 See id. at 674. 
92
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 9. 
93
 ROP CONST. Art. III, § 5. 
94
 King v. Republic of Palau, 6 ROP Intrm. 131, 132 (1997). 
95
 See id. at 132 n.2 (quoting Koror Public Law No. K1-25-88). 
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officer found ammunition in the defendant‘s pocket and a subsequent 
search of the automobile revealed a firearm under the driver‘s seat.96  The 
officer also found a matchbox on the defendant‘s person containing 
methamphetamine.
97
  The trial court suppressed the methamphetamine, 
but the defendant was found guilty of possession of a firearm and of 
possession of bullets.
98
  The curfew violation was apparently not 
prosecuted. 
The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the curfew law—
the original basis for the stop and arrest—as an impermissible restriction 
of his right to travel under Article IV, Section 9.
99
  The Court interpreted 
the right of citizens to migrate within Palau as protection from the 
government ordering a citizen to live in a certain place.
100
  The Court 
stated that the guarantee was not one of ―mobility and movement.‖101  
Because the Committee on Civil Liberties and Fundamental Rights of the 
Palau Constitutional Convention expressly stated that the police power of 
the state include the power to impose and enforce a curfew, the Court 
found the curfew law constitutional.
102
 
The interpretation of King is truly restrictive:  limiting the right to 
migrate to mean only that citizens cannot be order to live in a certain 
place.  Of course, on the other extreme, the right to migrate within Palau 
cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean that citizens are free to roam 
anywhere in the country at any time.  Such an interpretation would impede 
land ownership rights and security.  Given the confined scope of the issue, 
the King Court‘s constitutional interpretations of Article IV, Section 9 may 
have little application outside of the realm of curfew law. 
E. Non-Impairment of Contracts by Legislation 
The ―contracts clause‖ of Article IV, Section 6 guarantees that 
legislation shall not impair ―[c]ontracts to which a citizen is a party.‖103  
This safeguard has not been better defined in any reported opinion and its 
meaning is unclear.  Read broadly, any legislation (enacted by either a 
state or a national legislature) that harmed an already executed contract of 
                                                 
96
 See id. at 132. 
97
 See id. 
98
 See id. 
99
 See id. at 133. 
100
 See id.  The Court read the rest of the constitutional provision—the right of 
citizens to ―enter and leave Palau‖—to mean that the government could not ―arbitrarily 
deny a citizen the right to leave or enter the country.‖  See id. 
101
 Id. 
102
 See id. 
103
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 6. 
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a citizen would be unconstitutional.  Carried to an extreme, this clause 
could conceivably block many legislative enactments.  Until it is better-
defined through judicial interpretation its bounds are largely unknown.  
However, it is likely to be construed narrowly to avoid impinging on 
legislative enactments (which presumably benefit the public at large) in 
favor of private contracts (which presumably do not). 
F. Examination of Government Documents 
Another clause that, if read broadly (or even literally), could 
severely impact the functioning of the government is Article IV, Section 
12.  This section grants citizens the right ―to examine any government 
document and to observe the official deliberations of any agency of 
government.‖104  Pursuant to the literal language of this section, the 
Republic cannot keep any document secret from its citizens.  However, 
this section must have yet-to-be-defined narrower bounds, lest all personal 
information collected by the government, ongoing police investigations, 
judicial deliberations, and matters of national security be exposed at great 
detriment to the public at large.
105
 
G. Health Care and Education 
Article VI, ―Responsibilities of the National Government,‖ 
requires the national government to provide free or subsidized health care 
and free public education (from grades one through twelve) to citizens.
106
  
Article IV, Section 16, as added by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, 
mandates the free provision of preventive health care (as prescribed by 
law) by the national government.
107
 
                                                 
104
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 12. 
105
 The Trial Division declined to entertain an Article IV, Section 12 argument 
because it was not presented ―squarely‖ to the Court.  See Shell Co. v. Palau Pub. Utils. 
Corp., 15 ROP 158, 161 (Trial Div. 2008) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.).  But the lack of square 
presentation in Shell arose because the defendant failed to respond to the plaintiff‘s 
constitutional contentions in the plaintiff‘s application for a preliminary injunction.  See 
id.  The defendant was thus able to duck the issue by ignoring the argument in the 
plaintiff‘s filing. 
106
 ROP CONST. Art. VI. 
107
 For more on Article VI and the constitutional responsibilities of the national 
government, see section XVII, infra. 
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IV. FREEDOMS OF RELIGION, EXPRESSION AND ASSEMBLY 
A. Freedom of Religion 
The first three sections of Article IV secure important—although 
infrequently litigated—rights to the people of Palau.  Section 1 declares 
―freedom of religion‖ and prohibits the government from either 
compelling or hindering religious exercise.
108
  In a forward-thinking 
clause, Section 1 permits the government to provide assistance ―to private 
and parochial schools on a fair and equitable basis for nonreligious 
purposes.‖  Although the meanings of ―fair and equitable basis‖ and 
―nonreligious purposes‖ are open to debate, no reported opinion has yet to 
address these issues. 
B. Freedoms of Expression and Press 
Section 2 guarantees the ―freedom of expression‖ through absolute 
language as well as recognizing a reporter‘s privilege for ―bona fide‖ 
reporters.
109
  Although the language of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression is seemingly absolute, it has been narrowed (as it must) 
through interpretation. 
The Appellate Division contemplated the freedom of expression 
rights of governmental employees in April v. Palau Pub. Utils. Corp.: 
Although citizens do not generally have a right to public 
employment, it is impermissible for a public employer to 
force employees to surrender fundamental rights as a 
condition of their employment.  Otherwise public 
employers would be free to require their employees to vote 
for a certain candidate or join a certain religion.  At the 
same time, however, public employers must be afforded 
sufficient autonomy to oversee and reprimand their 
employees lest every grievance be elevated to a matter of 
constitutional proportions.
110
 
In April, the Appellate Division analyzed under what 
circumstances a governmental employer could reprimand its employees 
for employee expression.  The Court first found that the ―government must 
be free to oversee its employees without judicial interference when public 
employees speak as government agents.‖111  But, because the ―government 
no longer has the same level of self-interest in the employee‘s expression‖ 
                                                 
108
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 1. 
109
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 2. 
110
 April v. Palau Pub. Utils. Corp., Civ. App. No. 08-038, slip op. at 7 (Nov. 3, 
2009). 
111
 Id. at 8. 
2011] Bennardo  23  
when the employee speaks as a private citizen, some—but not all—private 
speech of public employees lies outside the bounds of employer 
oversight.
112
  The Court held that ―[a]bsent a powerful justification, 
punishing public employees for expressing themselves on issues of public 
concern—whether those issues relate to the public employer or not—
would run afoul of our constitutional guarantee to freedom of 
expression.‖113  Expression regarding matters of public concern ―is at the 
heart of our guarantee of freedom of expression‖ and ―a bedrock of any 
democratic society.‖114  The Court opted to leave ―issues of public 
concern‖ undefined, but advised future jurists to ―inspect the gravity of the 
substance of the expression to delineate between matters that may concern 
only a few individuals and those that truly rise to the level of public 
concern.‖115 
The Court applied its newly-expressed jurisprudence to find that 
the terminated employee in April did not suffer a violation of her freedom 
of expression right.  The employee‘s speech regarded her demotion at 
work, which was not a matter of public concern.
116
  Therefore, her 
governmental employer was unconstrained by the freedom of expression 
clause in reacting to the employee‘s speech.117 
Opponents to the Compact of Free Association between Palau and 
the United States claimed that denial of airtime on Palau‘s radio station 
infringed their constitutional right to free expression.
118
  The undisputed 
facts showed that, leading up to the 1993 Compact plebiscite, two 
Compact opponents and one Compact supporter requested airtime, and all 
three requests were denied.
119
  Justice Miller found that Palau‘s radio 
station was a government entity, and then proceeded to the inquiry of 
whether the radio station was required to grant the requested airtime.
120
  
The Court waxed about the ―idea‖ behind Article IV, Section 2—that 
―more speech, not enforced silence‖ would benefit the Republic (quoting a 
Justice Brandeis concurrence to a 1927 United States Supreme Court 
case), but then contrasted it with the notion that freedom of expression 
does not guarantee access to government property (quoting another United 
                                                 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. at 9. 
114
 Id. 
115
 Id. 
116
 See id. at 9. 
117
 See id. 
118
 See Wong v. Nakamura, 4 ROP Intrm. 364, 371 (Trial Div. 1994) (Miller, J.). 
119
 See id. 
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 See id. 
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States Supreme Court case).
121
  Ultimately, Justice Miller found that the 
issue need not be resolved because the remedy sought—the invalidation of 
the entire plebiscite—did not follow from the harm allegedly inflicted.122  
Given the result, the Court should have refrained from breaking this new 
ground in declaring the ―idea‖ behind the freedom of expression in Palau, 
especially without citation to Palauan authority. 
C. Freedoms of Assembly and Petition 
Section 3 compiles two related, yet distinct, fundamental rights:  
the right ―to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress 
of grievances‖ and the right to ―associate with others for any lawful 
purpose.‖123  The first clause appears to be written as a required 
conjunctive—the first clause of Section 3 only guarantees the right to 
peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, 
but not to peacefully assemble for other purposes or to petition the 
government for redress of grievances other than in a peaceful assembly 
(e.g., individually or in a violent assembly).  However, the second clause 
of Section 3 would protect peaceful assemblies for purposes other than 
petitioning the government (as long as those purposes were lawful) and 
Section 2‘s freedom of expression guarantee would protect an individual 
petitioning the government for redress of grievances.  In an apparent effort 
to avoid clarifying litigation, Section 3‘s second clause explicitly states 
that the right to associate with others for lawful purposes includes ―the 
right to organize and to bargain collectively.‖  The ―right to organize,‖ 
when conjoined with the right ―to bargain collectively,‖ most naturally 
means the right to form unions. 
 
V. TAKINGS CLAUSES 
Two sections of the Constitution relate to the ―taking‖ of private 
property by the government.  Article IV, Section 6 is written as a negative 
limitation protecting the right of individuals:  ―nor shall private property 
be taken except for a recognized public use and for just compensation in 
money or in kind.‖124  Article XIII, Section 7 is written as a positive grant 
of power to the government:  ―The national government shall have the 
power to take property for public use upon payment of just 
compensation.‖125  The latter provision enumerates further requirements 
before a governmental taking may be made, including exhaustion of ―good 
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faith negotiation‖ and consultation with the state government where the 
property is located.  It also grants state governments an identical power to 
―take‖ as the national government.  Furthermore, a taking ―for the benefit 
of a foreign entity‖ is prohibited, and this clause has been read to prohibit 
a taking even if it only secondarily benefits a foreign entity.
126
 
The remedy for an unconstitutional taking is ―not . . . return of full 
rights to the land to the original owner,‖ but rather ―payment of [just] 
compensation.‖127  An unconstitutional taking conveys title (or a use right) 
to land despite its unconstitutionality.
128
  Therefore, the consent of the 
landowner to the ―taking‖ is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether 
the land became government land—it only portends to whether just 
compensation is due.
129
  These statements were made in the context of a 
case where a landowner claimed that the installation of power poles on his 
property constituted an unconstitutional (and therefore, void) ―taking.‖130  
The Court noted in dicta that, ―[g]enerally, a taking may be 
unconstitutional in one of two ways:  (1) for lack of just compensation or 
(2) for non-public use.‖131  In deciding whether a ―taking‖ through 
regulation has occurred, ―a court will focus on both the character of the 
governmental action and the nature and extent of interference with 
rights.‖132  Takings clause constitutional claims are subject to procedural 
rules (almost) just like any other lawsuit.
133
 
When a governmental ―taking‖ occurs, interest accrues to the 
former landowner from the time of the taking until the time just 
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compensation is paid.
134
  Interest ―is part of the constitutionally required 
just compensation.‖135  Therefore, the constitutionally-required 
―reasonable‖ rate of interest must be judicially determined and the issue 
cannot be left to legislation alone.
136
 
In Gibbons v. Salii, the Appellate Division tackled the question of 
whether the military defense site provisions in the Compact of Free 
Association between Palau and the United States were per se 
unconstitutional under Article XIII, Section 7.
137
  The Compact grants 
rights to the United States to designate land and water areas to use as 
defense sites in Palau.  The Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement, 
a separate agreement referenced by the Compact, describes the specific 
designated areas within Palau.  Under the Compact, when the United 
States wishes to establish a defense site in one of the designated areas, it is 
to notify Palau and Palau shall make the designated site available.  Palau 
may suggest alternative sites, but the United States has the right to reject 
such suggestions and demand access to the originally-designated site 
within sixty days of the designation.
138
 
The Gibbons plaintiffs argued that this provision violated the 
provision in Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution preventing the 
Palauan government from exercising its eminent domain powers ―for the 
benefit of a foreign entity.‖139  The plaintiffs further contended that the 
sixty-day time frame would necessarily prohibit the government from 
fulfilling its constitutional duty to exhaust good faith negotiations and use 
its eminent domain powers ―sparingly‖ as a ―final resort.‖140 
The Court found that the Compact provisions were not per se 
unconstitutional because such a designation and transfer to the United 
States could be effected without Palau even exercising its eminent domain 
powers—Palau could (hypothetically) purchase the designated land from 
the private landowners.
141
  Notwithstanding this possibility, the Court 
stated that the sixty-day time limit provided in the Compact is 
―extraordinarily tight‖ to transfer title to land by mutual agreement and 
that ―constitutional risk [is] inherent in these provisions‖ of the Compact 
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and Military Use Agreement.
142
  The Court foresaw the following 
impasse: 
It is plain to us that the defense site provisions may 
eventually place the government of Palau at a fork where 
one road points toward violation of the Constitution and the 
other leads to breach of the Compact.  That fork, however, 
has not yet been reached and we see a possibility that the 
fateful choice may never present itself.  The Compact does 
not by its terms require exercise of the power of eminent 
domain.  It would be premature and improper for us simply 
to assume that such an event will come to pass.
143
 
 
Despite the under-ripeness of the issue before it, the Court went on 
to provide an advisory opinion on the ―for the benefit of a foreign entity‖ 
provision of Article XIII, Section 7.
144
  The Court rejected the 
government‘s syllogism that whatever use the Executive Branch chose to 
exercise its eminent domain powers for must inherently be ―for the benefit 
of Palau‖ because otherwise it would not have chosen to exercise its 
eminent domain powers—even if the land is given to a foreign entity.145  
The Court, narrowly construing the Constitution, stated that ―if the [taken] 
land in question is to be used by a foreign nation[,] the government of the 
Republic of Palau has an extremely heavy burden of showing 
extraordinary circumstances which establish that the particular use is for 
the sole benefit of Palauan persons or entities.‖146  Thus, the prohibition 
against the use of the eminent domain power ―for the benefit of a foreign 
entity‖ is read to mean that the use of the eminent domain power must be 
―for the sole benefit of Palau.‖147 
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After ratification of the Compact, the appellants in Wong v. 
Nakamura sought a judicial order barring implementation of the 
Compact.
148
  Among other arguments, the appellants pressed again 
(apparently without citation to authority) that the Compact was facially 
invalid under the eminent domain clauses of the Palau Constitution.
149
  
The Court summarily rejected this contention with a citation to 
Gibbons.
150
 
Land lost to the government through erosion has not been ―taken.‖  
Pursuant to statute, the government owns all marine areas below the 
ordinary high water mark.
151
  Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found that erosion 
that expands the government-owned area below the high water mark was 
not a ―taking‖ for purposes of Article IV, Section 6.152  Although no 
erosion was proved in the case, the Chief Justice stated that ―the Court 
hereby adopts the legal authority stating that even a registered or titled 
land lost by erosion returns to the government and no compensation to the 
original owner is required for the lost portion of the land.‖153 
In Micronesian Yachts Co. v. Palau Foreign Inv. Bd., the Appellate 
Division affirmed a Trial Division ruling that placing additional conditions 
on a renewal on a foreign investment certificate is not an unlawful taking 
of property in violation of Article IV, Section 6 of the Constitution.
154
  At 
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the renewal of the certificate, the Palau Foreign Investment Board added a 
provision that the foreign investment certificate was subject to revocation 
if any of the company‘s shares were transferred to a non-citizen without 
Board approval.
155
  However, this ―renewal addendum‖ was not an actual 
addendum because the original certificate was flatly non-transferable; 
therefore, the Court found nothing ―taken‖ by the addendum.156 
Justice Miller found no constitutional ―taking‖ where a plaintiff 
alleged that the building of a road would injure his business in 
Ngiraiuelenguul v. Ngchesar State Government.
157
  The plaintiff alleged 
that the new road interfered with his ability to float logs up a stream to his 
sawmill.
158
  The Court found that the new road did not ―take‖ any of the 
plaintiff‘s existing property or interfere with his riparian right of access to 
water; it merely interfered with the plaintiff‘s ability to float logs from the 
greater ocean to the saltwater pond adjacent to his property.
159
  Justice 
Miller stated the Constitution required that ―[w]hen the government 
actually takes away or invades in some destructive fashion a person‘s land, 
compensation must be paid.‖160  But the decision went on to state that 
―when the government acts only upon its own property, and in what it 
believes to be the public interest, it should be able to do so without fear 
that it may be called upon to pay damages for consequential injuries to the 
value of nearby land, or to businesses located there.‖161  To safeguard 
abuse, Justice Miller stated (aspirationally) that abuses of this confidence 
would harm the decisionmakers, because the aggrieved populous would 
vent their frustrations through the democratic process.
162
  This procedure 
would provide little safeguarding, however, where the harmed individuals 
are not citizens (and therefore cannot vote) or, as is usually the case, are a 
marginalized population. 
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VI. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Section 5 of Article IV guarantees, inter alia, equal protection:  
―Every person shall be equal under the law and shall be entitled to equal 
protection.‖163  This unqualified statement is immediately checked and 
categorized, creating tension even within Section 5.  Some bases of 
governmental discrimination are explicitly prohibited:  sex, race, place of 
origin, language, religion or belief, and social status or clan affiliation.  
However, the Constitution specifically permits preferential treatment of 
Palauan citizens, minors, the elderly, the indigent, handicapped, and ―other 
similar groups.‖  Discrimination is also permitted ―in matters concerning 
intestate succession and domestic relations.‖164 
A. Foundations of Equal Protection Review:  The Rising Tide of Suspect 
Classifications 
In an early equal protection case, the Appellate Division adopted 
an expansive reading of the clause and found a constitutional violation in 
Alik v. Amalei.
165
  In Alik, the Court reviewed the appeal process of Land 
Commission determinations.  Appeals from Land Commission 
determinations were to be made within 120 days of the determination by 
statute.  The Alik appellant filed his appeal 149 days after the 
determination, but only eighty-nine days after receiving service of the 
determination.
166
  The Court found that it would be unconstitutional under 
Article IV, Section 5 for some claimants to receive more time and others 
less time to appeal depending on when they received service of the Land 
Commission determination.
167
  To avoid this unconstitutional construction, 
the Court interpreted the statutory language to mean that the 120-day time 
to appeal runs from receipt of service of the determination and not from 
the date of the determination itself.
168
 
In Alik the Court effectively applied Article IV, Section 5 in an 
unqualified way—permitting no unequal treatment of anyone without 
looking at the basis of discrimination.  The Alik plaintiff did not allege 
discrimination based on any ―protected class‖ such as sex or race; he 
merely claimed that he had a diminished opportunity to appeal because he 
received service of his determination sixty days after the determination 
was made whereas other claimants might receive service two (or 102) 
days after determination.  Although this application of the equal protection 
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clause tracks the constitutional language (―[e]very person shall be equal 
under the law‖), it could hinder the operation of the government if applied 
to literally and too broadly.  The Alik interpretation has not been repeated 
in later opinions.
169
 
As stated in Ikeya v. Melaitau, Justice Miller‘s view of the equal 
protection clause, placing great stock in the ―suspect classifications,‖ bore 
very little resemblance to the Alik panel‘s interpretation: 
The declaration that ―Every person shall be equal under the 
law and shall be entitled to equal protection[‖,] Palau 
Constitution Art. IV, Section 5, plainly does not forbid the 
legislature from making policy choices and passing laws 
that may benefit one person over another if it acts 
reasonably and does not discriminate on the basis of any of 
the suspect classifications contained in the next sentence of 
that section.
170
 
When none of the ―suspect classifications‖ contained in Article IV, 
Section 5 are at play, Justice Miller advised that the ―only criterion for 
constitutionality [] is reasonableness.‖171  In Ikeya, Justice Miller found 
the legislature‘s distinction between bona fide and non-bona fide 
purchasers of land to be reasonable and therefore not violative of the equal 
protection clause.
172
  Justice Miller‘s creation of ―rational basis‖ 
(―reasonableness‖) review for ―non-suspect classifications‖ (although 
more in line with United States case law) is at odds with the Appellate 
Division‘s earlier decision in Alik, wherein the Court did not question the 
basis for the appellant‘s claim of unequal treatment. 
Chief Justice Ngiraklsong separated equal protection analysis into 
―at least two levels of judicial review‖:  the rational basis test 
(―governmental action will be upheld if there is a rational relationship 
between the action taken and the objective‖) and the strict scrutiny test 
(―governmental conduct will only be upheld if it is necessary to achieve a 
‗compelling‘ governmental purpose‖).173  The Chief Justice stated that the 
                                                 
169
 Justice Materne, sitting in the Trial Division, later found that Alik‘s holding 
that the 120-day time frame runs from the date of service rather than from the date of 
determination does not apply retrospectively to appeals filed pre-Alik.  See Temol v. Tellei, 
15 ROP 156, 157-58 (Trial Div. 2007) (Materne, J.) (finding appeal filed 181 days after 
the determination was issued, but only seventy-nine days after the notice of determination 
was served to be untimely).  The notice of appeal in Temol was filed in 1985, three years 
before the Alik decision was rendered.  See id. at 157. 
170
 Ikeya v. Melaitau, 3 ROP Intrm. 386, 392 n.2 (Trial Div. 1993) (Miller, J.). 
171
 Id. 
172
 See id. at 392-93. 
173
 Perrin v. Remengesau, 11 ROP 266, 269 (Trial Div. 2004) (Ngiraklsong, 
C.J.). 
32 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 12:2 
strict scrutiny test should be applied where governmental action creates 
―suspect‖ classifications (such as those based on race or national 
origin).
174
 
Shortly thereafter, the Appellate Division (in a panel including 
both Chief Justice Ngiraklsong and Justice Miller) applied the rational-
basis test in denying an equal protection challenge based on an allegation 
that individuals were classified based on the source of their land.
175
  The 
challenge was to a resolution stating that land acquired in fee simple from 
the Trust Territory government was to pass to the oldest living male child 
in the event that the deceased left no will.  The Court, in its brief analysis, 
found that the distinction between land acquired from the Trust Territory 
government and land acquired from all other sources was not irrational.
176
 
The Appellate Division again applied rational basis review to an 
equal protection challenge in Tulop v. Palau Election Commission.
177
  The 
alleged unequal treatment required absentee voters to submit their votes by 
the day before the special election rather than on the day of the election.  
The Court stated that under rational basis review—―a relatively low level 
of judicial review‖—―almost any rational reason provided by the 
government would serve to defeat a challenger‘s case.‖178  The Court 
upheld the voting requirement, finding that requiring absentee votes to 
arrive by the day before the election was a ―rational means to avoid delay 
in certifying the results of the special election.‖179  This rationale does not 
seem ―rational,‖ especially given the Court‘s concession that the purpose 
would have been equally served by requiring the absentee votes to arrive 
by the day of the election.
180
  In Tulop, the Court lowered the bar in 
rational-basis review so low that it became no test at all. 
B. Representation in Government 
Challenges relating to representation in government, specifically 
the redistricting of electoral precincts, loom large in equal protection 
jurisprudence.  Eriich v. Reapportionment Commission resolved disputes 
concerning the Senate redistricting plan, including an equal protection 
challenge under Article IV, Section 5.
181
  In prefacing its equal protection 
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analysis, the Court stated that ―[e]qual protection in the context of 
representation in government means that all persons must be represented 
equally‖ and that ―equal protection does not apply only to voters, but to all 
persons within the government‘s jurisdiction.‖182  Chief Justice Nakamura 
analyzed United States equal protection law and chose the more lenient 
standards that apply to state redistricting rather than the more stringent 
rules regarding federal redistricting.
183
  The more lenient ―state standard‖ 
allows for recognition of historical subdivisions, a distinction that the 
Court felt was important given the cultural significance of traditional 
villages in Palau.
184
  In sum, a reviewing Court should attempt to 
minimize statistical deviations but must balance that effort against other 
legitimate state interests.
185
  Chief Justice Nakamura then went about 
redistricting, splitting the country into five districts represented by 
fourteen Senators.
186
 
Chief Justice Nakamura‘s redistricting of the Fifth Senatorial 
District was challenged on appeal.
187
  As designed by the Chief Justice, the 
Fifth Senatorial District comprised eight states and had the power to elect 
two Senators.  Six of the states within the district objected, claiming that 
the two most populous states could collude to elect both of the Senators.
188
  
The appealing states also complained that the Fifth Senatorial District was 
not geographically compact, as it included four states located on the large 
northern island of Babeldaob and four states composed of outlying 
southern and southwest islands.
189
  In response to these complaints, the 
Appellate Division chose to further subdivide the district into two districts 
of four states each (splitting the northern Babeldaob and the southern 
island states into separate districts) even though such grouping resulted in 
a somewhat higher statistical deviation.
190
 
Senatorial redistricting was again before the Court in Yano v. 
Kadoi.
191
  The Court followed the redistricting equal protection test of 
Eriich: 
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When reviewing such a plan, this Court must first examine 
the existing deviations in the plan and determine if they can 
be reduced.  Second, if the deviations can be reduced, we 
must consider other arguments made in favor of the 
existing plan by its drafters, to see if they represent 
legitimate national interests.  Finally, we must strike a 
balance between the deviations from strict mathematical 
equality and the asserted national interests.
192
 
Article IX, Section 4 requires senatorial districting to be ―based on 
population,‖ which the Court read to mean ―citizen population‖ rather than 
―actual population‖ or ―voter population.‖193  Because only citizens are 
afforded the right to vote, the Court felt it proper to address only citizens‘ 
rights to equal protection rather than the rights of all inhabitants to equal 
protection.
194
  The Court stated that it would be incongruous to allow a 
state to benefit in redistricting from an influx in non-citizen population 
when those elected would have ―absolutely no duty‖ to respond to the 
needs of those non-citizens.
195
  While the Court‘s ―absolutely no duty‖ 
language was hopefully hyperbole, it is true that even a few hundred non-
citizens could alter the voting districts significantly were the districting to 
be done on the basis of total population.  And, because Article IV, Section 
5 permits discrimination in favor of citizens, no equal protection objection 
could stand in favor of the non-citizens. 
C. Additional Equal Protection Case Law 
The equal protection cases decided before ―suspect classifications‖ 
and ―rational-basis review‖ came into vogue still remain good law and 
may be useful in the proper instance.  These cases largely fail to articulate 
a standard of review, but provide discrete measuring points along the equal 
protection continuum. 
In Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, the Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of the President‘s impoundment of funds appropriated to 
the state governments as block grants.
196
  The Court found that, while the 
President is authorized to impound funds, such impoundment must not 
violate other constitutional provisions, such as the equal protection 
clause.
197
  Chief Justice Nakamura stated that ―the impoundment authority 
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may not be exercised in a manner so as to invidiously discriminate against 
a person or class of persons.‖198  The Court found that no equal protection 
violation was properly stated, as the plaintiffs did not allege that, for 
instance, the impoundment was done to discriminate against one state 
(―place of origin‖ discrimination).199 
Although the case was resolved on non-constitutional grounds, the 
Appellate Division noted that authority for judicial review of non-uniform 
voter standards is implicitly found in Article IV, Section 5 (along with 
Article X, Section 5) in Skebong v. Election Commissioner.
200
  This 
statement seems questionable, as Article IV, Section 5 is not a grant of 
jurisdiction but a guarantee of rights (however, every grant of a 
constitutional right does implicitly carry with it the right of judicial review 
of deprivation of that right).  But judicial jurisdiction to review such 
deprivation is more properly found in the constitutional grant of 
jurisdiction, Article X of the Constitution. 
An Airai legislator challenged a recall election for violating her 
equal protection rights in Simeon v. Election Commission.
201
  The petition 
for recall stated as the reason for recall that the legislator ―no longer 
represent[ed the petitioners‘] interests.‖202  The legislator objected, 
arguing that the stated reason was so ambiguous that it violated her right 
to equal protection.
203
  The Court disagreed and permitted the recall 
election, finding no constitutional violation.
204
 
The appellant, a United States citizen, asserted that he was denied 
equal protection by Palau‘s Memorandum of Agreement with the 
Federated States of Micronesia in Kruger v. Social Security Board.
205
  The 
Memorandum of Agreement provided unlimited social security benefits to 
non-resident non-citizens who were citizens of the Federated States of 
Micronesia while other non-resident non-citizens (such as United States 
citizens) were limited to only six months of Palauan social security 
benefits.
206
  Although the equal protection violation appears plain, the 
Court declined to expressly rule on the ―hypothetical‖ issue because the 
appellant was not in a position to receive social security benefits 
                                                 
198
 Id. 
199
 See id. at 211. 
200
 Skebong v. Election Comm’r, 1 ROP Intrm. 366 (1986). 
201
 Simeon v. Election Comm’n, 3 ROP Intrm. 372 (Trial Div. 1991) 
(Ngiraklsong, J.). 
202
 See id. at 373. 
203
 See id. 
204
 See id. at 374. 
205
 Kruger v. Soc. Sec. Bd., 5 ROP Intrm. 91 (1995). 
206
 See id. at 92-93. 
36 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal [Vol. 12:2 
regardless of his country of citizenship.
207
  However, the Appellate 
Division did agree with the Trial Division‘s finding that any potential 
equal protection problem could be cured by simply denying the extra 
benefit to citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (or by granting 
the extra benefit to citizens of all non-Palauan countries). 
The plaintiff in Sechelong v. Republic of Palau attempted to stretch 
the coverage of equal protection too far by arguing that the statute 
prohibiting certain types of automobile window tinting violated Article IV, 
Section 5 because it allowed some types of window tinting (e.g., factory-
installed tinting) and prohibited others (e.g., reflective tinting).
208
  Justice 
Beattie properly rejected the equal protection argument, but gave short 
shrift to his rationale, stating only that ―it is not the province of the Court 
to supplant the judgment of the [Olbiil Era Kelulau].‖209 
In Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, a plaintiff-cum-appellant 
challenged the Trial Division‘s decision to allow the defendant/appellee to 
amend his answer as an abuse of discretion because the plaintiff/appellee 
was denied leave to amend its answer in a different lawsuit.
210
  The Court 
found the equal protection argument to be frivolous and sanctionable, 
because Article IV, Section 5 ―does not assure uniformity of judicial 
decisions.‖211 
 
                                                 
207
 See id. at 93. 
208
 Sechelong v. Republic of Palau, 6 ROP Intrm. 368, 370 (Trial Div. 1997) 
(Beattie, J.). 
209
 Id.  Justice Beattie would have assumedly felt differently had the Olbiil Era 
Kelulau enacted a law unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of a suspect 
classification.  Such deference to the legislature is inappropriate in constitutional 
analysis. 
210
 Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, 9 ROP 173, 175 (2002). 
211
 Id. at 176 (citing numerous United States cases for support).  The Appellate 
Division echoed its Seid axiom most recently in Taima v. Sun Xiu Chun, Civ. App. No. 
09-005 (Dec. 10, 2009).  The Taima appellant argued that his right to equal protection 
was violated when the lower court permitted his adversary to miss a hearing but 
―unequally‖ entered a default judgment against him when he missed a hearing.  See 
Taima, Civ. App. No. 09-005, slip op. at 10.  Because the Appellate Division found that 
the appellant‘s opponent never missed a hearing—and therefore no unequal treatment had 
occurred—it rejected the equal protection claim while stressing that the equal protection 
guarantee ―‗does not assure uniformity of judicial decisions or immunity from judicial 
error.‘‖  See id. at 10 n.7 (quoting Palau Marine Indus. Corp. v. Seid, 9 ROP 173, 176 
(2002) (quoting Beck v. Washington, 82 S. Ct. 955, 962-63 (1962))). 
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VII.  DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
A. Due Process Overview 
―Due process‖ is guaranteed before the government may take 
action ―to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property‖ by Article IV, 
Section 6 of the Palau Constitution.  Because the government may use a 
wide-range of vehicles to deprive persons of their life, liberty, or 
(especially) property, courts have been called upon to define what 
quantum of process is ―due‖ in a variety of situations.  Consistency can be 
hard to achieve in this area, but certain guiding standards have emerged. 
The first inquiries in any due process analysis should be whether 
(1) the actor alleged to have caused the deprivation is a ―government‖ 
actor and (2) the ―thing‖ allegedly taken qualifies as life, liberty, or 
property.  If either inquiry results in a negative response, ―due process‖ is 
not due and no constitutional violation may be rightfully claimed.  The 
next step in a due process analysis is to determine what level of process 
was ―due,‖ and then determine whether that process was afforded.  If the 
proper level (or a greater level) of process was afforded to the 
complainant, no due process violation has occurred. 
Courts in the United States have read the United States due process 
clause to encompass two different guarantees:  the right of procedural due 
process and the right of substantive due process.  Procedural due process 
ensures that a person is afforded the proper level of process before 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurs.  Substantive due process 
requires that governmental action ―shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or 
capricious, and… the means selected shall have a real, and substantial 
relation to the object sought to be attained.‖212  Only one reported Palauan 
decision—the Chief Justice Nakamura penned Governor of Kayangel v. 
Wilter Trial Division opinion—engages in a substantive due process 
analysis (and no violation was found).
213
  The Appellate Division has not 
recognized substantive due process as an aspect of the Palauan due 
process clause.
214
 
                                                 
212
 Nebbia v. New York, 54 S. Ct. 505, 511 (1934) (quoted in Governor of 
Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206, 211 (Trial Div. 1985) (Nakamura, C.J.)). 
213
 Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206, 211 (Trial Div. 1985) 
(Nakamura, C.J.).  In response to an allegation of denial of equal protection, substantive 
due process, and procedural due process, the Trial Division recounted the Governor of 
Kayangel substantive due process standard, but engaged in a hybrid equal protection-
procedural due process analysis in Perrin v. Remengesau, 11 ROP 266, 268-70 (Trial Div. 
2004) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.).  Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found no constitutional violation in 
Perrin. 
214
 The Appellate Division has uttered the words ―substantive due process‖ only 
twice:  ―The [Land Claim Hearing Office‘s] delay in issuing this determination is 
condemnable, but it did not deny procedural or substantive due process to the appellant.‖  
Elbelau v. Semdiu, 5 ROP Intrm. 19, 22 (1994).  The question of whether the 6.5 year 
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Procedural due process ―requires notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.‖215  The person attacking a governmental act by alleging lack of 
due process bears the burden of demonstrating the constitutional 
violation.
216
 
B. The Process Due for Deprivation of Life 
No Palauan case has addressed the process due before the Republic 
may deprive someone of their life.  No criminal statute provides for the 
death penalty and the issue has not otherwise arisen. 
C. Decisionmakers in Criminal Proceedings 
The Constitution, as originally drafted, did not guarantee the right 
to a trial by jury in any prosecution.  The Ninth Amendment provided for 
jury trials for certain criminal cases starting on January 1, 2010.
217
  Before 
this constitutional amendment, defendants had attempted to find a jury 
trial ―right‖ in the due process clause but Palauan courts steadfastly 
rejected those attempts. 
Stated quite bluntly in Republic of Palau v. Chisato, ―There have 
never been jury trials in Palau.‖218  Palau chose to not exercise its option 
to hold jury trials during its Trust Territory days and again rejected jury 
trials during the Constitutional Convention.
219
  On the basis of such (lack 
                                                                                                                         
delay that intervened between the Land Commission‘s rendering its Summary and 
Adjudication awarding the land at issue to the Elbelau appellees and the formal Land 
Claims Hearing Office Determination of Ownership violated due process called into 
question the procedure employed, not the substance of its decision.  The Court did not 
engage in a substantive due process analysis and therefore its comment that the procedure 
did not violate ―substantive due process‖ is merely dictum. 
 The Appellate Division summarily rejected the appellant‘s deprivation of due 
process claim in Ngerungel Clan v. Eriich with the words, ―Neither a substantive nor a 
procedural due process claim can lie here.‖  15 ROP 96, 100 (2008).  The Appellate 
Division rejected the deprivation claim because the appellant was provided notice of the 
hearing and an opportunity to present witnesses at the land claim hearing at issue—issues 
of procedure, not of substance.  See id. 
215
 Pedro v. Carlos, 9 ROP 101, 102 (2002) (citing Ngerketiit Lineage v. Seid, 8 
ROP Intrm. 44, 47 (1999)); see also Governor of Kayangel v. Wilter, 1 ROP Intrm. 206, 
209 (Trial Div. 1985) (Nakamura, C.J.). 
216
 See Pedro, 9 ROP at 102 (citing Uchellas v. Etpison, 5 ROP Intrm. 86, 89 
(1995)).  The Pedro Court did not meaningful review the appellant‘s due process 
argument, however, because the record on appeal did not include the pertinent records.  
See id. at 102.  Therefore, because the appellant bore both the burden of creating a 
sufficient appellate record and the burden to demonstrate a due process violation, the 
Appellate Division denied the appeal and affirmed the opinion below.  See id. at 102-03. 
217
 See section XIII.I, infra. 
218
 Republic of Palau v. Chisato, 2 ROP Intrm. 227, 229 (1991). 
219
 See id. at 230. 
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of) history of jury trials in Palau, the Court held ―that the due process 
clause of the Palau Constitution does not, by implication or otherwise, 
grant the right to trial by jury in the Republic of Palau.‖220  Given that 
Chisato was a murder trial and the appellant was facing a sentence of life 
imprisonment plus ten years, this statement eviscerates any due process 
right to a jury trial in any criminal proceeding. 
Even during the Trust Territory days, the right to a jury trial for 
United States citizens as guaranteed by the United States Constitution did 
not apply to criminal prosecutions in Palauan courts.
221
  Justice Beattie 
reasoned that Palau was a Trust Territory of the United Nations, not the 
United States, and therefore the American rule that the Bill of Rights 
guarantees (including the right to trial by jury) apply when the United 
States prosecutes its citizens abroad did not apply.
222
 
Murder trials are conducted by special ―murder panels‖ at the trial 
level—one ―presiding‖ judge accompanied by two ―special‖ judges.  This 
procedure does not violate the due process rights of the accused.
223
  
Indeed, it would be anomalous for a three-judge panel to violate due 
process where a lone decisionmaker would not. 
                                                 
220
 Id. at 231. 
221
 See Republic of Palau v. Wolff, 3 ROP Intrm. 278, 278-81 (Trial Div. 1993) 
(Beattie, J.). 
222
 See id. at 280 (―The Palau Supreme Court was created by the Government of 
Palau, not the United States…  The Palau Supreme Court is not an agency of the United 
States…  [I]t is the Palau Constitution which applies to criminal proceedings in Palau for 
violation of its statutes.‖). 
223
 See Chisato, 2 ROP Intrm. at 232 (confirming the holding of Republic of 
Palau v. Santos, 1 ROP Intrm. 274 (1985)). 
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D. Translation of Criminal Proceedings 
A criminal defendant‘s due process rights include the right to an 
interpreter if needed to understand the proceedings.
224
  This right of 
interpretation is ―rooted in fundamental fairness and integrity of court‖ 
and cannot ―be abandoned absent an express waiver‖ by the defendant.225 
Although the determination of who is to provide and pay for the 
interpretation is left to the trial court, the Appellate Division‘s Pamintuan 
v. Republic of Palau opinion demands that trial courts ―halt proceedings 
until an interpreter [is] present.‖226  The duty to inform the court of the 
need for interpretation falls on the defendant, as does the duty to provide 
and pay for translation unless the defendant provides proof of 
indigence.
227
 
E. Statutory Issues 
An overly-vague statute describing a crime can violate the due 
process clause because it does not provide sufficient notice of the acts 
constituting a crime.  The Appellate Division set out the boundaries of 
constitutionally-acceptable concreteness in Ngirengkoi v. Republic of 
Palau: 
It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless 
that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it 
prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without 
any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is 
not in each particular case.
228
 
The Ngirengkoi Court upheld the constitutionality of the indecent 
assault statute against a void-for-vagueness challenge.  Palau‘s indecent 
assault statute criminalizes ―tak[ing] indecent and improper liberties with 
                                                 
224
 See Pamintuan v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 32, 40 (2008) (―[W]e find that 
the Palauan Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to an interpreter if they 
are unable to meaningfully understand the English language…‖). 
225
 Id. 
226
 Id. 
227
 See id. at 39 n.2.  This structure—requiring a defendant to provide a 
translator and not commencing proceedings until a translator is present—may tempt 
abuse, especially because the right of interpretation can only be waived expressly.  A non-
English speaking, non-indigent defendant could attempt to postpone her criminal trial—
perhaps indefinitely—by simultaneously refusing to waive her right to translation and 
refusing to provide a translator.  But a trial court could presumably coerce a criminal 
defendant into providing an interpreter through its contempt powers or appoint a 
translator and require the non-indigent defendant to pay for the translator‘s services.  
228
 Ngirengkoi v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 41, 42 (1999) (quoting 
Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 86 S. Ct. 518, 520-21 (1966)). 
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the person of a child under the age of 14 years without committing or 
intending to commit the crime of rape or carnal knowledge.‖229  In 
Ngirengkoi, the defendant contended that ambiguousness of the phrase 
―indecent and improper liberties‖ unconstitutionally deprived him of his 
right to due process in violation of Article IV, Section 6 and to be 
informed of the nature of the accusation against him as guaranteed by 
Article IV, Section 7.
230
 
The Court applied the canon of construction ―that a law should be 
construed to sustain its constitutionality whenever possible‖ and noted that 
at least six United States jurisdictions have found that statutes 
criminalizing the taking of ―indecent liberties‖ are not unconstitutionally 
vague.
231
  Furthermore, vagueness challenges not involving free speech 
must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand and the conduct 
at issue in Ngirengkoi was of the sort that ―a person of ordinary 
intelligence‖ would know were acts of indecent liberties.232  The Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the indecent assault statute without 
engaging in a separate Article IV, Section 7 analysis regarding an 
accused‘s right to be informed of the nature of the charges. 
The constitutional right to due process may be violated by a 
conviction of a crime that lacks a mens rea requirement.
233
  The Court—
because it found a mens rea requirement in the statutory crime at hand—
did not fully define the rationale or boundaries of this due process right, 
other than to say that ―where a statute incorporates an offense from the 
common law, a culpable state of mind must accompany the conduct 
proscribed by the statute.‖234 
 
F. Charging Issues235 
 
It is violative of due process to find a defendant guilty of a crime 
without charging the defendant of that crime.  In Franz v. Republic of 
Palau,
236
 the defendant was charged with assault and battery and 
                                                 
229
 17 PNC § 2806. 
230
 See Ngirengkoi, 8 ROP Intrm. at 42. 
231
 See id. at 42-43. 
232
 Id. at 43. 
233
 See Takada v. Sup. Ct. of the Republic of Palau, Trial Div., 3 ROP Intrm. 262, 
263 (1993). 
234
 Id. 
235
 See also section XIII.E infra, (discussing an accused‘s right to be informed of 
the nature of the accusation). 
236
 Franz v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 52 (1999). 
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attempted assault and battery with a dangerous weapon but convicted of 
assault and battery and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.  
Because the prosecution had charged only an attempted assault and battery 
with a dangerous weapon, but not a completed assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction for that 
offense.
237
  ―Attempted‖ and ―completed‖ crimes are separate offenses 
because, under the applicable statute,
238
 an ―attempt‖ offense requires that 
the perpetrator ―fall short of actual commission of the crime.‖239  In Franz, 
the Court found ―fundamental due process prevents a court from 
convicting an accused of an offense not charged in the information and not 
necessarily included in an offense charged.‖240  The Franz decision has 
often been cited as setting forth the due process standard as it relates to 
charging documents:  ―The constitutional right of a defendant to know the 
nature and cause of the accusation means that the offense charged must be 
set forth with sufficient certainty so that the defendant will be able to 
intelligently prepare a defense.‖241 
In dicta, the Franz Court appeared to uphold the constitutionality 
of ROP R. CRIM. P. 31(c), which permits conviction of a defendant ―of an 
offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to 
commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included 
therein if the attempt is an offense.‖242  It is not immediately clear why a 
                                                 
237
 See id. at 52. 
238
 17 PNC § 104. 
239
 Franz, 8 ROP Intrm. at 54. 
240
 Id. at 55. 
241
 Pamintuan v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 32, 44 (2008) (citing Franz v. 
Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 52, 54-55 (1999)).  See also Republic of Palau v. 
Kasiano, 13 ROP 289, 290 (Trial Div. 2006) (Salii, J.) (A criminal information is 
sufficient—under both ROP R. CRIM P. 7 and the due process clause—―if it contains all 
the essential elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the accused of the 
charges against him which he must defend.‖) (citing Franz v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP 
Intrm. 52, 55 (1999)). 
In a pre-Franz opinion, the Appellate Division formulated the standard as 
follows:  ―A criminal information is sufficient if it ‗contains the elements of the offense 
charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against he must defend.‘‖  Sungino 
v. Republic of Palau, 6 ROP Intrm. 70, 70-71 (1997) (quoting Hamling v. United States, 
94 S. Ct. 2887, 2907 (1974)).  Without explanation, the Appellate Division chose not to 
finish the Hamling quotation, which reads in whole: 
[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the 
offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against he 
must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or 
conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. 
Hamling, 94 S. Ct. at 2907. 
242
 Franz, 8 ROP Intrm. at 55, n.4. 
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defendant may be charged with a completed crime, but instead found 
guilty of an attempted crime when it is not constitutionally permissible for 
the opposite to be true.  Permitting conviction of an attempted crime when 
only a completed crime has been charged may be sensible in the United 
States where, as the Supreme Court of Palau noted, attempted and 
completed crimes are not ―separate offenses.‖243  But, given that attempted 
and completed crimes are ―separate offenses‖ in Palau because of the 
statutory requirement that an attempted crime ―fall short‖ of completion, 
due process should disallow a conviction of an attempt crime where only 
the completed offense was charged. 
In Gotina v. Republic of Palau, the Appellate Division held that 
charging the accused with unlawful fishing ―on or before‖ a certain day is 
not unconstitutionally ambiguous in violation of Article IV, Section 6 or 
7.
244
  The Court read ―on or before‖ as ―reasonably synonymous‖ with the 
―widely used ‗on or about‘ language, and as providing an equally 
sufficient measure of reasonable particularity as to the time of the alleged 
offense.‖245  While (as the Court stated) this reading of the charges 
recognizes ―practical‖ rather than ―technical‖ considerations, it skews the 
literal meaning of the words.  ―On or before‖ a certain date does not carry 
the same meaning as ―on or about‖ a certain date.  Indeed, ―on or before‖ 
could literally mean any time before the stated cut-off date, and therefore 
provides almost no information about the alleged time frame of the 
offense (nor of whether the alleged offense occurred within the applicable 
statute of limitations). 
In Republic of Palau v. Kumangai, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong 
dismissed a count charging the defendant with committing child abuse 
from September 23, 1997 to September 22, 2000 for ―being too indefinite 
with respect to the time of the alleged offense‖ and thus violating the 
defendant‘s constitutional due process rights.246  Noting the similarity to 
the United States due process clause, the Chief Justice stated that the 
clause ―requires that a defendant in a criminal case be given notice of the 
elements of the offense charged against him and a fair opportunity to 
defend himself against those charges.‖247  It is a due process violation for a 
charge to fail to give the defendant the approximate time the charged 
                                                 
243
 Id. at 54 n.3 (citing United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1038 & n.4 (5th Cir. 
1978)). 
244
 Gotina v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 56 (1999). 
245
 Id. at 58. 
246
 Republic of Palau v. Kumangai, 10 ROP 176, 177 (Trial Div. 2001) 
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.). 
247
 Id. 
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conduct occurred because the defendant is deprived of a fair opportunity 
to defend against the charge.
248
 
In Kumangai, the government could only point to one specific act 
of child abuse, but could not pinpoint the date more specifically than the 
three-year time period noted above.
249
  Although the information charged 
an ongoing abuse for those three years, it became clear at trial that the 
government only had evidence of a single act; because it was too late for 
the defendant to request a bill of particulars, the Court found that the 
charged count was too indefinite as to time for the defendant to adequately 
defend himself against the charge.
250
 
 
G. Warrant Issues 
As long as an arrest warrant for breach of parole is supported by 
probable cause, no immediate preliminary post-arrest hearing must occur 
to comport with due process.
251
  All that due process requires is ―notice 
and an opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time frame.‖252  Justice 
Michelsen outlined the procedure required to satisfy due process:  (1) 
service of summons on a parolee and a hearing within thirty days; or (2) 
issuance of an arrest warrant by the court based on probable cause 
supported by an affidavit.
253
 
 
H. Non-Disclosure of Evidence 
In Malsol v. Republic of Palau, the Appellate Division 
contemplated the due process implications of the prosecution‘s late 
disclosure of a written witness statement.
254
  The prosecution waited until 
the week before trial to produce the witness statement of a murder victim‘s 
neighbor, and by that time the defendant was unable to locate the 
witness.
255
  Although the witness statement was somewhat ambiguous, the 
defendant argued that the witness statement showed that the murder victim 
was still alive up until the time that the defendant had a solid alibi, thereby 
                                                 
248
 See id. 
249
 See id. 
250
 See id. 
251
 See Masami v. Kesolei, 10 ROP 213, 214 (Trial Div. 2003) (Michelsen, J.). 
252
 Id. 
253
 See id. at 216.  But, because the relevant statute improperly authorized 
members of the Parole Board, rather than a judge, to issue an arrest warrants upon an 
allegation of a parole violation, the Court ordered the parolee‘s release.  See section 
VIII.C, infra. 
254
 Malsol v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 161 (2000). 
255
 See id. at 162 
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proving that the defendant was not present when the victim was slain.
256
  
Although the witness statement was admitted at trial, the defendant 
claimed the prosecution‘s withholding of the evidence violated her due 
process rights because she was denied an opportunity to question the 
witness in person.
257
  Because the defendant did not argue a constitutional 
violation to the Trial Division, the Appellate Division reviewed only the 
conduct of the Trial Division—admitting the witness statement on the 
defendant‘s motion—rather than the prosecution‘s late disclosure of the 
witness statements.
258
  The Court found no constitutional violation, but did 
urge the Attorney General‘s office to adopt an ―open file‖ policy and 
freely share all non-privileged information with defense counsel.
259
 
Like Malsol, in Kumangai v. Republic of Palau, the defendant 
claimed a due process violation in the government‘s failure to disclose 
evidence to him in advance of trial.
260
  The withheld evidence was the 
confidential informant‘s audiotape, which the government allegedly 
misplaced until after trial.  The Court stated its test: 
In determining whether a criminal defendant‘s due process 
rights have been violated by the government‘s failure to 
disclose impeachment evidence, the Appellate Division 
must ask whether, but for the failure to disclose, the 
outcome of the proceeding below would have been 
different.
261
 
Recounting the Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau decision, the Kumangai 
Court stated the a due process violation only occurs when the withheld 
evidence is ―material‖ to the issue of a defendant‘s guilt or punishment 
and that, to be ―material,‖ disclosure of the evidence creates a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
262
  
A ―reasonable probability‖ is described as ―a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.‖263  The Court summarily ruled that 
                                                 
256
 See id. 
257
 See id. at 163. 
258
 See id. 
259
 See id. at 163 & n.2.  To be sure, it does not offend the Constitution for the 
government to fail to turn over a witness statement that does not exist.  See Republic of 
Palau v. Worswick, 3 ROP Intrm. 269, 276-78 (1993) (finding that trial court‘s 
determination that no witness statements were taken was not clearly erroneous and 
therefore no constitutional violation for withholding the witness statements could have 
occurred). 
260
 Kumangai v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 79 (2001). 
261
 Id. at 82-83 (citing Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 159, 172 & 
n.9 (1996)). 
262
 See id. at 85. 
263
 Id. 
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no showing had been made that disclosure of the misplaced tape would 
create such a reasonable probability and therefore the defendant‘s due 
process rights were not violated by the government‘s failure to produce the 
tape.
264
  This ―reasonable probability of a different outcome‖ standard, as 
applied, is a high bar to meet, especially where the defendant does not 
know what is contained in the withheld evidence. 
The Court rejected a second ―failure to disclose‖ due process 
argument in Kumangai, where the defendant alleged that the government‘s 
untimely disclosure of the confidential informant‘s counterfeiting 
activities prejudiced his ability to impeach the witness.
265
  But, as in 
Ngiraked, the Court felt that the defendant had ―significant impeachment 
material‖ about the same witness, including a drug trafficking arrest and 
the information that the witness was testifying in order to gain leniency for 
himself.
266
  Again, the ―reasonable probability‖ standard proved a high bar 
to hurdle, even where the government withheld evidence of an important 
witness‘s criminal dishonesty. 
The Ngiraked decision cited in Kumangai is a grave case stemming 
from the assassination of Palau‘s first President.  The prosecution initially 
interviewed a witness, but then the interview tapes were inadvertently 
destroyed.  The witness was subsequently called at trial and testified.  The 
defendants alleged that the destruction of the interview tapes violated their 
due process rights, as well as their right to examine all witnesses.
267
  With 
regard to due process, the Ngiraked Court adopted the United States‘ 
―Brady rule‖ in Palau.268  The Brady rule states that suppression of 
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution in the face of a defendant‘s 
request for evidence violates the due process clause where the evidence is 
―material‖ to guilt or punishment.269  Evidence is ―material‖ only if the 
disclosure of the evidence to the defense would create a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.
270
  
The ―suppressed‖ evidence in question in Ngiraked, however, was not 
exculpatory, but instead was only potentially impeaching evidence.
271
  The 
Court found the suppressed evidence was not material in light of the other 
                                                 
264
 See id. 
265
 See id. 
266
 See id. 
267
 See Ngiraked, 5 ROP Intrm. at 170.  Ngiraked‘s examination clause analysis 
is discussed in section X, infra. 
268
 See id. at 172 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963)). 
269
 See id. 
270
 See id. 
271
 See id. 
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impeachment evidence available to the defense and therefore found no due 
process violation.
272
 
I. Non-Disclosure of the Identity of a Confidential Informant 
 
The government‘s non-disclosure of the identity of a confidential 
informant potentially implicates due process clause considerations.  The 
Appellate Division visited this non-disclosure issue in Ueki v. Republic of 
Palau.
273
  In Ueki, police officers used a confidential informant to execute 
three controlled buys of methamphetamine from the defendant.
274
  The 
government revealed the identity of the confidential informant to defense 
counsel only for the purpose of the attorney running a conflict check and 
prohibited the conveyance of the identity of the informant to the 
defendant.
275
  After recounting United States case law, the Court stated the 
constitutional rule: 
[T]he question whether a defendant is entitled to disclosure 
of and/or testimony from a confidential informant is 
entirely distinct from the question whether the government 
may prove its case without such testimony.  ―When 
disclosure is warranted, it is for the purpose of allowing the 
defendant to determine whether he wishes to call the 
informant as a witness in an effort to rebut the 
government‘s case.‖276 
And, because the confidential informant was the only ―direct participant‖ 
in the controlled buys, the informant‘s testimony in Ueki would not have 
been cumulative.
277
  Based on the impermissible non-disclosure, the 
Appellate Division vacated the Ueki defendant‘s convictions and 
remanded the case for retrial.
278
  In the interest of safeguarding 
informants, the Court noted that trial courts may, on a case-by-case basis 
when appropriate and as demonstrated by the government, take steps to 
protect witnesses in criminal prosecutions.
279
  But the Court stated that the 
Republic‘s interest in prosecution of narcotics cases must, on some 
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occasions, ―be trumped by the defendant‘s constitutional due process right 
to a fair trial, which includes the right to adequately prepare and present 
his defense.‖280  Ueki was such a case. 
Following Ueki, the Appellate Division held, in Ngirailild v. 
Republic of Palau, that the disclosure of the identity of a confidential 
informant to defense counsel only (and not to the defendant) did not run 
afoul of the defendant‘s right to due process under Article IV, Section 6 or 
his rights to effective counsel or to examine all witnesses in Article IV, 
Section 7.
281
  The Ngirailild Court quoted extensively from the Ueki 
opinion for the standard applicable to disclosure of a confidential 
informant, but ultimately found that no disclosure was required.
282
  The 
defense was told that it could call the informant as a witness and defense 
counsel was permitted to interview the informant about the drug sale that 
led to the arrest.
283
  In finding that none of the defendant‘s Article IV 
rights were violated (without separately addressing the rights to due 
process and to examine all witnesses), the Appellate Division put great 
weight in the trial court‘s explicit direction to the defense that it was 
permitted to call the confidential informant as a witness.
284
 
 
J. Civil Court Procedure for Deprivation of Property Rights 
The due process clause guarantees that courts (and administrative 
bodies) follow certain minimum procedures in adjudicating property 
rights.  Failure to adhere to these minimum procedures may violate a 
litigant‘s due process right and invalidate the court‘s decision.  The 
―specifics of each case‖ determine whether and what sort of hearing a trial 
court must hold on a motion, for ―procedural due process does not entitle a 
litigant to a hearing on every motion.‖285  An oral hearing on a motion is 
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―necessary only if determination of the motion requires resolution of a 
material and genuine factual dispute.‖286 
The Appellate Division held that it is not violative of due process 
for a lower court to hold a civil trial without a defendant‘s attendance in 
the absence of proof that the absent defendant was not served with notice 
of the trial date in Malsol v. Ngiratechekii.
287
  The Malsol defendant filed 
an answer in the civil personal injury case, but failed to provide an address 
for service (in violation of ROP R. CIV. P. 11).
288
  The case then dragged 
on for nine years before trial (during which time the defendant appeared at 
two status conferences).
289
  The absent defendant was found liable and 
subsequently appealed.
290
  On remand for fact-finding, the Trial Division 
found that the absent defendant had received notice of the trial date.
291
  
The Appellate Division held that the due process clause guarantees a civil 
defendant the right to notice of the trial date, but does not require a trial 
court to make a determination as to whether an absent defendant received 
such notice before going forward with trial.
292
  The Court noted that a 
defendant is not guaranteed personal service of a trial notice when the 
defendant does not comply with the rules requiring the furnishing of a 
current address to the court:  ―The service rules, however, do not require 
the court or the litigants to track down a party whose address is 
unknown.‖293  Following Malsol, the Appellate Division has found no due 
process violation where service of notice of a land court hearing was 
actually made, although not at the appellant‘s abode, place of business, or 
to his specified agent.
294
 
As held in Silmai v. Land Claims Hearing Office, it violates an 
appellant‘s due process rights for a trial court to sua sponte dismiss the 
pleadings without providing the parties with an opportunity to be heard.
295
  
The lower court in Silmai had treated the defendant‘s answer and 
affirmative defenses as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and issued 
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a sua sponte order dismissing the complaint.
296
  The Appellate Division, in 
finding that the lower court had abused its discretion, did not state what 
sort of ―opportunity to be heard‖ must be afforded before dismissal of the 
pleadings is constitutionally permissible. 
In Klai Clan v. Bedechel Clan, the Court reviewed the Trial 
Division‘s sua sponte order to vacate and amend its previous order.297  The 
amended order called for remand of the case to the Land Claims Hearing 
Office (―LCHO‖) for further proceedings.298  Because the Trial Division 
did not give the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, as required 
by ROP R. CIV. P. 59(d), the Appellate Court found that the sua sponte 
vacation and amendment of the order violated the litigant‘s procedural due 
process rights as set forth in Article IV, Section 6.
299
  This use of the due 
process clause seems strained, especially in light of Rule 59(d)‘s focus on 
a trial court‘s authority to grant a new trial, not amend an order. 
The Appellate Division held that a court may rule on a motion for 
default judgment without a hearing without offending the procedural due 
process right of the party seeking the judgment in Western Caroline 
Trading Co. v. Leonard.
300
  The Western Caroline appellant won a default 
judgment, but appealed the amount of the trial court‘s judgment.301  The 
Appellate Division found that the opportunity to file a motion in favor of 
default judgment and supporting documents afforded the moving party 
sufficient process.
302
 
It is violative of due process for a trial court to apply res judicata to 
bar a claimant‘s claim to land when the claimant was not involved in the 
earlier proceeding that serves as the basis for the res judicata ruling.
303
  
Instead of reaching this constitutional question, however, the Appellate 
Division could simply have overruled the lower court‘s finding that res 
judicata applied and thereby achieved the same result. 
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The Appellate Court held in Bruno v. Santos that it does not violate 
due process for the LCHO, in response to a request to define a boundary, 
to define the boundary per the request without holding a hearing.
304
  The 
parties, in a letter, asked the LCHO to review four items and then make a 
boundary determination; it did so, but the disappointed party claimed on 
appeal that the determination violated due process because no hearing was 
held.
305
  The Appellate Division disagreed, pointing out that ―[t]he 
agreement neither requested nor anticipated that the Land Court would 
hold a hearing regarding the disputed boundaries.‖306  This opinion 
basically permits individuals to ―bargain away‖ their due process rights—
if a governmental body is jointly asked by both parties to complete certain 
steps before coming to a determination and it does so, no more process is 
due. 
As to execution of money judgments, the Appellate Court relied on 
United States case law to find that due process requirements are satisfied 
if:  (1) notice is provided to the judgment debtor that property has been 
seized; (2) notice is provided to the judgment debtor of exemptions to 
which the judgment debtor may be entitled; and (3) a prompt opportunity 
to be heard is provided for the judgment debtor to assert exemptions or 
challenge the seizure.
307
  Due process, however, does not require pre-
attachment notice.
308
  The same process is due to judgment debtors when 
property is seized by way of writ of attachment as when it is seized 
through a writ of execution.
309
 
In Peleliu State Government v. 9th Peleliu State Legislature, Chief 
Justice Ngiraklsong laid out the minimum due process requirements in 
prejudgment seizure cases: 
(1) the availability of ex parte prejudgment seizure must be 
limited to situations where plaintiff has established that the 
property to be seized is of a type that can be readily 
concealed, disposed of, or destroyed; (2) the plaintiff must 
allege specific facts based on actual knowledge supporting 
the underlying action and the right of plaintiff to seize the 
property; (3) the application for the order of seizure must 
be made to a judge rather than to a clerk; (4) the defendant 
has a right to a prompt, postseizure hearing to challenge the 
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seizure; and (5) the defendant must be able to recover 
damages from the plaintiff if the taking was wrongful and 
to regain possession of the seized items by filing a bond.
310
 
Where the assets to be seized were fungible boat parts, the Chief Justice 
found that the due process requirements had been met and ordered 
prejudgment seizure upon posting of a sizeable bond.
311
 
The Appellate Division recently stated, in In re Idelui, that a 
judicial decision that violates a party‘s right to due process is a nullity.312  
In Idelui, four claimants to a parcel of land were overlooked and therefore 
received no notice of the hearing determining ownership of the land.
313
  
The Land Court held the hearing and issued a determination of ownership 
and a certificate of title before it realized its mistake over a year later.
314
  
The Appellate Division upheld the Land Court‘s cancellation of the 
determination of ownership and certificate of title despite the lack of rule-
based authority to do so.  The Court found that, because the Land Court 
hearing was conducted in violation of the four excluded claimants‘ due 
process rights, the subsequent determination of ownership and certificate 
of title were void ab initio and could be cancelled pursuant to the lower 
court‘s inherent authority.315 
 
K. Due Process Implications of Property Rights in Employment 
 
Certain government employees and elected officials possess a 
property right to their continued employment.  When such a right is 
recognized, an employee or elected official must be afforded due process 
before she may be removed from office.  Such a property right to 
employment may arise through a contract for continued employment for a 
specified time (or for an unspecified time upon certain conditions, such as 
―good behavior‖ or ―satisfactory execution of duties‖). 
In a since-vacated opinion, Justice Ngiraklsong ruled that the due 
process clause entitles a member of the House of Delegates to notice and 
                                                 
310
 Peleliu State Gov’t v. 9th Peleliu State Legislature, 15 ROP 179, 181 (Trial 
Div. 2008) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (quoting Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Doe, 821 F. Supp. 
82, 87-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
311
 See id. at 182. 
312
 In re Idelui, Civ. App. No. 10-013, slip op. at 5 (Sept. 24, 2010) (―The 
deprivation of a party‘s constitutional due process right to notice and an opportunity to be 
heard renders a court‘s judgment on that issue void.‖). 
313
 See id. at 2. 
314
 See id. 
315
 See id. at 6-7. 
2011] Bennardo  53  
an opportunity to be heard before expulsion from that body.
316
  Justice 
Ngiraklsong agreed that the expelled member was at least entitled to 
notice of the resolution calling for his expulsion so that he could appear 
before the House of Delegates to argue against (or acquiesce in) the 
resolution.
317
  Justice Ngiraklsong found the lack of notice especially 
unreasonable given that ―Koror is a small town‖ and ―[t]he Legislature 
Building is within approximately 2 miles from [the expelled member‘s] 
office and even less from his residence.‖318  The Appellate Division, 
however, found that the controversy was moot because the House of 
Delegates of the Second Olbiil Era Kelulau had already completed their 
service; therefore the Court remanded the case back to Justice Ngiraklsong 
with instructions to vacate the judgment.
319
 
As found by Justice Miller in Ngiraingas v. Eighth Peleliu State 
Legislature, due process requires that a state governor be given notice of 
removal from office and an opportunity to state her case before the state 
legislature vote that results in removal.
320
  In Ngiraingas, a super-majority 
of the state legislature of Peleliu had resolved that the governor would be 
removed from office unless the legislature voted to revoke the removal by 
a certain date.
321
  The resolution of removal was the first notice the 
governor received of the legislature‘s actions, and no further official 
legislative meeting occurred between the notice and the date set for 
removal.
322
  Justice Miller found that the governor‘s opportunity to speak 
to the individual legislators on an ad hoc basis before his removal took 
effect fell short of fulfilling the governor‘s due process rights: 
The opportunity to be heard guaranteed by the due process 
clause is not the opportunity to hear oneself talk, but to 
have one‘s words and arguments given consideration by the 
person or persons who will be determining whether to 
deprive you of your life, liberty, or property.
323
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Because the governor was not afforded an opportunity to present his case 
before the legislature preceding the vote to remove him, the resolution 
violated his due process rights.
324
  
The Appellate Division found a violation of a terminated public 
employee‘s right to procedural due process in April v. Palau Public 
Utilities Corp.
325
  The defendant-employer utility company, a public 
corporation wholly owned by the national government with board 
members appointed by the President of Palau, qualified as a ―government 
actor‖ for due process purposes.326  In determining whether the terminated 
employee had a due process right to continued employment, the Appellate 
Division looked no further than the defendant-employer‘s answer 
admitting that a right to continued employment existed.
327
  Upon finding 
that property right to continued employment with a government employer, 
the Court stated that the employee ―should have been afforded due process 
before [a] deprivation‖ of her employment occurred.328 
In determining whether sufficient process was afforded to the 
terminated employee, the April Court first rejected the appellant‘s 
contention that her employer had failed to adhere to its own internal 
procedures in terminating her employment.
329
  Turning to the ―notice and 
an opportunity to be heard‖ aspect of procedural due process, the 
Appellate Division found that the employee‘s constitutional rights had 
been violated because she was terminated on the spot, without ―even a 
minimal level of process.‖330  Without setting forth exactly what quantum 
was due, the Court noted ―one procedure does not fit all‖ in determining 
what or how much process is due before a particular deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property may occur.
331
  Damages for a deprivation of procedural 
due process ―should be calculated only to compensate a plaintiff for the 
affront of suffering a deprivation of process‖ and recovery of ―anything 
resembling back pay or compensation for her termination‖ would only be 
permissible ―if proper process would have resulted in [the employee‘s] 
reinstatement.‖332  Citing United States case law, the Court stated that 
nominal damages are likely appropriate unless notice and an opportunity 
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to be heard would have left the terminated employee in a better position 
employment-wise.
333
 
After remand to the Trial Division to calculate damages, the April 
employee‘s plight returned to the Appellate Division a second time.334  
The Trial Division awarded nominal damages of one dollar and the 
employee appealed the amount of the award.
335
  After affirming the Trial 
Division‘s decision not to impose punitive damages, the Appellate 
Division again remanded because it found that the Trial Division had 
failed to answer the vital question of whether a proper hearing would have 
substantively improved the employee‘s situation.336 
L. Other Property Rights 
The Disciplinary Tribunal stated that a respondent in an attorney 
disciplinary proceeding is afforded due process protection based on the 
quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings.
337
  However, it is not the 
―quasi-criminal‖ nature of disciplinary proceedings that confer due 
process rights upon respondents—due process is afforded to parties in 
many entirely non-criminal settings.  It is a type property—the 
respondent‘s law license—that is on the line in such proceedings, not the 
respondent‘s life or liberty. 
The appellant claimed that failure to receive notice that certain 
land was claimed as government land before the expiration of the time 
period in which to file land claims against the government violated his 
right to due process in Carlos v. Ngarchelong State Public Lands 
Authority.
338
  The Appellate Division disagreed, ruling that the 
constitutional provision (Article XIII, Section 10) and enabling legislation 
(35 PNC § 1304(b)) at issue did not foreclose any rights because even 
after the expiration of the time period set out to claim government lands 
claimants could still file quiet title actions against the government.
339
 
The Carlos Court improperly focused on whether the limited time 
span of the rights afforded by Article XIII, Section 10 (and its enabling 
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legislation) created a due process violation.  Just because a right is ―new‖ 
and for a limited time (effectively an ―excess right‖) does not mean—as 
the Court seemingly held—that deprivation of that right creates no due 
process violation.  The appellant did not argue that Article XIII, Section 10 
deprived him of due process—he argued that the government‘s failure to 
publish notice of its claim to certain land deprived him of due process 
because he was unaware of his need to file an Article XIII, Section 10 
claim.  The Court dispensed of this argument in one sentence, finding that 
it is the citizens‘ duty to identify public land rather than the government‘s 
duty to publish notice regarding the allegedly public status of land.
340
  
This analysis is clouded by the rest of the Court‘s opinion.  While the 
outcome was correct—no due process violation occurred—the Court‘s 
reasoning should have focused solely on the actual claimed due process 
violation. 
In Western Caroline Trading Co. v. Philip, the Appellate Division 
stated that a party to a contract ―does not have a constitutional right to 
have a contract interpreted in its favor.‖341  The contract at issue in 
Western Caroline included a clause governing the payment of attorney‘s 
fee should litigation arise concerning the contract.
342
  Despite one party‘s 
argument that the due process clause protected its property right, the Court 
properly stated that ―there is no constitutional issue for us to decide.‖343 
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VIII. SEARCHES AND WARRANTS 
 
Article IV, Section 4 provides the seemingly absolute guarantee 
that ―[e]very person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers 
and effects against entry, search and seizure.‖344  But Section 6 of the same 
article then provides that ―[a] warrant for search and seizure may not issue 
except from a justice or judge on probable cause supported by an affidavit 
particularly describing the place, persons, or things to be searched, 
arrested, or seized.‖345 
By its own terms, Section 4 protects against all searches or 
seizures, warranted or unwarranted.  Section 4 does not limit only 
government actors, but provides a freedom from searches and seizures by 
anyone.  As a result, even a private party could infringe on another‘s 
search and seizure rights.  Section 6 contradicts Section 4 by setting forth 
a warrant procedure for conducting a search or seizure.  The language of 
Section 4‘s absolute freedom cannot be resolved with the incongruity of 
Section 6‘s warrant provision without altering the plain meaning of one of 
the provisions.  It is Section 4 that has given way, and searches and 
seizures pursuant to valid warrants have not been seriously challenged.  
On the other hand, criminal defendants have mounted numerous 
constitutional challenges to searches and seizures performed in the 
absence of a warrant. 
A. Interpretation of the Search and Seizure Guarantees 
Facing a rule that would ―cripple[] law enforcement,‖ the government 
appealed from the Trial Division‘s interpretation that the Constitution 
prohibits all warrantless searches and seizures in Republic of Palau v. 
Gibbons.
346
  In Gibbons, two officers arrived at the scene and were told 
that the defendant had a gun in his automobile.
347
  The officers impounded 
the vehicle and arrested the defendant.
348
  The Appellate Division, citing 
United States authority, stated that ―[o]nce the police had facts sufficient to 
indicate there was probable cause to believe that defendant was in 
possession of an illegal firearm, they could have searched defendant‘s 
automobile even if no search warrant was obtained.‖349  With that 
statement, sanctioned warrantless searches and seizures came to Palau and 
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the Appellate Division eviscerated the literal meaning of Article IV, 
Section 4. 
The Gibbons Court explicitly overruled the Trial Division‘s finding 
that Article IV, Section 4 flatly prohibits warrantless searches and seizures, 
stating that ―[s]uch a broad declaration is neither logical nor practical.‖350  
The Court held that Article IV, Section 4 ―speaks only of the general right‖ 
to be free from searches and seizures and, ―[t]aken in a vacuum and 
construed literally, this section would prohibit any search or seizure under 
any circumstances.‖351  The Court found that a warrant procured pursuant 
to Article IV, Section 6 permits a search or seizure and therefore, Section 
4‘s prohibition against all searches and seizures ―is not, and cannot be, an 
absolute right.‖352 
Upon establishing this crack in Section 4‘s absolutism, the Court 
went on to expand the exceptions, stating that Section 4 ―does not 
preclude warrantless searches merely because it does not contain the word 
‗unreasonable.‘‖353  The right to be free from ―unreasonable‖ searches and 
seizure is guaranteed by statute (1 PNC § 403), and the Court found it 
proper to read this ―unreasonable‖ limitation into the constitutional 
language as well.
354
  For support, the Court noted that, in the absence of a 
warrantless search and seizure exception, a police officer could not arrest a 
person without first obtaining a warrant even if the officer observed the 
person shoot and kill another person.
355
 
Citing United States case law, the Court stated that a seizure of a 
person (in the form of an arrest) occurs when, under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that she is free to 
leave.
356
  The Court found that no warrant is needed for arrests based on 
probable cause.
357
  The Court went on to state that the ―police are not 
required to obtain a search warrant to stop an automobile‖358 when the 
police possess probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains 
contraband or evidence of a crime because (1) automobiles are inherently 
mobile, thereby creating exigent circumstances that make the warrant 
requirement impractical, and (2) people have a reduced expectation of 
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privacy in automobiles.
359
  The Court stated that its examples were non-
exhaustive and that any judicial proclamation prohibiting warrantless 
searches across the board would only handicap law enforcement.
360
  The 
Court‘s language not only cracked the door to warrantless searches, it blew 
the hinges. 
 
B. Exceptions to the Warrant “Requirement” 
With the establishment of the constitutionality of warrantless 
searches and seizures in Gibbons, the Court went about the difficult—and 
unguided—task of delineating under what circumstances the warrant 
―requirement‖ may be circumvented.361  Through case law, courts have 
upheld warrantless seizures of items in plain view, border searches, and 
searches incident to lawful arrests.  In addition, courts have held that, 
although police officers do not need warrants to enter public places, 
officers may not rely on the ―open fields‖ doctrine to enter privately-
owned land surrounding a residence.  These cases are discussed below. 
Contraband in ―plain view‖ may be seized as long as the intrusion 
that enabled the police to perceive and physically seize the item was 
legal.
362
  Relying on United States law, the Appellate Division stated that 
an ―investigatory stop short of an arrest is valid if based upon a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot‖ and ―reasonably related in scope 
to the justification for its initiation.‖363  Reasonable suspicion ―must be 
based upon ‗specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] 
intrusion.‘‖364 
Justice Michelsen addressed the ―border search‖ exception to the 
warrant requirement in Republic of Palau v. Techur.
365
  In Techur, the 
defendant‘s cargo on an international flight alerted a trained narcotics dog; 
the cargo was then opened by a customs officer (without a warrant) and 
marijuana was discovered in the cargo.
366
  The defendant argued that the 
search violated her constitutional rights.  After stating (without citation) 
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360
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 ―Unguided‖ in the sense that the basis for unwarranted searches and seizures 
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362
 See Republic of Palau v. Singeo, 1 ROP Intrm. 551, 556-59 (1989) (finding 
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 See id. at 559. 
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that ―[t]he Palau Constitution incorporated the search warrant requirement 
that was a familiar part of [pre-Constitution] Trust Territory law,‖ the 
Court went on to state that border searches were considered reasonable at 
the time of the adoption of the Constitution and that nothing in the 
Constitution ―can be construed to be an effort to restrict border searches to 
something stricter than what had been previously allowed.‖367  Thus, the 
―border search‖ exception to the warrant requirement was formally 
recognized.  The defendant further argued that the exception should only 
apply to inbound (and not outbound) passengers and cargo, but the Court 
was not moved by the argument.
368
  However, the Court did state—
without deciding—that ―secret searches‖ conducted outside the presence 
of the owner may be held to more stringent standards, such as a reasonable 
suspicion requirement, opening of cargo in the presence of a witness, or 
the subsequent notification of the owner that a search was conducted.
369
 
It seems dangerous to rely on ―whatever was considered 
reasonable‖ at the time of the adoption of the Constitution (especially 
without citation to evidence as to what that was) as a method of 
constitutional construction.  Under Techur it would seem that whatever 
was reasonable at the time of the adoption would continue to be 
permissible as long as it was not specifically made unconstitutional in the 
Constitution. 
The Appellate Division recognized the constitutionality of a 
―search incident to a lawful arrest‖ in King v. Republic of Palau.370  
Because the King defendant was ―validly‖ stopped and arrested for a 
curfew violation, the Court held that the pat-down search incident to the 
arrest and seizure of the ammunition from the defendant‘s pants pocket 
was also valid.
371
  The arresting officer found ammunition in the 
defendant‘s pocket and a subsequent search of the automobile revealed a 
firearm under the driver‘s seat.372  The officer also found a matchbox on 
the defendant‘s person containing methamphetamine.373  The trial court 
suppressed the methamphetamine, but the defendant was found guilty of 
both possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition.
374
 
The King Court then examined 18 PNC § 301(a), the statute 
dealing with searches incident to arrest, and concluded that the law—
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which was enacted under the Trust Territory government—may be written 
over-inclusively to permit unconstitutional searches as it was written to 
codify subsequently-overruled United States search and seizure case 
law.
375
  The Court recounted its Gibbons decision wherein it 
rejected the syllogism that (1) the United States 
Constitution allows ―reasonable‖ searches without a 
warrant; (2) Article IV Section 4 of the Palau Constitution 
makes no mention of reasonableness; (3) therefore the 
Palau Constitution does not allow ―reasonable‖ searches 
without a warrant.
376
 
Recognizing the danger attendant to custodial arrests (especially those 
involving automobiles), the Court held that ―when a police officer has 
made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a motor vehicle, the 
officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile.‖377  Therefore, the automobile 
search and resulting seizure of the firearm were found to be 
constitutional.
378
 
The Trial Division ruled against the recognition of the ―open 
fields‖ warrant exception in Republic of Palau v. Rafael.379  In Rafael, 
Justice Miller granted the defendant‘s motion to suppress where police 
officers entered the defendant‘s land without a search warrant and found 
marijuana plants growing in the jungle.  The Court looked to United States 
case law to determine whether the marijuana patch was located on an 
―open field‖ (in which, under prevailing United States case law, a 
defendant does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy) or within the 
defendant‘s ―curtilage‖ (in which a defendant does have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy).
380
  Ultimately, however, Justice Miller found that 
importing the United States approach was not appropriate in this instance 
because ―the conception of privacy an[d] geography which underlie the 
U.S. decisions do not translate well to Micronesia and to Palau in 
particular.‖381  Noting that Palau‘s ―total area is less than some of the 
ranches and forests in the U.S.,‖ Justice Miller found that a legitimate 
expectation of privacy exists in Palauan family farms.
382
  The Court 
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further noted that the ―open fields‖ doctrine even as applied in the United 
States is problematic because it permits police officers to effectively 
trespass on citizens‘ land without search warrants.383  The Court stated its 
ultimate finding:  ―privately-owned land surrounding a residence, as long 
as it is not generally accessible or visible to the public, should be protected 
from unwarranted searches regardless of whether it would be considered 
curtilage under current U.S. law.‖384 
In Republic of Palau v. Shmull, the Court considered whether or 
not a warrant is required for law enforcement officers to enter a store and 
conduct a search.
385
  In Shmull, three officers were sent to investigate a 
report that illegal fish were being offered for sale at a store.
386
  When the 
officers arrived, the ―Open‖ signed was turned over to ―Closed‖ and one 
of the store‘s three entrances were locked.387  As two customers exited one 
of the open doors, two of the officers entered, and the third officer entered 
through an open back door.
388
  Justice Miller recited that officers are free 
to enter stores that are open to the general public without search warrants, 
but that storeowners are free to refuse entry to any persons.
389
 
Justice Miller found that the store owners did not sufficiently 
exercise their right to exclude the officers from their store because a third 
party arriving on the scene would have felt free to enter through the open 
doors and the officers were not verbally told that the store was closed.
390
  
The Court found no constitutional harm in the officers opening the display 
freezers once inside the store, as any customer would be permitted to look 
at the fish for sale.
391
 
It is sensible that police officers do not need a search warrant to 
enter public businesses and other areas generally open to the public.  But 
the Court‘s holding that store owners may exclude police officers from 
their premises could be tested when put to extremes—for instance, a sign 
on the door of the store saying ―Open to the Public, but No Police Officers 
Allowed‖ or even a sign on a particular freezer within the fish market 
forbidding only police officers from opening that specific freezer.  Such 
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hypothetical signs are not readily distinguishable from a shopkeeper‘s oral 
request that an officer leave a store, and may well be within a 
shopkeeper‘s rights.392 
 
C. Probable Cause and the Issuance and Scope of Warrants 
 
The Appellate Division has imposed a constitutional requirement 
for probable cause hearings before the Republic may ―seize‖ an accused 
person for extended periods: 
Article IV, Sections 4 and 6, of the Palau Constitution 
require a judicial determination of probable cause as a 
prerequisite to any extended pretrial restraint on the liberty 
of an arrested person.  What must be determined is whether 
there is probable cause to believe a crime has been 
committed and that the arrested person has committed it.
393
 
Following United States case law, the Court found that probable cause 
hearings do not need be adversarial in order to be constitutional.
394
  And a 
second probable cause hearing is not needed after arrest if a judge has 
already found that probable cause existed to issue an arrest warrant.
395
  
The Trial Division has since found that Article IV, Sections 4 and 6 do not 
impose a constitutional requirement for a probable cause hearing if the 
defendant is not subject to pretrial restraint.
396
 
For a search warrant to issue, probable cause must exist to believe 
evidence of a crime or contraband is to be found at the specific premises; 
however, probable cause need not exist that the owner or occupier of the 
property is involved in the crime.
397
  This rule is sensible because a 
contrary rule would permit wrongdoers to hide their contraband or 
criminal tools in the premises of innocent third parties.  As the Court 
stated, ―the culpability of the occupier of the premises is not an issue when 
the court issues a search warrant.‖398  The question, in deciding whether to 
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issue a search warrant, is merely ―whether there is probable cause to 
believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.‖399 
As long as a judge is the decisionmaker who decides whether to 
issue a warrant, a criminal defendant‘s constitutional rights are not 
violated if an affidavit in support of a warrant is sworn before a Clerk of 
Courts instead of in front of the judge.
400
  This result is consistent with the 
Constitution, which only requires that a warrant must be issued by a 
―justice or judge on probable cause supported by an affidavit.‖  The 
Constitution does not require the affidavit to be physically sworn before 
the judge. 
In Masami v. Kesolei, Justice Michelsen found the statutory 
provision authorizing members of the Parole Board to issue arrest warrants 
when a parolee is alleged to have violated the terms of their parole  in 
―direct conflict‖ with the constitutional requirement that a warrant for 
search or seizure may not issue except from a ―judge or justice.‖401  The 
Court also found the statute to be constitutionally infirm because it 
permitted the issuance of an arrest warrant on the mere allegation of a 
parole violation, a lower threshold than the constitutionally-required 
standard of ―probable cause supported by an affidavit.‖402  Because the 
arrest warrant in Masami was not issued by a judge or justice, the Court 
granted the parolee‘s request for a writ of habeas corpus ordering his 
release.
403
 
Justice Miller considered the scope of a search warrant in Republic 
of Palau v. Shao Wen Wen.
404
  The search warrant described the premises, 
a beauty salon, as a ―two story concrete building,‖ and the defendants 
argued that the description was insufficient to permit the officers to search 
all of the apartments and rooms in the building.
405
  The general rule is that 
the search of multiple units at a single address must be supported by 
probable cause as to each unit.  However, Justice Miller found exceptions 
to the general rule in Shao Wen Wen.
406
  Given that a prostitution arrest 
was made in one of the upstairs apartments, the Court found that probable 
cause existed for the officers to extend the search to the other upstairs 
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apartments.
407
  Furthermore, the Court found that the entire premises may 
be searched including separate bedrooms if multiple people share common 
living quarters.
408
 
This second ―exception‖ seems particularly suspect, and was 
supported by only a citation to a state appellate case from the United 
States.  It would not seem permissible to search the bedroom of person A 
just because person A and person B share a living room where officers 
have probable cause to believe that person B harbors evidence of a crime.  
The separateness of the bedrooms should be recognized despite the 
closeness of the quarters.  Person A‘s expectation of privacy in her 
bedroom should not be upended because her housemate is suspected of 
prostitution. 
The Shao Wen Wen Court also rejected the argument that the search 
warrant was not sufficiently particularized in describing the items to be 
seized.
409
  The search warrant authorized the seizure of ―evidence of 
prostitution including, but not limited to condoms, pornography, sexual 
devices and aids, and financial records, receipts, cash as well as articles of 
personal property tending to establish the identity of persons in control of 
the premises.‖410  Justice Miller found that the direction to seize only 
―evidence of prostitution‖ constitutionally specific enough to guide the 
officers in their search.
411
 
In addressing the articles seized, the Court stated that, ―the 
question whether evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant is 
distinct from the question whether that evidence will prove defendants‘ 
guilt or even be deemed admissible at trial.‖412  According to the Court, it 
is enough that the officers had ―cause to believe‖ that the seized items 
would aid in the apprehension or conviction of persons involved in the 
crime of prostitution.
413
  This last statement may go too far and permit 
over-seizure of items when applied too leniently.  For instance, the Court 
approved the seizure of earrings from the beauty salon, even though it is 
hard to imagine how such items would aid in the defendant‘s 
conviction.
414
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IX. CONFESSIONS AND SELF-INCRIMINATION 
 
Section 7 of Article IV protects two related liberties:  the freedom 
from forced self-incrimination and from coerced confessions.
415
  The first 
states that a person accused of a criminal offense ―shall not be compelled 
to testify against himself.‖416  Although this privilege could be narrowly 
construed to protect only in-court testimony, such a construction would 
afford relatively little protection.  Similarly, ―[c]oerced or forced 
confessions‖ are inadmissible as evidence and a conviction may not be 
made ―solely on the basis of a confession without corroborating 
evidence.‖417  These two clauses collectively protect accused persons from 
compelled confessions, whether they be true or false, made at the police 
station or during trial. 
 
A. Freedom from Compelled Self-Incrimination 
 
The freedom from compelled self-incrimination is almost absolute; 
it is trumped only where an actual grant of immunity has been bestowed 
upon the self-incriminator.  Even a high unlikelihood of prosecution does 
not prevent the invocation of the constitutional privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination.
418
  The constitutional freedom from 
compelled self-incrimination belongs to ―[a] person accused of a criminal 
offense.‖  Hearings before the Disciplinary Tribunal, although serious in 
nature, are not criminal and therefore those responding to such charges 
should not be granted the privilege against compelled self-incrimination 
(or at least the basis for the privilege should not be grounded in the 
Constitution).  The Disciplinary Tribunal has ruled that assertion of the 
privilege before the tribunal requires that the person asserting the privilege 
(or their counsel) actually assert it before the tribunal.
419
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B. Inadmissibility of Coerced Confessions as Evidence 
―Coerced‖ or ―forced‖ confessions are constitutionally excluded 
from evidence ―regardless of whether the statement was given after an 
advice of rights, and without a separate inquiry whether such statements 
were truthful.‖420  The voluntariness of a confession is measured by a 
―totality of the circumstances‖ approach, inspecting both questions of the 
capacity of the suspect and the actions of the government.
421
  Factors 
considered in determining whether the suspect had the requisite ―capacity‖ 
to voluntarily confess include the suspect‘s age, intelligence, health, and 
level of impairment due to drugs or alcohol.
422
  Actions by the government 
that tend to demonstrate an involuntary confession include physical 
threats, abuse, deceits, or impossible promises made by the police.
423
 
In Republic of Palau v. Recheluul, the defendant was taken by 
police officers to a hotel room rather than to jail in an attempt to secure her 
agreement to act as a confidential informant.
424
  The defendant‘s young 
son was with her and was also taken by the police to the hotel room.
425
  
After several hours of questioning, the defendant agreed to make a 
statement.
426
  The government then sought to use the statement against the 
defendant at her trial.
427
  The defendant objected to the admissibility of her 
statement, arguing that it was unconstitutionally procured because the 
burden of the custody of her young son added undue psychological 
pressure for her to cooperate with the police officers and because she was 
misled into believing that the police officers were going to use her as a 
confidential informant when in actuality they sought her confession to use 
against her.
428
 
                                                                                                                         
incrimination.  See id. at 38.  However, the respondent filed no response to the 
disciplinary complaint and the invocation of the privilege was never formally made to the 
tribunal.  See id.  Therefore, the tribunal found that the privilege was not properly 
invoked and did not rule on whether the privilege could be invoked by a respondent in a 
disciplinary matter.  See id.  Should the issue be properly presented to the tribunal in the 
future, it should decline to find a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in 
civil disciplinary proceedings. 
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The Court rejected the defendant‘s constitutional arguments, 
finding that the child was adequately cared for during the interrogation 
and that the police officers did not attempt to use the presence of the 
defendant‘s child against her.429  The Court further found that the police 
officers were seeking to use the defendant as a confidential informant and 
not merely seeking to elicit her confession.
430
  However, citing statutory 
authority, the Court suppressed the defendant‘s statement because the 
police officers denied the defendant‘s request to make a telephone call to 
her family during the course of the interrogation.
431
 
The Appellate Division took up contemplation of the voluntariness 
of statements made to the police in Wong v. Republic of Palau, and, similar 
to the Recheluul decision, found the statements to be voluntary.
432
  The 
Wong defendant was found guilty of the first degree murder of his 
cellmate at Koror Jail.
433
 
In Wong, a guard found the defendant‘s cellmate badly beaten, and 
asked the defendant either, ―What have you done to him?‖ or ―What 
happened to him?‖434  The defendant responded that he had ―hurt‖ or ―hit‖ 
his cellmate.
435
  While walking the defendant out of the jail to a different 
building, the officer told the defendant to ―relax, relax.‖436 The defendant 
explained that a fight had unfolded after his cellmate had taken his 
compact disc, refused to return it, and had threatened to beat him up.
437
  
The defendant was given an hour to calm down before the officer read him 
his constitutional rights.
438
 
The Court held that these statements should not be suppressed 
because the defendant‘s statements were not the result of ―interrogation‖ 
by the police.
439
  ―[C]ustodial interrogation is inherently coercive,‖ and 
therefore ―a defendant in police custody must be advised of his right to 
remain silent and right to counsel before interrogation begins.‖440  The 
                                                 
429
 See id. at 208. 
430
 See id. 
431
 See id. at 208-09 (citing 18 PNC §§ 218, 220).  Given this statutorily-based 
suppression, it was unnecessary for Justice Michelsen to indulge in any constitutional 
discussion. 
432
 Wong v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 178 (2004). 
433
 See id. at 181. 
434
 See id. at 180. 
435
 See id. 
436
 Id. 
437
 See id. at 181. 
438
 See id. 
439
 See id. at 181-82. 
440
 Id. at 182. 
2011] Bennardo  69  
Court cited to 18 PNC § 218,
441
 stating that it codifies the ―reading of 
rights‖ rule of the United States case of Miranda v. Arizona442 and 
therefore permits the consultation of United States authorities.
443
  The 
Court stated the following regarding interrogation: 
Interrogation includes ―either express questioning or its 
functional equivalent,‖ which is defined as ―any words or 
actions on the part of the police… that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the subject.‖  Rhode Island v. Innis, 100 S. 
Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980).  A defendant is interrogated for 
Miranda purposes when ―the inquiry is conducted by 
officers who are aware of the potentially incriminating 
nature of the disclosures is sought.‖  United States v. 
Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1987).  However, the 
Miranda Court distinguished ―[g]eneral on-the-scene 
questioning as to facts surrounding a crime‖ as beyond the 
reach of the rule laid down in that case.  See United States 
v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
Miranda, 86 S. Ct. at 1629); United States v. Chase, 414 
F.2d 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that limited, on-the-
scene investigative questioning need not be preceded by 
Miranda warnings).
444
 
The Court held that the guard‘s initial questioning of the defendant 
was ―on-the-scene investigative questioning‖ to ascertain what had 
occurred and the extent of the injuries, ―not a question calculated to 
extract incriminating statements.‖445  The defendant‘s subsequent 
statements, following the guard‘s statement to ―relax,‖ were held to be 
―spontaneous‖ statements not responsive to any questioning.446  As a 
result, both of the defendant‘s statements were deemed admissible. 
The Wong defendant went on to make additional incriminating 
statements after advisement of his rights.
447
  The Court found each of 
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those statements to be admissible because the defendant had been advised 
of his rights prior to making the statements.
448
  The statements that the 
defendant made before being advised of his rights did not disable the 
defendant from subsequently waiving his rights after advisement and 
confessing.
449
  Assessing the voluntariness of a defendant‘s waiver of his 
rights ―requires the court to examine the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether the will of the suspect was overborne by government 
coercion.‖450  The ―Wong test‖ for the voluntariness of a confession is 
―‗whether the confession was extracted by any sort of threats or violence, 
or obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the 
exertion of any improper influence.‘‖451  The defendant‘s subsequent 
statements were found to be voluntary; therefore, the Court found that the 
defendant‘s rights were not violated.452 
Nevertheless, Wong leaves unanswered whether the reading of pre-
interrogation warnings is a constitutional requirement or merely a 
statutory one.  It is certainly the latter, but it is unclear whether the former 
bears upon the issue as well.  Given the present statutory nature of the 
right, it is best to regard its constitutional nature as undefined, rather than 
try to perceive the boundaries of a constitutional guarantee from an 
analysis of what was largely a statutory issue. 
C. Necessity of Evidence Corroborating a Confession 
Article IV, Section 7 prohibits conviction solely based on a 
confession without ―corroborating evidence.‖453  Justice Miller, in dictum 
and without citation, stated that the Court had previous interpreted this 
clause to mean ―that a person should not be convicted where his 
confession is the only evidence that a crime was committed.‖454  While a 
reasonable interpretation, it is not particularly illuminating.  This 
constitutional guarantee is likely largely illusory, as some low quantum of 
circumstantial or other evidence will virtually always exist.  But where a 
person walks off the street and confesses to some remote offense, the 
police would at least have to engage in some investigation before a 
prosecution could be brought.  Hence, unless a defendant waived her 
constitutional rights, a prosecution could not be successfully based on a 
confession alone. 
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X. EXAMINATION AND COMPULSION OF WITNESSES 
Section 7 of Article IV guarantees a person accused of a criminal 
offense a ―full opportunity to examine all witnesses‖ as well as ―the right 
of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and evidence on his behalf 
at public expense.‖455  This ―examination clause‖ protects criminal 
defendants from anonymous accusers as well as provides a powerful tool 
to enlist witnesses in their defense.
456
 
The Appellate Division addressed the right of a criminal defendant 
to ―examine all witnesses‖ in Rechucher v. Republic of Palau.457  A 
victim‘s written statement was admitted at trial even though the victim 
testified at trial that she could no longer remember some of the events in 
question.
458
  The defendant challenged the statement as hearsay and its 
admittance as violative of his constitutional examination clause right 
because the victim could not be effectively questioned.
459
  Despite 
differences between the constitutions, the Court found United States 
confrontation clause case law instructive. 
The Court quoted language from the United States Supreme Court 
that ―when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements.‖460  The Rechucher Court recognized that the 
Crawford decision abrogated the earlier test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts
461
 to determine whether admitting 
hearsay evidence violates the ―confrontation clause.‖462  However, the 
                                                 
455
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7. 
456
 In an (unisolated) instance of post-facto ―Americanizing‖ of the Palauan 
Constitution, the right to ―examine all witnesses‖ has been referred to as the 
―Confrontation Clause‖ (a nod to the Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution‘s 
guarantee that an accused in a criminal case shall have the right ―to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him‖).  The Palauan clause is more properly known as the 
―examination clause.‖ 
457
 Rechucher v. Republic of Palau, 12 ROP 51 (2005). 
458
 See id. at 52-53. 
459
 See id. at 55. 
460
 Id. at 57 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 n.9 (2004)). 
461
 Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980). 
462
 See Rechucher, 12 ROP at 57.  Under the Roberts test: 
[H]earsay can be admitted, consistent with the Confrontation Clause in 
the United States Constitution and thus consistent with the right to 
examine witnesses granted by the Palau Constitution, if (1) the 
declarant is unavailable and (2) the statement bears adequate indicia of 
reliability. 
Id. at 56 (citing Roberts, 100 S. Ct. at 2538-39).  In Crawford: 
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Rechucher Court still engaged in a full Roberts analysis, stating that it 
need not choose between the Roberts or the Crawford approach because 
Crawford did not apply because no confrontation clause violation can 
occur if the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial.
463
  This 
reading of Crawford confuses the issue.  Crawford abrogated the Roberts 
test and therefore a finding of no constitutional impropriety under 
Crawford means that no constitutional impropriety is present, not that 
Crawford does not apply to a particular case.   
Chief Justice Ngiraklsong has since cited Crawford for the 
proposition that ―testimonial statements, including custodial police 
statements, cannot be admitted against a co-defendant because such 
statements violate the co-defendant‘s right to confront witnesses against 
him.‖464  Therefore, a co-defendant‘s statements to police are not 
admissible to the extent that the statements regard the actions of the 
declarant‘s co-defendant.465 
In a similar vein as Rechucher, the Court established that the 
examination clause is generally satisfied by a criminal defendant‘s 
opportunity to cross-examine a witness.  In Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau 
the prosecution initially interviewed a witness, but then the interview tapes 
were inadvertently destroyed.
466
  The defendants were not able to examine 
the tapes; however, the witness was called at trial and testified.  The 
defendants alleged that the destruction of the interview tapes violated their 
right to ―full opportunity to examine all witnesses.‖467  The Court looked 
to United States case law without ruling whether the Palauan examination 
clause grants more rights than its counterpart in the United States 
confrontation clause.
468
  The Court ruled that the lack of production of a 
                                                                                                                         
[T]he [United States] Supreme Court divided hearsay statements into 
testimonial and nontestimonial:  admission of nontestimonial hearsay is 
―wholly consistent‖ with the Constitution, but testimonial hearsay 
evidence may only be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if 
there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 
Id. (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374). 
463
 See id. at 57. 
464
 Republic of Palau v. Avenell, 13 ROP 266, 267 (Trial Div. 2006) 
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (citing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374). 
465
  See id. at 267-68. 
466
 Ngiraked v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 159 (1996). 
467
 See id. at 170.  The Ngiraked defendants further alleged that the destruction 
of the tapes violated their due process rights.  For more on that aspect of the decision, see 
section VII.H, supra.  
468
 See id. at 170-71. 
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witness statement does not violate the examination clause where the 
defense is permitted to cross-examine a witness at trial.
469
 
Although usually analyzed under the guise of due process,
470
 the 
government‘s non-disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant 
can raise examination clause issues if the defendant is impeded from 
calling the informant as a witness.  Nonetheless, no examination clause 
concerns are present if the court informs the defendant that the 
confidential informant may be called.
471
  Lastly, the examination clause 
does not carry with it the right for a defendant to demand that the 
government call a certain witness.
472
 
 
XI. RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
 The Constitution secures an ―accused‖ the right to counsel in 
Article IV, Section 7:  ―At all times the accused shall have the right to 
counsel.  If the accused is unable to afford counsel, he shall be assigned 
counsel by the government.‖473  The Constitution leaves open the 
questions of when the right to counsel attaches, how ―effective‖ counsel 
must be, when an accused is deemed ―unable‖ to afford counsel, and even 
who qualifies as ―counsel.‖  Case law has made steps to answer some of 
the questions, but significant issues await resolution.  The right to counsel 
– appointed or otherwise – does not extend to civil cases, as civil litigants 
are not ―accused.‖ 474   
 
A. The Right to Appointed Counsel 
 
 The right to ―appointed counsel‖ only comes into play when the 
accused is ―unable to afford counsel.‖  A proper showing of inability to 
afford counsel must be supported by sufficient evidence; a court is not 
obligated to accept a defendant‘s conclusory, unsworn statements of 
                                                 
469
 See id. at 171-72. 
470
 See section VII.I, supra. 
471
 See, e.g., Ngirailild v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 173, 175 (2004) (finding no 
constitutional violation where ―the defense was told explicitly that it could call the 
informant as a witness.‖). 
472
 See Oiterong v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 195, 198 (2002) (―There is no right 
for the defendant to compel the government to call the informant as a witness.‖ (footnote 
omitted)). 
473
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7. 
474
 Emaudiong v. Arbedul, 4 ROP Intrm. 200, 200 n.2 (1994) (stating that 
litigants–even indigent litigants–in civil cases have no constitutional right to a waiver of 
transcription fees). 
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poverty.
475
  Although the right to appointed counsel does not amount to a 
right to ―level the playing field,‖ indigent criminal defendants should, on a 
proper showing of inability to pay, be afforded other considerations—such 
as waiver of transcription fees—in order to ensure that they receive a fair 
trial. 
 Appointed counsel, although required to be zealous advocates, are 
not conscripted into slavery.  They need not press frivolous appeals on 
behalf of their clients.  Upon determination that a filed appeal is frivolous, 
appointed counsel is to make a ―no merit‖ motion accompanied by a brief 
setting forth anything in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal.
476
  The brief must be served on the client and the client must be 
given an opportunity to rebut anything in the motion or the brief.
477
  The 
court then decides whether the appeal is frivolous and therefore worthy of 
dismissal or non-frivolous and worthy of continued representation.
478
  This 
procedure safeguards the client‘s right to an attorney while also 
recognizing an attorney‘s duty to refrain from engaging in frivolous 
arguments.
479
  It should be noted, however, that in balancing these or any 
other competing interests, a thumb should always be placed on the side of 
the scale favoring the constitutional right. 
 
B. The Qualifications and Effectiveness of Counsel 
 
 In Republic of Palau v. Decherong, the Appellate Division looked 
to a memorandum issued by Chief Justice Nakamura to determine whether 
a criminal defendant‘s right to counsel had been violated by representation 
by a non-attorney ―trial counselor‖ rather than a full attorney.480  Trial 
counselors, also referred to as trial assistants, are non-attorneys who 
effectively act in the place of attorneys in both trial and pre-trial 
proceedings.  In 1983, the Chief Justice issued a memorandum to the 
Attorney General and the Public Defender that outlined the Supreme 
                                                 
475
 Wolff v. Ngiraklsong, 9 ROP 20, 20 (2001) (stating that a prior representation 
of a defendant by the Office of the Public Defender does not demonstrate inability to 
afford counsel, as that office ―has a longstanding practice of attempting to represent all 
criminal defendants who ask for counsel, regardless of need.‖). 
476
 Orrukem v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 256, 257 (1996) (stating where 
counsel determines before filing a criminal appeal that it would be frivolous, counsel 
should file the appeal and proceed with a no-merit brief). 
477
 Id. 
478
 Id. 
479
 See In re Tarkong, 4 ROP Intrm. 121, 132 (Disc. Trib. 1994) (ordering 
attorney to reimburse client for the monetary sanctions imposed for filing a frivolous 
appeal in a civil case). 
480
 Republic of Palau v. Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. 152, 161 (1990). 
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Court‘s policy on the use of such trial counselors.  The memorandum 
stated that trial counselors were to only handle criminal cases where the 
possible maximum punishment would not exceed five years.
481
  The 
memorandum further stated that this limitation necessarily restricted the 
use of trial counselors to cases assigned to the Court of Common Pleas.
482
 
 The Decherong defendant was represented by a trial counselor at 
her plea hearing despite facing a maximum of thirty years‘ imprisonment 
in violation of the Chief Justice‘s policy memorandum.483  The Appellate 
Division found that the guilty plea was void for violation of the policy set 
forth by the memorandum, but drew short of actually injecting the 
memorandum‘s policy with constitutional significance.484 
 The majority separately considered the defendant‘s constitutional 
right to ―effective‖ assistance of counsel.  The Court ruled that such 
challenges are to be brought by collateral attack through a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus rather than via a direct appeal.
485
  The Court cited 
United States case law for the rationale behind this approach:  ineffective 
assistance claims usually require development of facts outside the record 
and habeas proceedings provide an appropriate format for such 
development.
486
  A trial court‘s failure to take sua sponte notice of 
―obviously‖ inadequate representation, however, could properly be 
brought on direct appeal as it involves the actions of the trial judge rather 
than defense counsel.
487
  Therefore, ―as a matter of policy, future claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel [shall] be brought via a writ, unless the 
claimed conduct of counsel is so egregious as to amount to ‗plain 
error.‘‖488 
 In concurrence, Justice Ngiraklsong complained that the majority 
permitted the Chief Justice to ―establish ‗judicial policy‘ by memoranda 
                                                 
481
 See id. at 160-61. 
482
 See id. at 161. 
483
 See id. 
484
 Id. (―Because appellant‘s guilty pleas were ultimately taken in the Trial 
Division of the Supreme Court, defendant‘s representation by a trial counselor in that 
court violates the procedure established in the 1983 memorandum from the Chief 
Justice.‖).  In doing so, the Court regarded the memorandum as a ―court rule,‖ the 
violation of which could result in the reversal of a conviction, but avoided the 
constitutional issue.  Furthermore, the Court stated that it was unclear whether the trial 
counselor was retained or appointed.  Id. at 154.  But retention of a trial counselor could 
not violate the defendant‘s constitutional right to counsel, for such retention would be the 
defendant‘s choice and act as a waiver of any right to representation by a full-fledged 
attorney. 
485
 Id. at 167-68. 
486
 Id. at 167. 
487
 Id. at 167-68. 
488
 Id. at 168 (citation omitted). 
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regarding constitutional issues such as effectiveness of counsel.‖489  
Justice Ngiraklsong felt that, given the purpose of the right to counsel, 
which is to ensure that a criminal defendant does not suffer as a result of 
ignorance of the law, the Decherong defendant was constitutionally 
entitled to the assistance of an attorney rather than a trial counselor.
490
  
Although he concurred in the outcome, Justice Ngiraklsong voiced his 
opinion that the policy of the use of trial counselors should be formed by 
the legislature or through judicial opinions, not by a memorandum.
491
 
 Following Decherong, the ―right to counsel‖ guarantee of Article 
IV, Section 7 has been specifically construed to ―confer a right to effective 
assistance of counsel‖ and ―to give rise to a constitutional claim where 
counsel‘s performance was deficient and the deficiency prejudiced the 
defense.‖492  In Saunders v. Republic of Palau, the Appellate Division 
confirmed the dictum of Decherong directing ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims to be made by collateral attack rather than on direct 
appeal.
493
  Only where the ―record is sufficiently developed‖ to allow a 
reviewing court to rule on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
without any additional evidence is it proper to bring such a claim by direct 
appeal.
494
  This holding clarifies the Decherong dictum stating that direct 
appeal is appropriate where ―plain error‖ by the trial court occurs.495 
 Citing Saunders, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong stated that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims cannot be brought or resolved until after 
judgment is entered in the trial court because no prejudice can be 
                                                 
489
 Id. at 170 (Ngiraklsong, J., concurring).  Justice Ngiraklsong has since 
succeeded Chief Justice Nakamura as Chief Justice. 
490
 Id. at 171. 
491
 Id. at 172. 
492
 Saunders v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 90, 90-91 (1999). 
493
 Id. at 91. 
494
 Id. at 92. 
495
 Id. at 92 n.5 (citing Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. at 167-68).  The Saunders 
decision does not, however, limit ineffective assistance of counsel claims to actions of 
counsel, rather than actions of the trial court.  A trial court could limit counsel‘s ability to 
defend her client so stringently that the defendant is deprived of effective assistance of 
her counsel.  Such a possibility was overlooked in Ngirailild v. Republic of Palau, 11 
ROP 173, 174 (2004) (―[A]n ineffective assistance claim turns on decisions made and 
actions taken by counsel, not by the court.‖).  The Ngirailild Court should not have 
summarily rejected the appellant‘s claim that the trial court‘s order to limit disclosure of 
the identity of a confidential informant to defense counsel and not to the defendant 
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel.  While that order may not have 
violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to counsel, an order severely restricting the 
length of time defense counsel could speak to a defendant (or another similarly stringent 
restriction) could—by the act of the court, not the act of counsel—violate the defendant‘s 
right to effective assistance of counsel. 
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demonstrated before that time.
496
  Although the record is usually 
inadequate for a trial court to assess the effectiveness of counsel, and few 
attorneys would move for a finding of their own ineffectiveness, a trial 
judge should be free to find ineffective assistance when the ineffectiveness 
of counsel is clear from conduct before the judge.  A trial judge should not 
be forced to turn a blind eye to gross ineffectiveness, find the defendant 
guilty, and hope that justice is served on collateral attack. 
 An important aspect of the constitutional right to counsel is the 
right to an attorney unencumbered by conflicts of interest.
497
  In 
safeguarding the right to counsel, a court may refuse to accept a criminal 
defendant‘s waiver of her attorney‘s conflicts.498  The rejection of such a 
waiver is questionable and perhaps overly paternalistic because a criminal 
defendant‘s right to counsel is wholly waivable.  By extension, it seems 
reasonable that a facet of that right—the right to unconflicted counsel—
should also be waivable. 
                                                 
496
 Republic of Palau v. Wolff, 10 ROP 180, 181 (Trial Div. 2002) (Ngiraklsong, 
C.J.) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised in post-trial 
habeas proceedings).  Even given the perceived prematurity of the motion, the Chief 
Justice found that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not stand where it was 
the actions of the defendant that ―destroyed‖ the attorney-client relationship.  See id. at 
182-83. 
497
 See generally Republic of Palau v. Taunton, 15 ROP 170 (Trial Div. 2008) 
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.). 
498
 See id. at 174-75 (adopting the holding of Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 
1692, 1698-99 (1988)). 
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XII. DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE 
 
 Section 6 of Article IV states that ―[n]o person shall be placed in 
double jeopardy for the same offense.‖499  This relatively simple statement 
raises substantial questions, such as when it is applicable, when jeopardy 
attaches, and what qualifies as the ―same offense.‖  The Supreme Court 
has resolved these questions to some degree. 
 
A. Jeopardy Limited to Criminal Prosecutions 
 
 The double jeopardy clause is a right to be free from criminal 
prosecution.  As the Court declared in Sugiyama v. Republic of Palau:  
―The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple civil actions by 
the government.‖500  In Sugiyama, officers confiscated two illegally 
undersized sea creatures from a restaurant and the Trial Division imposed 
a civil fine of $1,000 per illegal sea creature upon each of the three 
defendants:  the employee who procured the sea creatures, the employee‘s 
supervisor, and the owner of the restaurant.
501
  Although the Sugiyama 
proceeding may have been facially ―civil‖ in nature, the defendants argued 
that the ―penalties‖ imposed were punitive in purpose.502  Despite the 
Court‘s dicta to the contrary, it seems that multiple suits seeking civil 
penalties may raise constitutional questions.
503
  Thus, careful 
consideration of the nature of a proceeding must form the basis of any 
                                                 
499
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 6. 
500
 Sugiyama v. Republic of Palau, 9 ROP 5, 7 (2001). 
501
 Id. at 6. 
502
 The Marine Protection Act of 1994 provides for civil penalties in 27 PNC § 
1210.  The owner of the restaurant in Sugiyama claimed a double jeopardy violation 
because he paid three fines in total—his own fine plus the fines of his employees.  Id. at 
7.  The Appellate Division was unimpressed, stating that ―[t]he fact that one defendant 
chooses to pay the others‘ fines does not result in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.‖  Id.  This result is sensible because defendants could otherwise raise double 
jeopardy violations by conspiring to have one defendant pay the fines of all co-
defendants.  Double jeopardy is analyzed based on whom the punishment is assessed 
against, not based on who actually pays the fine. 
503
 Double jeopardy considerations should likewise apply to restitution awards in criminal 
actions.  In Blanco v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 205 (2009), the Appellate Division left 
open the question of whether a subsequent upward modification of restitution damages 
violates the double jeopardy clause.  See Blanco, 16 ROP at 208.  Because the Appellate 
Division disallowed the upward modification in restitution on non-constitutional grounds 
(finding that the Trial Division‘s jurisdiction to modify the sentence expired seven days 
after imposition of the sentence per ROP R. CRIM. P. 35), it properly declined to address 
the double jeopardy implications of the modification of a restitution award five months 
after sentencing. 
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double jeopardy analysis. 
 
B. The Attachment of Jeopardy 
 
 In wrestling with the question of whether jeopardy had attached, 
the Appellate Division laid much of the foundation for later interpretations 
of the double jeopardy clause in the early case of Akiwo v. Supreme Court 
of the Republic of Palau Trial Division.
504
  Upon defense counsel‘s motion 
that the prosecuting attorney was not qualified to serve as special 
prosecutor, the Akiwo defendant‘s first prosecution ended in dismissal 
after the presentation of the first witness.
505
  A second information was 
then filed and the defendant objected on grounds of double jeopardy per 
Article IV, Section 6.
506
  Citing United States case law, the Court outlined 
the interests involved in the double jeopardy clause: 
 
The double jeopardy provision manifests a constitutional 
policy of finality in criminal proceedings for the benefit of 
the defendant.  If a defendant is acquitted, or if he is 
convicted and the conviction is upheld on appeal, he may 
not be retried for the same offense.  In cases culminating in 
an acquittal, this will prevent the Government from having 
another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to 
offer in the earlier proceeding.
507
 
 
The Court also noted that a defendant has the right to have her guilt or 
innocence decided in a single proceeding in front of a particular tribunal, 
that the government should not be allowed multiple attempts to prosecute, 
and that a defendant should not be punished multiple times for the same 
offense.
508
  However, these interests must be balanced against ―society‘s 
interests in the fair and prompt administration of justice.‖509 
 The Court found two general rules in United States case law:  (1) 
―[w]hen a mistrial is declared upon the motion of defendant, or otherwise 
with his consent, the general rule is that the double jeopardy bar to 
reprosecution is removed‖ except where the reason for the mistrial is 
prosecutorial or judicial misconduct intended to provoke the defendant 
                                                 
504
 Akiwo v. Sup. Ct. of the Republic of Palau Trial Division, 1 ROP Intrm. 96 
(1984). 
505
 Id. at 97-98. 
506
 Id. at 98. 
507
 Id. at 99 (citations omitted). 
508
 Id. at 99-100. 
509
 Id. at 100. 
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into moving for a mistrial, and (2) ―[w]hen a mistrial is declared over a 
defendant‘s objection or where he has not consented to the mistrial, the 
general rule is that double jeopardy bars retrial‖ except where mistrial was 
justified by ―manifest necessity.‖510  The Court found that jeopardy 
(―exposure to danger‖) had attached in Akiwo (a bench trial) because the 
first witness had been sworn and had given testimony.
511
  However, the 
Court ruled that the defendant could be retried because the motion for 
dismissal could have been brought before jeopardy attached and the Trial 
Division specifically stated that the Government could re-file the case.
512
 
 
C. Multiple Punishments 
 
 Aside from barring multiple prosecutions, the double jeopardy 
clause also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.  
This guarantee raises the issue of how to define a single ―offense‖ and 
when multiple charges are permissible.   In Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 
the Appellate Division laid out its analysis of this issue in concluding that 
aggravated assault and use of a firearm constitute different offenses and 
are therefore separately punishable.
513
  In its analysis, the Appellate Court 
applied the so-called ―Blockburger test,‖ imported from the United 
States.
514
  The Blockburger test finds that two offenses are ―separate‖ if 
each of the offenses requires proof of a different statutory element.
515
  A 
single act can therefore be punished as two separate offenses without 
offending the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
516
 
                                                 
510
 Id. at 101. 
511
 Id. at 102. 
512
 Id. at 104-05.  Jeopardy has attached—and retrial is barred by the double 
jeopardy clause—where the appellate court overturns a conviction for lack of legally 
sufficient evidence.  See Republic of Palau v. Tmetuchl, 1 ROP Intrm. 443, 465 (1988) 
(noting that retrial was barred where Appellate Division overturned the convictions of the 
alleged assassins of Palau‘s first President for lack of reasonable evidence).  Justice King, 
writing separately, opined that the majority‘s application of the double jeopardy clause to 
pre-deny retrial of the defendants was premature.  See id. at 511-13 (King, J., concurring-
in-part and dissenting in-part).  Although unnecessary dictum, the majority likely made 
this note to discourage further prosecution in a politically and emotionally charged case.  
(Justice King opined that the prosecutorial misconduct in the case was so great that the 
convictions should be overturned for a violation of Article IV, Section 6‘s due process 
guarantee.  See id. at 506-07.) 
513
 Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 343 (1993). 
514
 See id. at 346-47 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932)). 
515
 See id. 
516
 See id. at 347.  Quite sensibly, ―[i]f the two convictions are based on different 
acts then the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated.‖  Mechol v. Republic of Palau, 9 
ROP 17, 19 (2001).  The defendant in Mechol had forged the Director of the Palau 
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 The Court applied the test to find separate offenses because each 
offense required proof of an element that the other did not.
517
  Specifically, 
aggravated assault requires an unlawful assault while the use of a firearm 
requires use of a gun.
518
  The Court further noted that the legislative intent 
did not favor a fifteen-year mandatory minimum which accompanies ―use 
of a firearm‖ to envelope all crimes involving the use of a firearm. The 
Court sensibly concluded that ―[a] person who shoots a human and is 
convicted of Aggravated Assault and Use of a Firearm would face no 
greater sentence than the person who shoots a beer can on a tree stump and 
is convicted of only Use of a Firearm.‖519   
 In an earlier opinion, Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, the Court had 
held that attempted murder in the second degree merged with use of a 
firearm because the ―same evidence‖ was required to establish each of 
those offenses in that case.
520
  The Kazuo decision overruled Ngiraboi to 
the extent it was inconsistent, thereby eviscerating the ―same evidence‖ 
test for future offenders.  However, because Kazuo broke new ground in 
applying the Blockburger test, the Court applied the old ―same evidence‖ 
rule of Ngiraboi to the Kazuo defendant and vacated the sentence on 
aggravated assault.
521
  While applying an overruled standard to a 
constitutional issue is questionable, the Ngiraboi ―same evidence‖ test 
resulted in a more favorable result to the Kazuo defendant than the Kazuo-
Blockburger test, so no harm was visited on the defendant‘s rights.522 
 The Appellate Division further refined the double jeopardy right in 
Scott v. Republic of Palau.
523
  The defendant in Scott was convicted of 
four counts of arson after a fire she set in one apartment spread and 
                                                                                                                         
Maritime Agency‘s signature on fishing permits and then later photocopied his own 
signature onto the same permits in an attempt to conceal the forgeries.  See id.  The 
Appellate Division found that these two acts constituted separate offenses and therefore 
could be separately punished without violation of the double jeopardy clause.  See id. 
517
 See Kazuo, 3 ROP Intrm. at 347. 
518
 See id. 
519
 Id. at 348. 
520
 Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 272 (1991). 
521
 Kazuo, 3 ROP Intrm. at 349. 
522
 The Court engaged in dicta in a footnote, stating that ―[w]here the question is 
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a subsequent prosecution following an 
acquittal or conviction,‖ the subsequent prosecution will be barred if, in order to establish 
any element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct 
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.  See id. 
at 348 n.3.  Because this scenario was not even tangentially before the Court, the Court 
should have refrained from commentary or said merely that a different rule may apply in 
such a situation. 
523
 Scott v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 92 (2003). 
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destroyed numerous adjacent buildings.
524
  The Court recounted that the 
double jeopardy clause protects three separate interests:  to avoid being 
tried, convicted, or punished for the same offense more than once.
525
  The 
issue in Scott was whether the defendant was subjected to multiple 
punishments for the same offense.  While recognized as good law, the 
Kazuo-Blockburger test was not applied because its application is limited 
to when a defendant is tried under two different statutory provisions.  
Conversely, the Scott defendant was convicted four times under a single 
statutory provision.
526
  The Court therefore sought to determine what ―unit 
of prosecution‖ was intended by the statutory provision.  This approach is 
also referred to elsewhere as the ―same transaction‖ test.527 
 The arson statute punishes every person who, with the requisite 
intent, ―set[s] fire to or burn[s] any [building].‖528  The Court inspected 
whether the ―unit of prosecution‖ intended by the statute was the act of 
―setting fire to or burning‖ or whether it focused on ―any building.‖529  
After attempting to review the legislative history (and finding none) and 
identifying an analogue in United States law, the Court concluded that the 
proper unit of prosecution was the act of setting the fire.  Therefore, 
―where a defendant starts only one fire, the statute permits only one 
conviction.‖530  The Appellate Division found that two of the defendant‘s 
arson convictions violated her double jeopardy rights because only one 
fire was set.
531
 
 The terms ―multiplicity‖ and ―duplicity‖ are sometimes employed 
when referring to double jeopardy violations: 
 
Multiplicity of charges refers to the improper charging of 
the same offense in several counts in the information.  This 
should not be confused with duplicity, which is the 
charging of separate offenses in a single count.
532
 
 
The Scott Court found that the sentences imposed for the remaining two 
arson counts were multiplicitous because only one crime had actually been 
                                                 
524
 Id. at 94. 
525
 Id. at 96. 
526
 See id. 
527
 See id. & n.4. 
528
 17 PNC § 401(a). 
529
 See Scott, 10 ROP at 96-97. 
530
 Id. at 97. 
531
 See id. 
532
 Republic of Palau v. Avenell, 13 ROP 268, 269 n.2 (Trial Div. 2006) 
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (citations omitted). 
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committed.
533
  The first count charged the arson of a dwelling and the 
apartments, including a laundry and two salons.
534
  The second count 
charged the arson of an office and the apartments, including a laundry and 
two salons.
535
  The only difference between the counts was the presence of 
the ―dwelling‖ in the first count, thereby subjecting the defendant to the 
enhanced penalty provision applicable only to arson of dwellings.  The 
Court found the charges multiplicitous and vacated the sentence that 
resulted from the conviction of the latter count.
536
 
 Chief Justice Ngiraklsong addressed a multiplicity argument in a 
later case in which the defendant had removed a porthole and possibly 
other items from a shipwreck in the Palau Lagoon.
537
  The government 
charged, in separate counts, violation of the Palau Lagoon Monument Act, 
grand larceny, malicious mischief, conversion of public funds and 
property, and improper removal from territorial waters.
538
  Despite finding 
that the issue of multiplicity was waived because the defendant did not file 
a timely motion, the Court went on to analyze the hypothetical merits of 
the defendant‘s arguments.539 
 The Chief Justice identified three protections afforded by the 
double jeopardy clause:  ―against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same 
offense.‖540  Even though multiplicity in charging does not fall into any of 
the three categories, it offends the double jeopardy clause because it 
creates the potential for multiple punishments for a single offense.
541
  
Applying the Kazuo-Blockburger test, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found no 
double jeopardy violation because each of the charges required proof of 
separate elements.
542
 
 The appellant in Uehara v. Republic of Palau alleged the 
government‘s charging document was duplicitous because Counts 87-89 
(perjury) and Counts 90-92 (misconduct in public office) were each 
                                                 
533
 See Scott, 10 ROP at 98. 
534
 Id. 
535
 Id. 
536
 Id. at 99. 
537
 See Avenell, 13 ROP at 269. 
538
 Id. 
539
 Id. at 270. 
540
 Id. 
541
 Id. at 270 n.4. 
542
 Id. at 271-72 (―[I]t is possible to violate the Palau Lagoon Monument Act 
without committing grand larceny, and it is possible to commit grand larceny without 
violating the Palau Lagoon Monument Act.‖). 
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contained in a single paragraph.
543
  The Appellate Division defined 
duplicity as ―where a single count charges the defendant with more than 
one criminal offense‖ and stated it is ―troublesome because it may be 
unclear whether a subsequent conviction rests on merely one of the 
offenses within a single count and, if so, which one.‖544  Upon reviewing 
the information, the Uehara Court found no double jeopardy violation 
because although three counts were consolidated into one paragraph, each 
count was separated within the paragraph.
545
 
 
D. Double Jeopardy Implications of Suspended Sentences 
 
 A later imposition of a suspended sentence does not violate a 
defendant‘s double jeopardy rights, even if the entirety of the sentence is 
imposed (e.g., the defendant does not receive credit for the time during 
which the sentence was suspended).  In Blesoch v. Republic of Palau, the 
appellant, Blesoch, pled guilty to two counts of trafficking of a controlled 
substance.
546
  On August 12, 2008, the Trial Division sentenced Blesoch to 
three years imprisonment, but suspended the entire sentence and placed 
the defendant on probation for that period.
547
 
 After more than a year on probation, on August 28, 2009, Blesoch 
pled guilty to five new charges (larceny, burglary-related, and traffic 
offenses) and was sentenced to five years in prison on these new 
convictions, but the Trial Division suspended the final three years of the 
sentence (and ordered probation for that time).
548
  These 2009 convictions 
constituted violations of Blesoch‘s 2008 probation and, at an October 14, 
2009 revocation hearing, the Trial Division ordered Blesoch to serve one 
year of his suspended three-year sentence on the 2008 trafficking 
convictions.
549
  That year of imprisonment was to be served consecutively 
to Blesoch‘s two-year prison term for the 2009 convictions.550 
 Meting out the dates, if Blesoch had served three years in prison 
for his trafficking conviction starting on August 12, 2008, he would have 
                                                 
543
 Uehara v. Republic of Palau, Crim. App. No. 09-001, slip op. at 13 (Apr. 29, 
2010). 
544
 Id. at 13-14. 
545
 See id. at 14 (―Even a quick read makes apparent that each paragraph charged 
three counts of perjury and three counts of misconduct in public office.‖). 
546
 Blesoch v. Republic of Palau, Crim. App. No. 09-003, slip op. at 1-2 (May 
21, 2010). 
547
 Id. at 2. 
548
 Id. 
549
 Id. 
550
 Id. 
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completed his sentence by August 12, 2011.  In reality, however, Blesoch 
was sentenced to serve two years for the 2009 convictions starting on 
August 28, 2009 and then was set to serve his one-year sentence for the 
2008 trafficking convictions.  Therefore, Blesoch would not finish his 
prison sentence on the 2008 trafficking convictions until August 28, 
2012—more than four years after he had been sentenced for the 2008 
convictions—for which he had only received a sentence of three years.  
Blesoch appealed, arguing that this sentencing arrangement violated his 
right to be free from double jeopardy.  He argued that ―all punishment for 
his 2008 offense—whether probation or jail time—must conclude within 
three years of the date of the original sentence, that is, by August 12, 
2011.‖551 
 The Appellate Division interpreted Blesoch‘s argument to be that 
―he should receive credit against his original three-year prison sentence for 
time spent on probation, such that the court cannot impose a prison 
sentence that would, when added to his probation, exceed a total of three 
years.‖552  The Court rejected this argument, citing United States case law 
holding that ―[t]he general rule is that, upon revocation of probation, the 
sentencing court may execute the entire sentence that it originally imposed 
and suspended.‖553  Upon revocation of a convicted person‘s probation for 
violation of its terms, the Trial Division ―has the discretion to impose the 
entire suspended prison sentence or any lesser term.‖554  The execution of 
a suspended sentence does not violate a defendant‘s double jeopardy rights 
because it does not amount to multiple punishments for the same 
offense—it is merely the execution of the original punishment.555 
 
XIII. ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RIGHTS AND RIGHTS OF THE 
ACCUSED 
 
A. Overview 
 
 Article IV, Section 7 guarantees numerous rights to ―accused‖ 
persons.  Such basic rights include the right to ―be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ the right to ―be informed 
of the nature of the accusation,‖ and the right ―to a speedy, public and 
                                                 
551
 Id. at 2-3. 
552
 Id. at 3. 
553
 Id. at 4. 
554
 Id. at 5. 
555
 Id. 
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impartial trial.‖556  Accused persons in custody are to be ―separated from 
convicted criminals‖ and further separated ―on the basis of sex and 
age.‖557  Those in pre-trial custody are guaranteed non-excessive bail.  
Section 6 of Article IV prohibits ex post facto punishment, conviction or 
punishment by legislation, and imprisonment for debt.  Article IV was 
amended to include a limited jury-trial right for qualifying criminal 
defendants in Section 14. 
 
B. Bail Provision 
 
 The Appellate Division has cited the bail provision of Section 7 as 
authority to grant post-conviction bail.
558
  The Constitution, however, only 
provides for bail to be set for those ―detained before trial.‖559  Section 7 
offers no authority to offer and affords no right to request release on bail 
after conviction. 
 
C. Habeas Corpus 
 
 Article IV, Section 7 ―recognizes‖ the writ of habeas corpus and 
prohibits its suspension.  Although useful to accused persons in pre-trial 
custody,
560
 the writ of habeas corpus is often invoked by convicted 
criminals and others in physical detention.
561
 
 
                                                 
556
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7. 
557
 Id.  Convicted criminals do not enjoy an explicit constitutional right to be 
separated by sex or age. 
558
 See Republic of Palau v. Tmetuchl, 1 ROP Intrm. 296, 297 (1986) (grant of 
bail pending appeal to criminal defendants convicted of murder and conspiracy); 
Republic of Palau v. Decherong, 1 ROP Intrm. 438 (1988) (grant of bail and release 
pending appeal to defendant convicted by plea to charges of embezzlement). 
559
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7. 
560
 See e.g., In re Oiwil, 1 ROP Intrm. 238 (Trial Div. 1985) (Nakamura, C.J.) 
(granting writs of habeas corpus to petitioners arrested in Palau on arrest warrants issued 
by the United States District Court for the Territory of Guam). 
561
 The Appellate Division reversed the Trial Division‘s grant of a writ of habeas 
corpus in Ringang v. Chiang, 16 ROP 129 (2009).  The issuance of the writ was a moot 
point, however, because the petitioner‘s conviction had been overturned by the time the 
appeal of the issuance of the writ was decided.  Despite noting the mootness of the 
appeal, the Appellate Division addressed the merits of the appeal and the issuance of the 
writ and found that the petitioner had not been denied effective assistance of counsel.  See 
Ringang, 16 ROP at 131, 133-34. 
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D. Liability of National Government for Unlawful Arrest and Damage to 
Private Property 
 
 Section 7 of Article IV states that ―[t]he national government may 
be held liable in a civil action for unlawful arrest or damage to private 
property‖ but then limits that liability ―as prescribed by law.‖562  In the 
early days of the Constitution, the Trial Division ruled that ―prescribed by 
law‖ included laws of the Trust Territory government.563  As Justice Lane 
stated, ―no requirement is expressed that the Palau Congress must 
prescribe them.‖564  Therefore, the Constitution did not supersede the Trust 
Territory laws waiving immunity from civil suit.
565
  The provision 
permitting suits against the national government for unlawful arrest or 
damage to private property does not apply to a suit for non-payment for 
work rendered.
566
 
 
E. The Accused’s Right to Be Informed of the Nature of the Accusation 
 
 An accused person ―enjoy[s] the right to be informed of the nature 
of the accusation‖ against her.567  Violation of this right also implicates 
due process concerns, discussion of which may be found in section VII.F, 
supra. 
 Charges for minor offenses are often issued by citation.  The 
defendant in An Guiling v. Republic of Palau, argued that his charge by 
citation failed to plead the essential elements of the crime and therefore 
violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him.
568
  The constitutional requirement that a 
charging instrument must sufficiently allege all essential elements of the 
charged offense may not be waived, and therefore may be challenged for 
                                                 
562
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7. 
563
 See Ngirausui v. Nat’l Gov’t of the Republic of Palau, 1 ROP Intrm. 185 
(Trial Div. 1985) (Lane, J.). 
564
 Id. at 186. 
565
 Id. (applying ROP CONST. ART. XV, § 3(a), which provides that all existing 
laws in effect at the time of the Constitution remain in force). 
566
 See Renguul v. Ililau, 1 ROP Intrm. 188, 190 (Trial Div. 1985) (Sutton, J.) 
(―This section clearly is not applicable to the present case.‖).  The Renguul case dealt 
with a complaint by a plaintiff who had contracted to haul lumber to a sawmill and saw it 
to specification in return for a sum of money, but had not been paid for the services.  See 
id. at 188. 
567
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 7. 
568
 An Guiling v. Republic of Palau, 11 ROP 132 (2004). 
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the first time on appeal.
569
  On the other hand, an objection that the 
charging instrument fails as to its factual specificity may be waived if not 
raised at the appropriate juncture.
570
  As set forth by 18 PNC § 101(c), a 
criminal citation briefly describes the criminal charge and instructs the 
defendant to appear at a specified time and place to answer the charge.
571
  
The Court of Common Pleas may accept a criminal citation in lieu of a 
formal information for misdemeanor offenses.
572
 
 The brevity of criminal citations creates the potential for violation 
of the constitutional guarantee that an accused has the right to have ―the 
offense charged [] set forth with sufficient certainty so that the defendant 
will be able to intelligently prepare a defense.‖573  A charging instrument 
is also constitutionally required to be specific enough ―to provide 
protection against [the defendant] being tried a second time for the same 
offense‖ in violation of the double jeopardy clause.574 
 The An Guiling Court held that the restriction of the use of 
criminal citations to ―simple misdemeanors‖ and the issuance of such a 
citation ―soon after the offense is committed‖ with a reference to the time 
and place of the offense sufficiently ―put[s] the defendant on notice of 
charges relating to a particular incident.‖575  The information contained in 
the An Guiling defendant‘s citation—the approximate time, date, and 
location of the offense and the name of the offense charged (―disturbing 
the peace‖)—was held to be sufficient to allow him to prepare his defense 
and to protect him from a second trial arising out of the same offense.
576
 
 The An Guiling ―simple misdemeanor‖ restriction is worrisome.  
The constitutional right to be informed of the charges applies to 
misdemeanors as well as felonies.  The emphasis must therefore be placed 
on the word ―simple‖ rather than the word ―misdemeanors.‖  
Misdemeanors may be complex and a brief citation may not pass 
constitutional muster for such allegations.  Only when the allegations are 
simple—and therefore detailed explanation is unnecessary to put the 
defendant on notice of the nature of the charges—should the limited 
information contained in a criminal citation pass constitutional muster. 
 
                                                 
569
 See id. at 134. 
570
 See id. 
571
 See id. at 134-35. 
572
 See id. 
573
 Id. at 135. 
574
 Id. 
575
 Id. 
576
 See id. at 136. 
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F. The Accused’s Right to a Speedy Trial 
 
 Charging within the statute of limitations does not guarantee that 
an accused‘s right to a speedy trial is met.577  The Republic of Palau v. 
Decherong majority recognized Palau‘s pre-Constitution adoption of the 
four speedy trial factors laid out in Barker v. Wingo:
578
  length of delay, the 
reason(s) for the delay, the defendant‘s assertion of the right to a speedy 
trial, and prejudice to the defendant.
579
  ―[M]ost important[ly],‖ because 
the Decherong defendant did not articulate any prejudice caused by the 
delay between the start of her prosecution and the planned trial, the 
majority found no violation of her speedy trial right despite a seventeen 
month delay between arrest and guilty plea.
580
 
 The Appellate Division found no merit in the defendants‘ 
contention that they were denied their constitutional and statutory speedy 
trial rights in Republic of Palau v. Sisior.
581
  A twenty-one month period 
intervened between the time of the Sisior defendants‘ arrest and the 
issuance of the information charging them with a crime.
582
  At the time of 
their arrest, the defendants signed a statement and were released from 
custody.
583
  Citing Decherong, the Court stated that the speedy trial right is 
―relative to the circumstances of the case and permits certain delays.‖584  
Because the defendants were not subjected to pre-charging restraint 
following arrest, the speedy trial right did not attach until the filing of the 
information.
585
  The Court noted but ultimately did not decide that a delay 
in the filing of a charging document could potentially violate the due 
process clause of Article IV, Section 6.
586
  The Court went on to find that 
the six and one-half month delay between the filing of the information and 
trial was not presumptively prejudicial and did not, under a Decherong-
                                                 
577
 See Republic of Palau v. Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. 152, 163 (1990) (―[O]n 
rare occasions there are speedy trial considerations even for prosecutions begun within 
the limitations period.‖). 
578
 Barker v. Wingo, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2186-95 (1972). 
579
 See Decherong, 2 ROP Intrm. at 164 (citing Trust Territory v. Waayan, 7 TTR 
560, 563-66 (1977)). 
580
 See id. at 165-66.  Justice Ngiraklsong concurred in the result, but opined that 
the Court should not have even engaged in speedy trial analysis because that issue had 
not been appealed.  See id. at 172-73 (Ngiraklsong, J., concurring). 
581
 Republic of Palau v. Sisior, 4 ROP Intrm. 152 (1994). 
582
 Id. at 154. 
583
 Id. 
584
 Id. at 158. 
585
 Id. at 159. 
586
 Id. at 159 n.1. 
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Barker analysis, violate the speedy trial right of the defendants.
587
 
 As stated by Chief Justice Ngiraklsong in Republic of Palau v. 
Wolff, even a lengthy pre-trial delay does not violate the speedy trial right 
if the delay is attributable to the defendant.
588
  The Chief Justice applied 
the Decherong-Barker factors and found that the defendant‘s freedom 
from confinement for the entirety of the pre-trial period, the defendant‘s 
lack of attempts to press for a trial, and the defendant‘s failure to show 
prejudice resulting from the delay all weighed against the finding of a 
constitutional violation.
589
 
 
G. The Accused’s Right to an Impartial Trial 
 
 The constitutional right to an ―impartial trial‖ may be more 
appropriately labeled the right to an ―impartial judge‖ or ―impartial fact-
finder,‖ as the trial itself cannot be partial or impartial.  A defendant 
convicted of rape appealed his conviction on, inter alia, the constitutional 
basis that he was denied a ―fair trial‖ by the bias of the trial judge in Liep 
v. Republic of Palau.
590
  In scrutinizing the partiality of the trial judge, the 
Liep Court examined the ―entire record‖ of the case to determine whether 
it was left with an ―abiding impression‖ of partiality.591  Upon conclusion 
of its analysis, the Appellate Division was left with no such ―abiding 
impression.‖ 
 Post-Liep, the Appellate Division has employed more stringent 
language, stating that a judge‘s bias violates a defendant‘s right to an 
impartial trial ―only in the most extreme of cases.‖592  Without hinting at 
what those extreme cases might be, the Court quoted a United States case 
to say that ―[m]atters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of 
interest, would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative 
discretion.‖593  If these matters, particularly ―kinship‖ and ―personal bias,‖ 
are to be taken out of the mix, it would indeed take an ―extreme‖ case for 
a judge‘s bias to be found to constitute a constitutional violation. 
 
                                                 
587
 Id. at 160. 
588
 Republic of Palau v. Wolff, 10 ROP 180, 183-84 (Trial Div. 2002) 
(Ngiraklsong, C.J.) (finding thirty month pre-trial delay after the filing of the information 
constitutional because the delay was attributable to the defendant‘s health and his off-
island travel seeking medical treatment). 
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 Id. 
590
 Liep v. Republic of Palau, 5 ROP Intrm. 5 (1994). 
591
 Id. at 9. 
592
 Sandei v. Tungelel Lineage, 8 ROP Intrm. 228, 299 (2000). 
593
 Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1584-85 (1986)). 
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H. Ex Post Facto Laws 
 
 The ex post facto clause of Article IV, Section 6 ―is violated when 
a law defining a crime or increasing punishment for a crime is applied to 
events that occurred before its enactment to the ‗disadvantage‘ of the 
offender.‖594  The ex post facto clause is not violated by the application of 
a statute describing a ―continuing offense‖ to an enterprise that began prior 
to, but continued after, the effective date of the statute.
595
 
 In Republic of Palau v. Siang, Justice Miller found that the 
retroactive application of an extended statute of limitations for criminal 
prosecution of grand larceny violated neither the ex post facto nor the due 
process clauses of Article IV, Section 6.
596
  Justice Miller borrowed United 
States law to find that prosecution under an extended statute of limitations 
does not violate the Constitution unless the time for prosecution had 
expired before the extension went into effect.
597
  Because the three-year 
statute of limitations had not run before it was enlarged to six years, the 
Court found that the extension to six years was constitutionally 
permissible.
598
 
 
I. The Accused’s Right to a Jury Trial 
 
 The Ninth Amendment added a fourteenth section to Article IV.  
Section 14 permits the legislature to provide for jury trials in both criminal 
and civil cases.
599
  The legislature was not previously banned from 
instituting jury trial by statute, so this clause of Section 14 carried little 
significance.  Of more consequence, however, is the second clause of 
Section 14 which creates an accused‘s ―right to a trial by jury, as 
prescribed by law‖ for criminal offenses alleged to have been committed 
after December 31, 2009 and punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of 
                                                 
594
 Pamintuan v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 32, 41 (2008) (citing Collins v. 
Youngblood, 110 S. Ct. 2715, 2718 (1990)). 
595
 Id.  The Pamintuan Court found no ex post facto clause violation in a human 
trafficking conviction where the criminalized conduct—―harboring‖ a trafficked 
person—continued after the enactment of the statute.  Id. at 43. 
596
 Republic of Palau v. Siang, 10 ROP 202 (Trial Div. 2002) (Miller, J.).  The 
court need not have reached the constitutional question, however, because it found that 
the defendant‘s absence from the Republic tolled the statute of limitations so that neither 
the three year (nor extended six year) statute of limitations had run.  Id. at 203. 
597
 Id. at 204. 
598
 Id. 
599
 ROP CONST. amend. 9. 
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twelve years or longer.
600
  In calculating the relevant trigger, it is the 
alleged offense that must have occurred after December 31, 2009, not the 
allegation itself.  It is unclear to what degree the legislature could narrow 
this right ―as prescribed by law.‖ 
                                                 
600
 Id. 
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XIV. FREEDOM FROM INHUMANE PUNISHMENT AND EXCESSIVE FINES 
 
 Article IV, Section 10 prohibits ―[t]orture, cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment‖ as well as ―excessive fines.‖601  This 
section is not limited to government action—broadly read, it secures 
protection from cruel or degrading treatment from private individuals.
602
 
A. Firearm-Related Punishments 
 
 Article XIII, section 13(2) requires the legislature to impose a 
mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of fifteen years ―for 
violation of any law regarding importation, possession, use or manufacture 
of firearms.‖603  Interestingly, the legislature is not required to outlaw 
these practices—only to provide for the fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence in the event that they are outlawed.
604
 
 In Palau‘s post-Constitution, pre-independence days, the Appellate 
Division, over a strongly-worded dissent, effectively suspended Article 
XIII, Section 13(2)—specifically the fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence for possession of a firearm—for violation of the Trusteeship 
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands between the United 
States and the United Nations.
605
  In Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, the Court 
read the right to be free from ―cruel and unusual punishment‖ as secured 
by the United States Constitution into the Trusteeship Agreement under 
the mantle of the agreement‘s guarantee of ―human rights.‖606  Applying 
                                                 
601
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 10. 
602
 Appreciating that Article IV, Section 10 includes ―treatment‖ as well as 
―punishment,‖ the Appellate Division has stated that the government is prohibited from 
employing torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment regardless of the cause (be it 
as punishment or because of antipathy or indifference to a person or a group of people).  
See Eller v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 122, 130 (2003).  This reading of the provision is 
still overly constricting—by its terms, Article IV, Section 10 prohibits torture, cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment (or punishment) by anyone, not just by the government.  
Article IV secures ―Fundamental Rights,‖ not just fundamental rights vis a vis the 
government.  The Constitution need not be construed to only limit governmental action—
it may proscribe private action as well. 
603
 ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 13(2). 
604
 Article XIII, Section 12 provides that ―[n]o persons except armed forces 
personnel lawfully in Palau and law enforcement officers acting in an official capacity 
shall have the right to possess firearms or ammunition unless authorized by legislation 
which is approved in a nationwide referendum by a majority of the votes cast on the 
issue.‖  But this constitutional section does not provide for punishment for 
noncompliance. 
605
 Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 1 ROP Intrm. 154 (1984). 
606
 See id. at 161-64. 
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United States case law, the Kazuo majority found that the fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum for firearm possession violated that right.
607
  Justice 
Gibson, in dissent, read the Trusteeship Agreement‘s provision that the 
administering authority should promote self-governance and recognize the 
―freely expressed wishes of the people‖ as giving power and effect to the 
Palau Constitution and its imposition of a fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum for possession of a firearm.
608
 
 In other pre-independence cases, the Court established that the 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum for use of a firearm did not violate the 
Trusteeship Agreement and therefore was permissible.  Again, the analysis 
was not under the Palau Constitution, but under the United States 
Constitution as imported by the Trusteeship Agreement.
609
  Indeed, the 
same defendant from Kazuo came before the Court again on separate 
firearm charges—this time for ―use‖ instead of ―possession‖—and argued 
that the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for ―use‖ of a firearm 
violated the Trusteeship Agreement as cruel and unusual punishment.
610
  
                                                 
607
 See id. at 164-72. 
608
 See id. at 177-80 (Gibson, J., dissenting).  In a concurring opinion in a later 
case, Justice Ngiraklsong voiced his disagreement with the majority‘s holding in Kazuo: 
I do not see a conflict between Article XIII, Section 13 (2) of the Palau 
Constitution with its enabling legislation and the Trusteeship 
Agreement.  The primary purpose of the Trusteeship Agreement is to 
provide ―self government‖ or ―i[n]dependence‖ to the inhabitants of the 
Trusteeship.  I see the Constitution as perhaps the best living expression 
of what the people of Palau want….  I accept and recognize, as I 
believe we must, the supremacy of the Palau Constitution. 
Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 275-76 (1991) (Ngiraklsong, J., 
concurring).  Had Justice Ngiraklsong been on the Kazuo panel along with Justice 
Gibson, the decision may have turned out far differently. 
609
 See Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 265 (1991) (―The 
findings of [] Kazuo v. ROP; Yano v. ROP, 1 ROP Intrm. 154 (App. Div. Nov. 1984), 
which are specifically limited to the ‗grave and serious‘ crime of Possession of a Firearm, 
are not applicable to a case involving Use of a Firearm.‖); Republic of Palau v. Sakuma, 2 
ROP Intrm. 23, 40-41 (1990) (―[Use of a firearm to shoot at an occupied dwelling] is so 
fraught with peril to the safety of the Republic‘s citizens, and to the safety of the 
Republic of Pal[a]u itself, and the legislative intent is so clear, that the 15 year minimum 
sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, irrespective of whether the 
sentence is longer than the sentence for other more violent crimes in Palau, and 
irrespective of comparisons with foreign jurisdictions.‖); Republic of Palau v. Singeo, 1 
ROP Intrm. 551, 560 (1989) (in case where defendant was convicted of use of a firearm 
for discharging ammunition in a deserted area:  ―Here, appellant clearly used the pistol 
and, therefore, Kazuo/Yano simply does not apply.  Kazuo/Yano is therefore clearly and 
factually distinguisha[]ble from this case.  Accordingly, we affirm the Trial Court‘s 
sentence imposing 15 years impri[]sonment for use of a pistol.‖).  (The Kazuo opinion 
involved the consolidated appeal of Kazuo v. Republic of Palau and Yano v. Republic of 
Palau.  See Kazuo, 1 ROP Intrm. at 154.) 
610
 See Kazuo v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 343, 345 (1993) (―Kazuo II‖). 
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The Court summarily rejected the argument as previously decided, which, 
by that time, it was.
611
 
 Although still ―suspended‖ because of its ―conflict‖ with the 
Trusteeship Agreement, the fifteen-year mandatory minimum for 
possession of a firearm was found constitutional and, specifically, not in 
violation of the Article IV, Section 10 prohibition against cruel and 
inhumane punishment.
612
  The Court also upheld the five-year statutory 
maximum punishment for possession of ammunition against an Article IV, 
Section 10 challenge despite the ―disproportionality‖ of the punishment 
for possession of ammunition to the ―suspended‖ punishment for 
possession of a firearm.
613
  The Court stated that, except for instances of 
capital punishment, the proportionality approach is not favored and 
creation of the boundaries of punishment for separate crimes should 
generally be left to the legislature.
614
 
 Since Palau gained its independence in 1994 and the Trusteeship 
Agreement is no longer in effect, the fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence for firearm possession, use, importation, or manufacture 
mandated by Article XIII, Section 13(2) cannot be unconstitutional.
615
  
Any future challenges to this provision based on Article IV, Section 10 
must fail.
616
 
 Because the Constitution requires a punishment of fifteen years of 
imprisonment for firearms-related violations, suspension of such a 
sentence by the sentencing court is not constitutionally permissible.
617
  
                                                 
611
 Id. (―In [Sakuma] we held that the minimum sentence of fifteen years was not 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.‖).  In its double jeopardy analysis, the Kazuo II Court held that Ngiraboi 
was overruled to the extent it was inconsistent.  See id. at 348-49.  This aspect of the 
decisions is discussed at section XII.C, supra. 
612
 See Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. at 268 (―The Constitutional prohibition against 
cruel or inhuma[n]e treatment set forth in Article IV, Section 10 of Palau‘s Constitution 
cannot be used to subordinate or delete the equally weighty mandate contained in Article 
XIII, Section 13.‖). 
613
 See id. at 265-68. 
614
 See id. at 267 (―[Except in extraordinary cases], it would be inappropriate for 
this Court to second guess the Legislature as to whether a given sentence of 
imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime.‖). 
615
 The fifteen year mandatory minimum does not extend to convictions for 
attempted firearm possession.  See Ongalibang v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 219, 
220 (2000) (reviewing firearms mandatory minimum as a matter of statutory 
construction). 
616
 Indeed, such challenges have always failed.  But, pre-independence, the 
―cruel and unusual punishment‖ guarantee of the United States Constitution as imported 
through the Trusteeship Agreement provided an alternate—and stricter—basis for 
challenge. 
617
 See Ngemaes v. Republic of Palau, 4 ROP Intrm. 250, 252 (1994) (―We 
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Nor does a firearm sentence permit work release during the fifteen-year 
mandatory period of imprisonment.
618
  The structure of the work release 
system permits prisoners to work during the day, but requires them to 
return to and sleep in the jail each night.
619
  The Parole Reform Act of 
1992, however, categorizes work release as a type of ―parole‖ and a 
―release from imprisonment.‖620  Because any ―release from 
imprisonment‖ would offend the Article XIII, Section 13(2) mandatory 
minimum imprisonment requirement, the Court held that work release is 
not permissible within the mandatory minimum sentence period.
621
  
Oddly, the Court noted that it was declining to pass on the question of 
―whether the Parole Board may parole a convict before the conclusion of 
his 15 year term of imprisonment.‖622  It is not odd that the Court declined 
to rule on that question—as that question was not before it.  But it is odd 
that the Court specifically noted that it was declining to rule on that 
question, because its holding that any ―release from imprisonment‖ is 
impermissible during the mandatory period of imprisonment all but made 
the answer to the question a foregone conclusion.  Under the current case 
law, no parole or release from imprisonment is permissible before the 
conclusion of the mandatory minimum sentencing period. 
 
B. Controlled Substance-Related Punishments 
 
 A defendant, sentenced to twenty-five years for importing 
methamphetamine, challenged the twenty-five year mandatory minimum 
sentence for that crime in Eller v. Republic of Palau.
623
  The Court 
deferred strongly to the legislative will: 
[A]bsent circumstances that compel the conclusion that a 
particular sentence is properly characterized as cruel, 
inhumane, or degrading, ―it would be inappropriate for the 
Court to second guess the Legislature as to whether a given 
                                                                                                                         
believe it plain that the framers of the Constitution intended by this [mandatory minimum 
imprisonment] language that the mandated punishment not be subject to suspension.‖).  
In Ngemaes, the Appellate Division stated that whether parole before the conclusion of 
fifteen years of imprisonment is constitutional is a ―separate question from whether a 
sentencing court may suspend a portion of the fifteen year term of imprisonment‖ and 
withheld judgment.  See id. at 254. 
618
 See Teriong v. Republic of Palau, 15 ROP 88 (2008). 
619
 See id. at 90. 
620
 See id. (quoting 18 PNC § 1202(b)). 
621
 See id. at 91. 
622
 Id. 
623
 Eller v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 122, 129 (2003). 
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sentence is excessive in relation to the crime.‖624 
In considering the severity of a sentence in relation to the offense, it is 
appropriate to consider the availability of parole.
625
  The Court reviewed 
the legislative history of the methamphetamine statutes, identified the 
legislative will to be tough on drugs, and held that the twenty-five year 
mandatory minimum sentence could not be called ―cruel, inhumane, or 
degrading‖ by any reasonable standard.626 
 In reaching this decision the Court did not independently measure 
the harshness of the punishment to the severity of the crime—it merely 
identified legislative history demonstrating that the legislature had made 
an affirmative choice to punish drug importation harshly.  Although some 
deference to the legislature is appropriate, the Court‘s analysis did not 
answer the constitutional question—whether the punishment was cruel, 
inhumane or degrading—but rather centered on a different question—
whether the legislature purposefully arrived at the mandatory minimum 
sentence.  Such deference to the legislature is not appropriate in 
constitutional matters. 
 The Court extended the Eller holding in Silmai v. Republic of 
Palau.
627
  Basing its decision on the reasoning of Eller regarding 
importing methamphetamine, the Silmai Court held that the twenty-five 
year mandatory minimum sentence for the crime of trafficking 
methamphetamine was constitutional.
628
 
C. Excessive Fines 
 
 In Gotina v. Republic of Palau
629
 the Appellate Division‘s first 
application of the excessive fines clause,
630
 the Court found otherwise 
non-excessive fines were not made excessive by the criminal defendants‘ 
                                                 
624
 Id. at 130 (quoting Republic of Palau v. Ngiraboi, 2 ROP Intrm. 257, 267 
(1991)). 
625
 See id. at 131 & n.9 (considering availability of parole after completion of 
one-third of sentence for a sentence for methamphetamine importation). 
626
 See id. at 131. 
627
 Silmai v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 139 (2003). 
628
 See id. at 141. 
629
 Gotina v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP 65 (1999). 
630
 In an earlier decision—decided on other grounds—the Appellate Division 
stated that forfeiture of a four-million dollar vessel for remaining in Palauan waters for 
two months beyond the expiration of its permit in violation of the statute prohibiting 
passage in Palauan waters without a permit ―would raise substantial issues as to possible 
violation of the constitutional prohibition against excessive fines.‖  Republic of Palau v. 
M/V Aesarea, 1 ROP Intrm. 429, 434 (1988).  But the M/V Aesarea decision contained 
only excessive fines dicta, not an actual application of the clause. 
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inability to pay the fines.  The four Gotina defendants were each convicted 
of two counts of unlawful fishing.
631
  Two defendants were fined $10,000 
per count and two were fined $25,000 per count.
632
 
 In construing the excessive fines clause, the Court found it 
appropriate to consider United States case law.
633
  The Court‘s review of 
the case law uncovered ―many cases that have declined to scrutinize 
inability to pay as an element of the constitutional excessiveness inquiry, 
and have held that indigence becomes relevant only as a defense to any 
attempt on the part of the government to enforce payment of the fine.‖634  
The Court therefore found that arguments regarding ability to pay ―fail to 
raise a cognizable challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause‖ and 
therefore upheld the constitutionality of the fines.
635
 
 Less than a month after Gotina, the Appellate Division revisited 
the same issue in Flaga v. Republic of Palau.
636
  The Flaga defendant, 
sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment and a $50,000 fine, appealed 
the fine on the basis of her inability to pay.
637
  The Court was unimpressed 
with her argument, holding that a defendant‘s ―ability to pay ha[s] no 
bearing on the constitutionality of the fine.‖638  The Court affirmed the 
imposition of the fine stating that a ―fine can only violate the Excessive 
Fines Clause if the fine[] bears no relationship to ‗the gravity of the 
offense that it is designed to punish.‘‖639 
 In measuring the size of a fine, the Court has found the $50,000 
mandatory minimum fine for trafficking in methamphetamine to be 
constitutionally un-excessive.
640
  In doing so, the Court measured the 
gravity of the offense against the magnitude of the fine.
641
  The Court 
found two considerations particularly relevant:  (1) courts should grant 
substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily 
possess in determining the types and limits of criminal punishments; and 
(2) any judicial determination regarding the gravity of a particular offense 
                                                 
631
 See Gotina, 8 ROP at 65. 
632
 See id. 
633
 See id. 
634
 Id. at 66. 
635
 Id. at 67. 
636
 Flaga v. Republic of Palau, 8 ROP Intrm. 79 (1999). 
637
 See id. at 79. 
638
 Id. at 80 (citing Gotina, 8 ROP Intrm. at 67). 
639
 Id. (quoting Gotina, 8 ROP at 66). 
640
 See Silmai v. Republic of Palau, 10 ROP 139, 141-42 (2003). 
641
 See id. at 142 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. 2028, 2036 
(1998) (―The amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the 
offense.‖)). 
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will be ―inherently imprecise.‖642  Deferring to the legislature‘s 
determination that methamphetamine trafficking is a ―grave offense‖ 
deserving of a punishment eliciting a ―strong deterrent effect,‖ the Court 
found that the $50,000 mandatory minimum fine ―bears a constitutionally 
adequate relationship to the gravity of the crime of trafficking 
methamphetamine.‖643 
 
                                                 
642
 See id. (citing Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2037). 
643
 Id. at 142. 
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XV.  ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
 
A. Victims’ Compensation 
 
 Although compensation of victims is included in the ―Fundamental 
Rights‖ article of the Constitution, victims are not ―fundamentally‖ 
guaranteed compensation.  A victim of a criminal offense ―may‖ be 
compensated by the government ―as prescribed by law or at the discretion 
of the court.‖644  This section, therefore, only states that the legislature or 
the court has the power to prescribe victim compensation by the 
government, a power that certainly the legislature (and perhaps the 
judiciary) held without this explicit grant of power. 
 
B. Freedom from Slavery and Protection of Children 
 
 Slavery or involuntary servitude—whether it be imposed by the 
government or by a private entity—is prohibited by Section 11 of Article 
IV.  The only exception to the slavery and involuntary servitude ban is as 
punishment for a crime.
645
  Section 11 also includes an open-ended 
directive that ―[t]he government shall protect children from 
exploitation.‖646  Although a worthy sentiment, the vagueness of this 
provision dooms it to carry little weight. 
 
C. Familial Rights 
 
 As amended by the Twenty-Second Amendment, Section 13 of 
Article IV contains three distinct ideas.
647
  First, the grant of a right:  the 
government is required to ―provide for marital and related parental rights, 
privileges and responsibilities on the basis of equality between men and 
women, mutual consent and cooperation.‖648  Second, a restriction of 
liberty:  marriages contracted in Palau must ―be between a man and a 
woman.‖649  Lastly, an imposition of liability:  parents (or those acting as 
                                                 
644
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 8. 
645
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 11. 
646
 Id. 
647
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 13 & amend. 22. 
648
 Id. 
649
 This second clause, restricting the nature of marriage, was added by the 
Twenty-Second Amendment in 2008. 
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parents) are ―legally responsible for the support and for the unlawful 
conduct of their minor children as prescribed by law.‖650  This last clause 
carries no weight on its own, but only provides for the enactment of 
effectuating statutes. 
D. Academic Freedom 
 
 The Sixteenth Amendment added Section 15 to Article IV, 
guaranteeing ―academic freedom‖ in ―post secondary education and any 
institution of higher learning.‖651  It is unclear what the promise of 
―academic freedom‖ provides, especially in post secondary education.  It 
is uncertain whether this section grants ―freedom‖ to students, teachers, 
administrators or, if to all, how these competing freedoms should be 
reconciled. 
 
E. Prohibition on Land Tax 
 
 Article XIII, Section 9 prohibits the imposition of tax on land.
652
  
But the taxation forbidden by this section is only a ―direct tax on the land 
itself.‖653  A tax on revenue derived from land is not barred by this 
section.
654
  And the profit-sharing arrangement whereby the national 
government collects twenty-five percent of the revenue realized by a state 
public lands authority from the administration of public lands does not 
qualify as a ―tax‖ on land.655 
 
                                                 
650
 ROP CONST. Art. IV, § 13 & amend. 22. 
651
 ROP CONST. amend. 16. 
652
 ROP CONST. Art. XIII, § 9. 
653
 Koror State Gov’t v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 314, 320 (1993). 
654
 See id. (addressing revenue generated from the operation of a quarry). 
655
 See id. at 318-19. 
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XVI. TRADITIONAL RIGHTS 
 
A. Prohibition from Diminishing Roles of Traditional Leaders 
 
 Section 1 of Article V provides that—other than through the 
Constitution—the government is not to infringe upon the role or function 
of traditional leaders.
656
  This section formed the basis of the challenge in 
House of Traditional Leaders v. Seventh Koror State Legislature.
657
  The 
HOTL traditional leaders argued that several amendments to the Koror 
State Constitution that diminished their roles in the legislative affairs of 
the state (as previously granted by the Koror State Constitution) violated 
their traditional rights under Article V.
658
  The post-amendment state 
constitution altered the traditional leaders‘ status from ―the supreme 
authority of the State of Koror‖ to ―more of a consultative role.‖659 
 Despite the Article V, section 1 language proscribing actions of the 
―government,‖ the Court found no relevance in the fact that the 
amendments to the Koror State Constitution were proposed via legislative 
resolution rather than voter petition or citizen initiative.
660
  This section 
applies regardless of the method of constitutional amendment.
661
 
The Court interpreted Article V, Section 1 restrictively: 
The amendments [to the Koror State Constitution] also do 
not prevent traditional leaders from being ―recognized, 
honored, or given a formal or functional role‖ in the Koror 
State Government.  As the trial court explained, ―[e]ven 
taking the language of Article V, Section 1, at face value, 
the Court does not believe it requires that traditional leaders 
be accorded any particular role in the government.‖  A plain 
reading of Article V indicates that this article merely 
intends to ensure that no impediments are placed in the way 
of traditional leaders holding a governmental position.  
Instead of preventing the traditional leaders from holding 
office, the amendments merely adjust the role played by 
HOTL in the current structure of the Koror State 
                                                 
656
 ROP CONST. Art. V, § 1. 
657
 House of Traditional Leaders v. Seventh Koror State Legislature, 14 ROP 52 
(2007) (―HOTL‖). 
658
 See id. at 53-54. 
659
 Id. 
660
 See id. at 54-55. 
661
 See id. at 55. 
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government.
662
 
The Court‘s ultimate inquiry boiled down to whether the amendments 
prevented traditional leaders from running for office in their individual 
capacities.
663
 
 The Court specifically rejected the argument that, once granted, 
powers of traditional leaders in state government can never be diminished 
or removed.
664
  According to the Court, the right of the people to choose 
the structure of their government includes the right to change it.
665
  
However (as argued by the traditional leaders) Article V, Section 1—
explicitly made applicable to the state government through Article XI, 
Section 1‘s guarantee that the structure and organization of state 
governments shall not be inconsistent with the national Constitution—
freezes the roles and functions of traditional leaders as recognized by 
custom and tradition.  Therefore, no constitutional issue would arise with a 
state granting a traditional leader a non-traditional power and then 
subsequently taking it away.  But, under the terms of the Constitution, a 
state should not be able to take away power of a traditional leader, 
regardless of whether the process by which the power is removed 
comports with the state constitution. 
 A similar conflict played out in Gibbons v. Koror State 
Government.
666
  In Gibbons, Koror State passed a law vesting the power to 
select all seven members of the Koror State Public Lands Authority Board 
of Trustees (the ―Board‖) in the hands of the Governor.667  One seat on the 
Board had previously been reserved for the High Chief Ibedul, who had 
the authority to select three additional board members.
668
  The appellants, 
including the Ibedul, argued that the statute unconstitutionally stripped the 
Ibedul of his customary role in deciding and allocating use of public lands 
in Koror.
669
  The Appellate Division reviewed earlier case law stating that 
traditional leaders have no ―customary or traditional‖ function in state or 
national constitutional governments.
670
  The Court concluded that the 
                                                 
662
 Id. at 56. 
663
 See id. 
664
 See id. at 56-57. 
665
 See id. at 57. 
666
 Gibbons v. Koror State Gov’t, 13 ROP 156 (2006). 
667
 See id. at 157. 
668
 See id. 
669
 See id. at 158. 
670
 See id. at 159-60 (citing Becheserrak v. Koror State Gov’t, Civ. No. 166-86 
(Trial Div. May 16, 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 6 ROP Intrm. 74 (1997); Ngara-Irrai 
Traditional Council of Chiefs v. Airai State Gov’t, 6 ROP Intrm. 198 (1997)).  See section 
XVIII.B, infra, for a discussion of the Becheserrak appellate opinion and Ngara-Irrai 
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statute at issue was constitutional because ―traditional leadership had no 
customary and traditional role in selecting members of the KSPLA Board‖ 
and: 
[I]nsofar as Article V, Section 1 [and a similar provision of 
the Koror State Constitution] protects the roles and 
functions of traditional leaders as recognized by custom 
and tradition, it does not protect their role with respect to 
the KSPLA Board, a part of the constitutional government 
of Koror, for, as the Trial Division noted, there was and is 
no customary role or function of traditional leaders in the 
constitutional government.
671
 
 This restrictive reading essentially eviscerates any protection 
provided to traditional leaders by Article V, Section 1 by permitting 
exclusion of traditional leaders from their traditional roles by merely 
statutorily assigning another to that role. In Gibbons, the state government 
assigned the role of allocating public lands (a role allegedly traditionally 
occupied by the Ibedul) to a statutorily-created Board and the Court held 
that the Ibedul need not be afforded a place on the Board because his place 
as a Board member was not a ―traditional‖ one.  A better result in Gibbons 
would have been to find that the power over state land had been 
constitutionally granted to the states (and therefore taken from the Ibedul) 
by Article I, Section 2 rather than relying on the statutorily-created Koror 
State Public Lands Authority. 
 
B. Conflict Between Statutory and Traditional Law 
 
 Section 2 of Article V states that statutes and traditional law are 
―equally authoritative.‖672  Section 2 goes on to provide that statutory law 
prevails over conflicting traditional law ―only to the extent it is not in 
conflict with the underlying principles of the traditional law.‖  Traditional 
law thus trumps statutory law when the statutory law is in conflict with the 
―underlying principles‖ of the traditional law.  It seems unlikely that 
                                                                                                                         
Traditional Council of Chiefs. 
671
 Gibbons, 13 ROP at 161.  In concurrence, Chief Justice Ngiraklsong found 
the majority‘s constitutional determinations unnecessary and stated that he found the 
statute constitutional because insufficient evidence was presented at trial to demonstrate 
the Ibedul‘s traditional powers over public lands.  See id. at 166 (Ngiraklsong, C.J., 
concurring). 
672
 ROP CONST. Art. V, § 2.  No mention is made of the Constitution‘s 
weightiness in relation to traditional law, but, based on the transitive property, the 
superiority of the Constitution to statutory law should mean that the Constitution is also 
superior to traditional law (given that statutory law and traditional law are ―equally 
authoritative‖). 
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contradictory laws would not also conflict with the ―underlying 
principles‖ of each other.  Therefore, despite its wording, Section 2 may 
imbue greater superiority to traditional laws than to statutory laws.  When 
no statute is on point, customary law applies.
673
 
 Chief Justice Ngiraklsong has explained the effect of Article V, 
Section 2 in the following way:  ―Perhaps an appropriate statutory rule to 
use here, given the equal status of both statutes and Palauan custom, is that 
a statute should be read in a way to avoid nullifying Palauan custom more 
than the statute prescribes.‖674  Although not precisely in concert with the 
constitutional language, the Chief Justice‘s formulation is certainly more 
straight-forward and leaves less uncertainty about the effectiveness of 
Palauan statutes. 
 In dicta and without decision, the Appellate Division has stated 
that ―[t]here may be an argument… that the statute of limitations should 
not be applied at all to actions involving some issues of custom and 
traditional law‖ based upon Article V, Section 2.675  The Court noted such 
an argument was supported in some degree by ―[t]he fact that certain 
Palauan customary processes take longer in their normal course to work 
themselves out within the parameters of traditional law than would be 
allowed by the statute of limitations.‖676 
 The Court has consistently denied application of Article V, Section 
2 to disposition of assets belonging to a person who died before the 
enactment of the Constitution.  Such analysis, first articulated by Justice 
Miller, is proper in light of Article XV, Section 3(b)‘s protection of ―rights, 
interests, obligations, judgments and liabilities arising under the existing 
law‖ before the Constitution took effect.677  The Appellate Division has 
subsequently adopted this approach.
678
 
                                                 
673
 See Marsil v. Telungalk ra Iterkerkill, 15 ROP 33, 36 (2008) (―Absent an 
applicable [] statute, customary law applies.‖). 
674
 Bandarii v. Ngerusebek Lineage, 11 ROP 83, 88C (2004) (Ngiraklsong, C.J., 
concurring). 
675
 Kumangai v. Isechal, 1 ROP Intrm. 587, 588 (1989). 
676
 Id.  Given that the Court was called upon in Kumangai only to rule whether 
the trial judge erred in raising the statute of limitations issue sua sponte, it was imprudent 
of the Court to offer such constitutional musings. 
677
 See Morei v. Ngetchuang Lineage, 5 ROP Intrm. 292, 293 (Trial Div. 1995) 
(Miller, J.) (―It is clear that as of 1973, statutory law did prevail over traditional law.‖). 
678
 See Nakamura v. Markub, 8 ROP Intrm. 39, 40 n.4 (1999) (finding that the 
intestacy statute could not violate the yet-to-be-enacted Article V, section 2:  ―We merely 
note that the Palau Constitution did not exist in 1962, at the time of Markub‘s death.  We 
apply the law in effect at the time of his death.‖); Ngirchokebai v. Reklai, 8 ROP Intrm. 
151, 152 n.2 (2000) (―[T]he application of [statutory law] to property disposed of [at an] 
eldecheduch before the adoption of the Constitution does not conflict with article V, § 2 
of the Constitution.‖). 
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C. Preservation and Promotion of Palauan Heritage 
 
 In 2008 the Twenty-First Amendment added Section 3 to Article V.  
This new section mandates that the ―national government shall take 
affirmative action to assist traditional leaders in the preservation, 
protection, and promotion of Palauan heritage, culture, languages, customs 
and tradition.‖679  While an admirable display of support for traditional 
leaders and culture, Section 3 bears little teeth as far as enforceability. 
 
                                                 
679
 ROP CONST. amend. 21. 
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XVII. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
 According to Article VI (as altered by the Twenty-Third 
Amendment), the national government is required to ―take positive steps‖ 
in the interest of the following: 
conservation of a beautiful, healthful, and resourceful 
natural environment; promotion of the national economy; 
protection of the safety and security of persons and 
property; promotion of health and social welfare of the 
citizens through the provision of free or subsidized health 
care; and provision of public education for citizens which 
shall be free from grades one (1) to twelve (12) and 
compulsory as prescribed by law.
 680
   
The first three ―responsibilities,‖ conservation of the environment, 
promotion of the economy, and security, are amorphous and provide little 
limitation on the actions of the national government.  Furthermore, it is 
unclear who bears responsibility for their provision—the legislature, the 
executive, or some combination of the two.
681
  The buck could assuredly 
be passed between governmental branches and amongst ministries in 
almost any challenge to non-provision of these responsibilities. 
 The latter two responsibilities—free or subsidized health care and 
free and compulsory public education for citizens—are more measurable 
and thus more enforceable.  However, questions still exist, such as what 
level of health care or quality of public education must be provided for the 
national government to meet its responsibilities.  Although included in 
Article IV (―Fundamental Rights‖) rather than Article VI 
(―Responsibilities of the National Government‖), the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment added a new section mandating that the national government 
―provide free preventive health care for every citizen as prescribed by 
law.‖682  As with its Article VI responsibility to provide free or subsidized 
health care, this free preventive health care provision also leaves questions 
to be answered regarding the quantum and quality of care that is required. 
 
                                                 
680
 The Twenty-Third amendment, enacted in 2008, clarified this provision by 
adding the ―from grades one (1) to twelve (12)‖ language. 
681
 Justice Gibson cited Article VI as evidence that the framers of the 
Constitution intended a ―strong central government.‖  See Nakatani v. Nishizino, 1 ROP 
Intrm. 289, 295 (Trial Div. 1985) (Gibson, J.).  Although Justice Gibson perhaps 
overstated the implication of Article VI to some degree, Article VI does inferentially 
grant the national government ―powers‖ to carry out its enumerated responsibilities. 
682
 ROP CONST. amend. 24. 
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XVIII. POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 
A. State Governance Overview 
 Palau comprises sixteen states.  Each state is granted exclusive 
ownership over the natural resources within its territories by Article I, 
Section 2.
683
  States may not secede from Palau and new states—
comprising territory ―historically or geographically part of Palau‖—may 
be admitted upon approval by the national legislature and not less than 
three-fourths of the states.
684
 
 Article XI addresses (some of) the powers and responsibilities of 
state governments.  Section 1 concerns the structure of state governments 
and contains the ―guarantee clause.‖685  Section 2 grants all undelegated 
powers to the national government, while Sections 3 and 4 delegate 
powers to the state governments (subject to national statutes). 
B. Guarantee Clause 
 The most litigated portion of Article XI, located in section 1, is the 
guarantee clause.  It ―guarantees‖ that the ―structure and organization of 
state governments shall follow democratic principles, traditions of Palau, 
and shall not be inconsistent‖ with the Constitution.686  As found in 
Teriong v. Government of State of Airai, the issue of whether a state 
constitution ―conforms‖ to Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution is a 
justiciable issue.
687
  Because the Airai State Constitution did not afford 
citizens the right to vote for key public officials—an ―essential democratic 
principle‖ as guaranteed by Article VII688—it violated the guarantee clause 
of Article XI, Section 1.
689
 
 Like a state constitution, the structure of a state government may 
be challenged under the guarantee clause.
690
  The Court revisited the 
                                                 
683
 See section II.A, supra. 
684
 ROP CONST. Art. XIII, §§ 4-5. 
685
 Or, as some prefer, the ―guaranty clause.‖ 
686
 ROP CONST. Art. XI, § 1. 
687
 Teriong v. Gov’t of State of Airai, 1 ROP Intrm. 664, 673-74 (1989). 
688
 See section III.C, supra. 
689
 See Teriong, 1 ROP Intrm. at 675-76 (―Without the right to vote, a state 
constitution does not conform with the minimum requirement of ‗democratic 
principles.‘‖); see also id. at 681 (―We further hold that Article VII and Section 1, Article 
XI of the Constitution require that key state officials be elected and that the electorate be 
given the opportunity periodically to determine whether to retain or replace those 
officials through elections.‖). 
690
 See Becheserrak v. Koror State, 3 ROP Intrm. 53, 56 (1991) (―We hold that 
the issue of whether the Koror State government complies with the Guarantee Clause of 
the Palau Constitution is a justiciable issue which does not bar judicial review.‖). 
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Teriong decision in Koror State Government v. Becheserrak.
691
  It clarified 
that the Teriong decision focused on a state constitution that did not 
provide for the election of any key government officials and stated that 
―[t]he Teriong court did not hold that a constitution that failed to provide 
for the election of every key government official would be in violation of 
Article XI, section 1.‖692  The Court reasoned that democratic 
governments regularly have unelected key public officials and that a 
requirement that all key public officials must be elected would create an 
overly broad reading of the guarantee clause.
693
 
 Justice Beattie, writing separately, voiced his view that the 
majority, in an attempt to avoid Teriong without overruling it, created a 
mischievous brand of jurisprudence by inserting a post facto ―some‖ into 
the holding of Teriong.
694
  In Justice Beattie‘s view, the proper course 
would be to admit that Teriong‘s requirement of election of all key public 
officials was too broad and overrule it.
695
  The concurring justice did not 
agree that any key state officials need be elected to comport with the 
constitutional guarantee—only that the state constitutions permit the 
electorate to alter the structure of their state government should the 
citizens tire of non-elected leadership.
696
 
 Just as a state government cannot constitutionally run with wholly 
unelected officials, it also cannot constitutionally run without any role for 
traditional leaders.
697
  It is, however, for the states to decide in what 
capacity the traditional leaders should serve.
698
 
 In the most recent addition to its guarantee clause jurisprudence, 
the Appellate Division upheld the Trial Division‘s order finding the 
amendment provision of the Ngatpang State Constitution unconstitutional 
in The Ngaimis v. Republic of Palau.
699
  The Ngatpang government was 
                                                 
691
 Koror State Gov’t v. Becheserrak, 6 ROP Intrm. 74 (1997). 
692
 Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
693
 See id. 
694
 See id. at 79-80 (Beattie, J., concurring). 
695
 See id. at 80 (Beattie, J., concurring). 
696
 See id. at 80-82 (Beattie, J., concurring).  For Chief Justice Ngiraklsong‘s 
overview of Teriong and Koror State Government v. Becheserrak, see Gibbons v. Seventh 
Koror State Legislature, 13 ROP 156, 164 n.1 (2006) (Ngiraklsong, C.J., concurring). 
697
 See Ngara-Irrai Traditional Council of Chiefs v. Airai State Gov’t, 6 ROP 
Intrm. 198, 202-04 (1997). 
698
 See id. at 204 (finding use of traditional leaders in purely advisory roles to be 
constitutional). 
699
 The Ngaimis v. Republic of Palau, 16 ROP 26 (2009).  The Trial Division‘s 
treatment of the Ngaimis—affirmed on appeal—can be found at Republic of Palau v. 
Ngatpang State, 13 ROP 292 (Trial Div. 2003) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.) and Republic of Palau 
v. Ngatpang State, 13 ROP 297 (Trial Div. 2006) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.). 
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configured so that all state legislative and executive power was held by the 
Ngaimis, an unelected traditional council of ten chiefs.
700
  The amendment 
provision of the Ngatpang Constitution required approval of eight 
members of the Ngaimis before any amendment would take effect.
701
  
When a constitutional convention sought to place amendments on the 
ballot that would potentially restructure the government to drastically 
reduce the power of the Ngaimis, the Ngaimis canceled the vote and 
removed the proposed amendments from the ballot.
702
 
 Finding that ―the Teriong and Beches[]er[r]ak decisions establish 
that the right to change one‘s constitution and government as one chooses 
is fundamental to achieving democratic principles,‖ the Appellate Division 
held that the Ngaimis-controlled constitutional amendment provision was 
unconstitutional under the Guarantee Clause of the national 
Constitution.
703
  The right for the populous to change the structure of 
government is the heart of the Guarantee Clause as interpreted in the 
Teriong-Becheserrak-Ngaimis trilogy of cases.  State governments need 
not be run by elected officials to comport with Article XI, Section 1‘s 
requirement to ―follow democratic principles.‖  The main requirement is 
that a majority of the population can choose to alter the organization of 
government (and, presumably, shift away from unelected leaders) if they 
so desire. 
C. Delegation of Powers to the States 
 Section 2 of Article XI reserves to the national government all 
powers not expressly delegated to the state governments.  The national 
government may, by statute, delegate powers to the state governments.  
But the lack of reservation of powers to the states does not mean that the 
states are akin to ―municipal corporations,‖ the actions of which are 
subject to judicial review because of lack of separation of powers 
concerns.
704
 
 In assessing whether a state has a certain power, ―[t]he limiting 
language of Article XI, Section 2 significantly narrows the relevant 
inquiry… to whether either the Palau Constitution or the national 
                                                 
700
 See The Ngaimis, 16 ROP at 27.  Ngatpang had one elected official, but that 
official‘s capacities were largely administrative and under the supervision of the 
(unelected) governor.  See id. at 27. 
701
 See id. 
702
 See id. 
703
 Id. at 30.  The Court attempted to explain the relationship between its 
previous Teriong and Koror State Government v. Becheserrak decisions, avoiding any 
mention of ―overruling‖:  ―[t]he Teriong holding was followed and clarified in Koror 
State Government v. Becheserrak . . . ‖  Id. at 28. 
704
 See Tudong v. Sixth Kelulul A Ngardmau, 13 ROP 111, 113 n.2 (2006). 
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government has expressly delegated to the states the power.‖705  
Delegation by the national government has been found to grant states the 
power to prosecute their own criminal laws
706
 and to enact and enforce 
zoning laws.
707
  State legislatures also possess the constitutional power to 
tax.
708
  The national government, however, may limit a state‘s taxing 
power by legislation.
709
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
705
 State of Koror v. Blanco, 4 ROP Intrm. 208, 209 (1994) (finding that states 
have the power to prosecute their own criminal laws through a legislative delegation by 
the national government). 
706
 See id. at 211-12. 
707
 See Koror State Planning Comm’n v. Haruo, 8 ROP Intrm. 361, 361 (Trial 
Div. 2001) (Ngiraklsong, C.J.). 
708
 ROP CONST. Art. XI, § 3. 
709
 See id.; see also Koror State Gov’t v. Republic of Palau, 3 ROP Intrm. 127, 
128 (1992) (upholding statute prohibiting states ―from enacting any taxes or fees on 
persons, goods, services, sales, income, activities, objects, or other matters already taxed 
or charged by the national government‖ on the grounds that ―[t]he language of Article XI, 
Section 3 is a clear pronouncement that the Olbiil Era Kelulau (‗OEK‘) has authority to 
regulate state taxation.‖). 
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APPENDIX: SELECTED TEXT OF THE PALAU CONSTITUTION
710
 
 
Article I (Territory), as amended by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment 
Section 1 
(a) The Republic of Palau shall have jurisdiction and 
sovereignty over its territory which shall consist of all the 
islands, atolls, reefs, and shoals that have traditionally been 
in the Palauan archipelago, including Ngeruangel Reef and 
Kayangel Island in the north and Hatohobei Island (Tobi 
Island) and Hocharihie (Helen‘s Reef) in the south and all 
land areas adjacent and in between, and also consist of the 
internal waters and archipelagic waters within these land 
areas the territorial waters around these land areas and the 
airspace above these land and water areas extending to a 
two hundred (200) nautical miles exclusive economic zone, 
unless otherwise delimited by bilateral agreements or as 
may be limited or extended under international law. 
(b) The archipelagic baselines, from which the breadths of 
maritime zones are measured for the Palau Archipelago 
shall be drawn from the northernmost point of Ngeruangel 
Reef, thence east to the northernmost of Kayangel Island 
and around the island to its easternmost point, south to the 
easternmost point of the Babeldaob barrier reef, south to 
the easternmost point of Angaur Island and then around the 
island to its westernmost point, thence north to the reef to 
the point of origin.  The normal baselines, from which the 
breadths of maritime zones for the Southwest Islands are 
measured, shall be drawn around the islands of Fanna, 
Sonsorol (Dongosaro), Pulo Anna and Merir, and the Island 
of Hatohobei (Tobi Island), including Hocharihie (Helen‘s 
Reef). 
Section 2 
(a) The Republic of Palau shall have exclusive ownership 
and shall exercise its sovereign rights to conserve, develop, 
exploit, explore, and manage at a sustainable manner, all 
living and non-living resources within its exclusive 
economic zone and its continental shelf in accordance with 
                                                 
710
 Selected text reproduced by and on file with the author.  For an official 
version, consult the Singichi Ikesakes Law Library in Koror, Palau.  An unamended 
English version may be found on the website of the Senate of the Republic of Palau at 
www.palauoek.net/senate/legislation/PalauConstitutionEnglish.pdf. 
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applicable treaties, international law and practices.  The 
Republic of Palau shall have exclusive ownership and 
sovereign jurisdiction over all mineral resources in the 
seabed, subsoil, water column, and insular shelves within 
its continental shelf. 
(b) Each state shall have exclusive ownership of all living 
and non-living resources, except highly migratory fish, 
within the twelve (12) nautical mile territorial sea, 
provided, however, that traditional fishing rights and 
practices shall not be impaired. 
Section 3 
The national government shall have the power to add 
territory and to extend jurisdiction. 
Section 4 
Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted to violate the 
right of innocent passage and the internationally recognized 
freedom of the high seas. 
 
Article II (Sovereignty and Supremacy) 
Section 1 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
Section 2 
Any law, act of government, or agreement to which a 
government of Palau is a party, shall not conflict with this 
Constitution and shall be invalid to the extent of such 
conflict. 
Section 3 
Major governmental powers including but not limited to 
defense, security, or foreign affairs may be delegated by 
treaty, compact, or other agreement between the sovereign 
Republic of Palau and another sovereign nation or 
international organization, provided such treaty, compact or 
agreement shall be approved by not less than two-thirds 
(2/3) of the members of each house of the Olbiil Era 
Kelulau and by a majority of the votes cast in a nationwide 
referendum conducted for such purpose, provided, that any 
such agreement which authorizes use, testing, storage or 
disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological 
weapons intended for use in warfare shall require approval 
of not less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in such 
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referendum. 
 
Article III (Citizenship) 
Section 1 
A person who is a citizen of the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands immediately prior to the effective date of 
this Constitution and who has at least one parent of 
recognized Palauan ancestry is a citizen of Palau. 
Section 2, repealed by the Seventeenth Amendment 
[A person born of parents, one or both of whom are citizens 
of Palau is a citizen of Palau by birth, and shall remain a 
citizen of Palau so long as the person is not or does not 
become a citizen of any other nation.] 
Section 3, repealed by the Seventeenth Amendment 
[A citizen of Palau who is a citizen of another nation shall, 
within three (3) years after his eighteenth (18) birthday, or 
within three (3) years after the effective date of this 
Constitution, whichever is later, renounce his citizenship of 
the other nation and register his intent to remain a citizen of 
Palau. If he fails to comply with this requirement, he shall 
be deprived of Palauan citizenship.] 
Section 4, as amended by the Seventeenth Amendment 
A person born of parents, one or both of whom are citizens 
of Palau or are of recognized Palauan ancestry, is a citizen 
of Palau.  Citizenship of other foreign nations shall not 
affect a person‘s Palauan citizenship. 
Section 5 
The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall adopt uniform laws for 
admission and exclusion of noncitizens of Palau. 
 
Article IV (Fundamental Rights) 
Section 1 
The government shall take no action to deny or impair the 
freedom of conscience or of philosophical or religious 
belief of any person nor take any action to compel, prohibit 
or hinder the exercise of religion.  The government shall 
not recognize or establish a national religion, but may 
provide assistance to private or parochial schools on a fair 
2011] Bennardo  115  
and equitable basis for nonreligious purposes. 
Section 2 
The government shall take no action to deny or impair the 
freedom of expression or press.  No bona fide reporter may 
be required by the government to divulge or be jailed for 
refusal to divulge information obtained in the course of a 
professional investigation. 
Section 3 
The government shall take no action to deny or impair the 
right of any person to peacefully assemble and petition the 
government for redress of grievances or to associate with 
others for any lawful purpose including the right to 
organize and to bargain collectively. 
Section 4 
Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house, 
papers and effects against entry, search and seizure. 
Section 5 
Every person shall be equal under the law and shall be 
entitled to equal protection.  The government shall take no 
action to discriminate against any person on the basis of 
sex, race, place of origin, language, religion or belief, social 
status or clan affiliation except for the preferential 
treatment of citizens, for the protection of minors, elderly, 
indigent, physically or mentally handicapped, and other 
similar groups, and in matters concerning intestate 
succession and domestic relations.  No person shall be 
treated unfairly in legislative or executive investigations. 
Section 6 
The government shall take no action to deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor 
shall private property be taken except for a recognized 
public use and for just compensation in money or in kind.  
No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which 
was not a legally recognized crime at the time of its 
commission, nor shall the penalty for an act be increased 
after the act was committed.  No person shall be placed in 
double jeopardy for the same offense.  No person shall be 
found guilty of a crime or punished by legislation.  
Contracts to which a citizen is a party shall not be impaired 
by legislation.  No person shall be imprisoned for debt.  A 
warrant for search and seizure may not issue except from a 
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justice or judge on probable cause supported by an affidavit 
particularly describing the place, persons, or things to be 
searched, arrested, or seized. 
Section 7 
A person accused of a criminal offense shall be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and 
shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature of the 
accusation and to a speedy, public and impartial trial.  He 
shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses 
and shall have the right of compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses and evidence on his behalf at public 
expense.  He shall not be compelled to testify against 
himself.  At all times the accused shall have the right to 
counsel.  If the accused is unable to afford counsel, he shall 
be assigned counsel by the government.  Accused persons 
lawfully detained shall be separated from convicted 
criminals and on the basis of sex and age.  Bail may not be 
unreasonably excessive nor denied those accused and 
detained before trial.  The writ of habeas corpus is hereby 
recognized and may not be suspended.  The national 
government may be held liable in a civil action for 
unlawful arrest or damage to private property as prescribed 
by law.  Coerced or forced confessions shall not be 
admitted into evidence nor may a person be convicted or 
punished solely on the basis of a confession without 
corroborating evidence. 
Section 8 
A victim of a criminal offense may be compensated by the 
government as prescribed by law or at the discretion of the 
court. 
Section 9 
A citizen of Palau may enter and leave Palau and may 
migrate within Palau. 
Section 10 
Torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or 
punishment, and excessive fines are prohibited. 
Section 11 
Slavery or involuntary servitude is prohibited except to 
punish crime.  The government shall protect children from 
exploitation. 
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Section 12 
A citizen has the right to examine any government 
document and to observe the official deliberations of any 
agency of government. 
Section 13, as amended by the Twenty-Second Amendment 
The government shall provide for marital and related 
parental rights, privileges and responsibilities on the basis 
or equality between men and women, mutual consent and 
cooperation.  All marriages contracted within the Republic 
of Palau shall be between a man and a woman.  Parents or 
individuals acting in the capacity of parents shall be legally 
responsible for the support and for the unlawful conduct of 
their minor children as prescribed by law. 
Section 14, as added by the Ninth Amendment 
The Olbiil Era Kelulau may provide for a trial by jury in 
criminal and civil cases, as prescribed by law; provided, 
however, that where a criminal offense is alleged to have 
been committed after December 31, 2009, and where such 
criminal offense is punishable by a sentence of 
imprisonment of twelve (12) years or more, the accused 
shall have the right to a trial by jury, as prescribed by law. 
Section 15, as added by the Sixteenth Amendment 
In post secondary education and any institution of higher 
learning, academic freedom is guaranteed. 
Section 16, as added by the Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
The national government shall provide free preventive 
health care for every citizen as prescribed by law. 
 
Article V (Traditional Rights) 
Section 1 
The government shall take no action to prohibit or revoke 
the role or function of a traditional leader as recognized by 
custom and tradition which is not inconsistent with this 
Constitution, nor shall it prevent a traditional leader from 
being recognized, honored, or given formal or functional 
roles at any level of government. 
Section 2 
Statutes and traditional law shall be equally authoritative.  
In case of conflict between a statute and a traditional law, 
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the statute shall prevail only to the extent it is not in 
conflict with the underlying principles of the traditional 
law. 
Section 3, as added by the Twenty-First Amendment 
The national government shall take affirmative action to 
assist traditional leaders in the preservation, protection, and 
promotion of Palauan heritage, culture, languages, customs 
and tradition. 
 
Article VI (Responsibilities of the National Government), as amended by 
the Twenty-Third Amendment 
The national government shall take positive action to attain 
these national objectives and implement these national 
policies:  conservation of a beautiful, healthful and 
resourceful natural environment; promotion of the national 
economy; protection of the safety and security of persons 
and property; promotion of the health and social welfare of 
the citizens through the provision of free or subsidized 
health care; and provision of public education for citizens 
which shall be free from grades one (1) to twelve (12) and 
compulsory as prescribed by law. 
 
Article VII (Suffrage), as amended by the Eighteenth Amendment 
A citizen of Palau eighteen (18) years of age or older may 
vote in national and state elections.  The Olbiil Era Kelulau 
shall prescribe a minimum period of residence and provide 
for voter registration for national elections.  Each state shall 
prescribe a minimum period of residence and provide for 
voter registration for state elections.  A citizen who is in 
prison, serving a sentence for a felony, or mentally 
incompetent as determined by a court may not vote.  Voting 
shall be by secret ballot.  Voting shall only be by absentee 
ballot for voters who are outside the territory of Palau 
during an election. 
 
Article IX (Olbiil Era Kelulau) 
* * * 
Section 5 
The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall have the following powers: 
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* * * 
12) to regulate the ownership, exploration and exploitation 
of natural resources; 
 
Article XI (State Governments) 
Section 1 
The structure and organization of state governments shall 
follow democratic principles, traditions of Palau, and shall 
not be inconsistent with this Constitution.  The national 
government shall assist in the organization of state 
government. 
Section 2 
All governmental powers not expressly delegated by this 
Constitution to the states nor denied to the national 
government are powers of the national government.  The 
national government may delegate powers by law to the 
state governments. 
Section 3 
Subject to laws enacted by the Olbiil Era Kelulau, state 
legislatures shall have the power to impose taxes which 
shall be uniformly applied throughout the state. 
Section 4 
Subject to the approval of the Olbiil Era Kelulau, the state 
legislatures shall have the power to borrow money to 
finance public programs or to settle public debt. 
 
Article XIII (General Provisions) 
Section 1 
The Palauan traditional languages shall be the national 
languages.  Palauan and English shall be the official 
languages.  The Olbiil Era Kelulau shall determine the 
appropriate use of each language. 
Section 2, as amended by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
The Palauan and English versions of this Constitution shall 
be equally authoritative; in case of conflict the Palauan 
version shall prevail. 
* * * 
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Section 4 
No state may secede from Palau. 
Section 5 
An area which was historically or geographically part of 
Palau may be admitted as a new state upon the approval of 
the Olbiil Era Kelulau and not less than three-fourths (3/4) 
of the states. 
Section 6 
Harmful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or 
biological weapons intended for use in warfare, nuclear 
power plants, and waste materials therefrom, shall not be 
used, tested, stored, or disposed of within the territorial 
jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of not 
less than three-fourths (3/4) of the votes cast in a 
referendum submitted on this specific question. 
Section 7 
The national government shall have the power to take 
property for public use upon payment of just compensation.  
The state government shall have the power to take private 
property for public use upon payment of just compensation.  
No property shall be taken by the national government 
without prior consultation with the government of the state 
in which the property is located.  This power shall not be 
used for the benefit of a foreign entity.  This power shall be 
used sparingly and only as a final resort after all means of 
good faith negotiation with the land owner have been 
exhausted. 
Section 8, as amended by the Nineteenth and Twentieth Amendments 
Only citizens of Palau and corporations wholly owned by 
citizens of Palau may acquire title to land or waters in 
Palau.  Foreign countries, with which Palau establishes 
diplomatic relations, may acquire title to land for 
diplomatic purposes pursuant to bilateral treaties or 
agreements.  While non-citizens may not acquire title to 
land, Palauan citizens may lease land in Palau to non- 
citizens or corporations not wholly owned by citizens for 
up to 99 Years. 
Section 9 
No tax shall be imposed on land. 
* * * 
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Section 11 
The provisional capital shall be located in Koror; provided, 
that not later than ten (10) years after the effective date of 
this Constitution, the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall designate a 
place in Babeldaob to be the permanent capital. 
Section 12 
The national government shall have exclusive power to 
regulate importation of firearms and ammunition.  No 
persons except armed forces personnel lawfully in Palau 
and law enforcement officers acting in an official capacity 
shall have the right to possess firearms or ammunition 
unless authorized by legislation which is approved in a 
nationwide referendum by a majority of the votes cast on 
the issue. 
Section 13 
Subject to Section 12, the Olbiil Era Kelulau shall enact 
laws within one hundred and eighty (180) days after the 
effective date of this Constitution: 
1) providing for the purchase, confiscation 
and disposal of all firearms in Palau; 
2) establishing a mandatory minimum 
imprisonment of fifteen (15) years for 
violation of any law regarding importation, 
possession, use or manufacture of firearms. 
 
First Amendment 
Section 14 
(a) To avoid inconsistencies found prior to this amendment 
by the Supreme Court of Palau to exist between section 324 
of the Compact of Free Association and its subsidiary 
agreements with the United States of America and other 
sections of the Constitution of the Republic of Palau, 
Article XIII, section 6 of the Constitution and the final 
phrase of Article II, section 3, reading ―provided, that any 
such agreement which authorizes use, testing, storage or 
disposal of nuclear, toxic chemical, gas or biological 
weapons intended for use in warfare shall require approval 
of not less than three fourth (3/4) of the votes cast in such 
referendum,‖ shall not apply to votes to approve the 
Compact of Free Association and its subsidiary agreements 
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(as previously agreed to and signed by the parties or as they 
may hereafter be amended, so long as such amendments are 
not themselves inconsistent with the Constitution) or during 
the terms of such compact and agreements.  However, 
Article XIII, section 6 and the final phrase of Article II, 
section 3 of the Constitution shall continue to apply and 
remain in full force and effect for all other purposes, and 
this amendment shall remain in effect only as long as such 
inconsistencies continue. 
(b) This amendment shall enter into force and effect 
immediately upon its adoption. 
 
Second Amendment 
A person born of parents, one or both of whom are of 
recognized Palauan ancestry, is a citizen of Palau by birth.  
United States citizenship shall not affect a person‘s Palauan 
citizenship, nor shall a person of recognized Palauan 
ancestry be required to renounce United States citizenship 
to become a naturalized citizen of Palau.  Persons of 
recognized Palauan ancestry who are citizens of other 
foreign nations may retain their Palauan citizenship or 
become naturalized Palauan citizens as provided by law.  
Palauan citizens may renounce their Palauan citizenship.  
Renouncements made prior to the effective date of this 
amendment are not affected by this amendment. 
 
 
 
 
